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A3STRACT
This is a study of* a political society called 
the Committee of Union and Progress (Ittihad ve Terakki 
Cemiyeti) between the years 1908 and 1913- Because of 
the role it played in the insurrection which forced the 
Sultan to re-establish the 1876 Constitution, the 
Committee emerged as the dominant political group in 
July 1908. But the Committee’s position did not remain 
unchallenged for long. Political forces which had 
previously been obscured by the struggle against the 
Palace came to the surface, and there began a period 
of political activity and debate unequalled in the 
history of modern Turkey.
I have endeavoured to show that the CUP, while 
being the dominant political group, never had a monopoly 
of power during this period. Political and social 
conditions prevailing within (and without) the Ottoman » 
Empire forced it to share power with the traditional 
ruling groups, such as the bureaucratic elite symbolised 
by the Sublime Porte (BabiSli) and the army. The 
Committee also compromised with other political organ- * 
isations. X have also tried to show how the social 
and political attributes of the CUP were constantly
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changing, so that by 1913 the Committee had narrowed 
down its affiliations and was in a position to establish 
the so-called triumvirate of Enver, Cemal and Talat,
The thesis has been divided for the sake of 
convenience and symmetry into five chapters, each 
chapter ending with an event of major importance.
Chapter 1 deals with the rebellion and ends with the 
restoration of the constitution. Chapter II ends with 
the counter-revolution of 1909; Chapter III with the 
resignation of Grand Vezir Hilmi Pa^a in December, 1909; 
it also examines the constitutional amendments.
Chapter IV ends with Italy*s declaration of war in 
September 1911, and Chapter V with the coup d*&tat of 
23 January, 1913* I have concluded this study with 
some general observations on the period of the 
Committee of Union and Progress as a whole.
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PREFACE
Throughout this thesis I have used the official 
modern Turkish orthography in transcribing Turkish 
names, except when quoting from foreign sources. Some 
notes on pronunciation based on G.L.Lewis, Teach 
Yourself Turkish, 3rd ed.,(1959)» are given as an aid 
to readers unacquainted with the Turkish language, 
c - j as in jam
9 - ch as in church
g - soft g lengthens the preceding vowel
1 - something like u in radium
o - French eu as in deux or seul
§ - sh as in shall
u - French u as in lumiere.
X have also used modern Turkish place names; 
thus Istanbul and not Constantinople, Edirne and not 
Adrianople, again except when quoting. The term 
'Ottoman1 has been usually confined to official usage; 
e.g. 'Ottoman Government', 'Ottoman army'.
In the Ottoman Empire at this time four different 
calendars were in use. There was the Hijri,
the Turkish Solar Hijri, the Julian and the 
Gregorian. I have standardised all dates using the 
Gregorian calendar.
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CHAPTER I
THE ANTECEDENTS OF THE 1908 REVOLUTION
Early in February 1908 a student at the Salonika 
Law School wrote to a relative in Manastir that he had 
been asked by his Triends at the School to join a 
secret society* The membership of this society would 
involve the swearing of a sacred oath and the accept­
ance of prohibited literature. The relative, a minor 
judicial functionary, submitted the letter to the 
authorities nrho investigated the matter. , Their. inquiry . 
led to the arrest of some ten law students and about 
the same number of junior officers from the Third Army 
Corps stationed at Salonika. They were carefully 
interrogated and a long and thorough investigation 
followed. After some weeks most of the detainees 
were released, though Nazim Bey, chief of the military 
police in Salonika and the officer who conducted the 
inquiry, detained one or two of the junior officers.^
1. Annual Report, 1908, enclosure in Sir Gerard Lowther to 
Sir Edward Grey, no.105 con.,Pera, 17 Feb.,1909»
F .0.371/768/7053• Because of its secret nature 
this incident does not seem to have found a place 
in any Turkish source. Yet it may explain why there 
was an attempt to assassinate Nazim Bey soon after.
See belowf 10-11.
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The failure of the authorities to unearth the 
secret society is proof of the stringent precautions 
taken by the Committee of Union and Progress in the 
initiation of its new members* It also reveals the 
power the Committee had acquired among some of the 
higher officials in Macedonia, many of whom are said 
to have co-operated to quash Nazim Bey's inquiry. It 
is no coincidence that Manyasizade Refik, an active 
and influential Unionist and Minister of Justice in 
Kamil Papa's Cabinet, was one of the principle lect­
urers at the,Law School, while Azmi Bey, the Cireetoir 
of the School, and Haci Adil Bey, a lecturer and 
director at the Customs House, were both members of
the CUP. The lenient treatment of the law students
2may be attributed to the influence of these men.
In May 1908 the Committee of Union and Progress 
considered coming out into the open and taking charge 
of the situation in Macedonia, They held a meeting in 
Salonika and decided that they should reveal to the 
Powers the existence and influence of their society.
The Powers should be told that the Committee alone 
could bring peace to Macedonia and therefore Europe
2. Ibid.
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should abandon its futile schemes of reform. The
Unionists drew up a manifesto and sent it to the
3
consuls of the Powers. There was no response from 
the Powers; they could hardly acknowledge the mani­
festo of an illegal secret organisation whose strength 
they did not know. But it seems that the Committee 
had decided on positive action, so that when the in­
surrection broke out in July the Committee was in a 
position to direct it.
The immediate and short-term motive for the 
revolutionary outbreaks of June-July 1908 seems to 
have been self-preservation. The Committee, alarmed at 
the success of Abdulhamid's espionage network, decided 
to take swift and drastic measures against agents of 
the Palace in Macedonia. Failure to silence them could 
mean the destruction of the entire secret organisation. 
Colonel Nazim, who had conducted the February inquiry 
and made his report to the Palace, was the first agent
3* Consul-General Lamb to Grey, T. P . , Salonica, 23 July,1908, 
F . 0.371/544/25634 ; Ali Cevat, ikinci Megrutiyetin Ilani 
ve Otuzbir Mart Hadisesi,(1960), 158» and E,F.Knight,
The Awakening of Turkey,(1909), 130.
4. Accounts written after the event state that the Committee 
had decided to stage a coup. See Knight, ibid.,133» 
Annual Report, 1908; C.R.Buxton, Turkey in Revolution, 
(1909), 53-4; Sir Edwin Pears, Forty Years in Constan­
tinople. (1916), 287.
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on the list for assassination. On 11 June, the day-
before he left for Istanbul, Nazim Bey was shot and
5
wounded and next day left for the capital.
The attempt on Nazim Beyfs life coincided with 
the meeting of Edward VII and Nicholas II at Reval.
They discussed Anglo-Russian relations and agreed on 
a joint initiative to introduce far-reaching reform 
in order to end the anarchy prevailing in Macedonia.
But no reform scheme was drawn up.^ In the Ottoman 
Empire this meeting was misinterpreted as the prelude 
to Anglo-Russian collaboration and intervention in 
Macedonia. There was alarm and apprehension and Niyazi 
Bey, who initiated the insurrection in July, is reported
7
to have had three sleepless nights after the Reval meeting.
5 o Halil Mente§e, Eski Meclisi Mebusan Reisi Halil Mente^enin 
Hatiralan, Cumhuriyet. 17 Oct.,19^6; Ismail Hami Dani^mend, 
izahli Osmanli Tarihi Kronolojisi, IV, 2 ed.(1961),361;
A. Sarron, La Jeune Turquie el La Revolution,(1912),16-17;
E.E.Rarasaur, The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution 
of 1908, (1957), 132-3.
6 . C.P.Gooch and H.W.V.Temperley (edd), British Documents on 
the Origins of the War. 1898-1914, V,(l92fl),232-46.
Russian account of the Reval meeting in M.Isvolski to 
Count Benckendorff, ibid., 2^5-6. See also A.W.Ward and 
C.P.Gooch (edd) The Cambridge History of British Foreign 
Policy. 1783-1919. iii7(1923), 399-401.
7 o Knight, 153; Ward and Gooch, ibid., 400; WI, vi,(l96l), 
265-6 ; Dani^mend, iv, 360.
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Reval then, provided a further reason for changing the 
government and introducing reform before the Powers 
did so. It gave a greater sense of urgency to the 
constitutionalists already stirred by the Sultan*s 
repressive measures.
In Europe the Reval meeting was seen as the event 
which triggered off the revolution. This was because 
few people in Europe, indeed in Macedonia itself, were 
aware of the secret societies at work in the Empire.
They noticed that the revolutionary outbursts coincided 
with the Reval meeting and concluded that the former
Q
was directly related to the latter. But this was not
the whole story though it has almost acquired the status
of an ‘historical fact*. M.Steeg, French delegate on
the Macedonian Financial Commission and someone who
knew the situation wrote:
"Je suis persuade, cependant, que la question 
des reformes n ’etait que secondaire, et que le 
mouvement visait essentiellement le regime 
hamidien, c 'est-a-dire 1 *absolutisme et la 
corruption du Palais. La question des reformes
8 . Ibid., See also Goschen to Grey, no.94 con., Vienna,
22 July, 1908, F .0.371/544/26021, especially enclosures 
from the Austrian and German press. Annual Report, 
1908, 2-3 >n'i-
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macedoniennes n'est certainement pas au 
premier des preoccupation des membres du 
comite.M 9
In the same way Europe thought that the constitutional
movement was directed from Europe by Ottoman exiles
with whom they were familiar. But nothing could have
been further from the truth.^ It is impossible to
deny the psychological significance of Reval on the
reformers. But the origins of the insurrection must
be sought elsewhere.
Nazim Bey, who was shot in Salonika on 11 June,
returned to Istanbul and submitted his findings to the
Palace. After hearing Nazim's report the Sultan ordered
another commission of inquiry to be sent to Salonika,
ostensibly to inspect the arsenals of the Third Army,
11in reality to unearth the secret societies. Upon
9* M.Steeg to M,George Louis, Uskub, 30 July, 1908. Ministere 
des Affaires Etrangeres, Documents Diplomatiques Francais 
1871-1914, (1950-56), 2e Serie, xi, no.4l9, 719-22 
(hereafter cited as D .D .F .). See also General di Robilant's 
- the Italian commander of the gendarmerie - report on 
the internal situation and the CUP. Enclosure no.3 In 
Barclay to Grey, no.392 con., Therapia, 16 July,1908,
F .0.371/544/25303• See also Ramsaur, 134.
10. Ali Haydar Midhat, H a ttralanm, (1946), 189.
Ramsaur, 129-30.
11. Ahmed Bedevi Kuran, Osmanli Imparatorlugunda Inkilap 
Hareketleri ve Milli Mticadele, (1959)« 466; Ramsaur, 134; 
Cevat, 156; Annual Report, 1908,n . 1.
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the arrival of Mahir P a p ' s  commission in Salonika
events began to move with increased momentum. Ssat
P a p ,  Commander-in-Chief of the Third Army, and Ali
Riza Pa$a, his Chief of Staff were recalled to Istanbul.
They were held primarily responsible for the disaffection
in the Third Army, and the Palace calculated that if they
were replaced by new officers loyal to the Sultan,
who would impose stricter discipline, the movement in
12 9the army would collapse. Ibrahim Pa$a who had been
a reactionary earlier replaced Esat Pa$a. But now as
commander of the Third Army he co-operated with the
liberal Hilmi P a p ,  Inspector-General of Macedonia. They
made representations to the Palace to have the commission
recalled, and early in July Mahir Pa^a was summoned
13to the capital. Some subordinate members of his
commission were left behind, but they proved to be 
ineffective against the Committeefs policy of terrorism.
Mahir Pa^a had little success in uncovering the 
secret societies and the organisation of the CUP in 
Salonika remained intact. In Istanbul, however, he caused 
some confusion by denouncing Hilmi P a p  and other high
12. Annual Report, ibid. These events not mentioned elsewhere
13. Ibid.
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officials in Macedonia of treasonable activities. He
even accused the Grand Vezir Damad Ferid Papa’s son-
in-law, Ali P a p .  He may well have been right but his
14reward for being so bold was exile to Bursa.
In another part of Macedonia the Sultan’s
espionage met with greater success. The Palace agent
in Manastxr, the Military Chaplain (Alay Muftusu) of
the army units stationed there succeeded in infiltrating
the conspiratorial group led by Adjutant-Major Niyazi.
Niyazi was already known to the secret police and had
once been cited before a court-martial. But on account
of a lack of evidence he had been acquitted, and against
the advice of the Vali of Mcnastir he had been allowed
to return to his post at Resne. The mufti’s discovery
forced him to act before his group was broken up. He
set about organising his rebellion and called a secret
meeting for 28 June. The mufti, who was returning to
Istanbul to make his report, was shot and seriously
15wounded on 12 July.
14. Barclay to Grey, no.392, op.cit.
15 • Mentep, Cumhuriyet, 17 Oct.1946; Dani^mend, iv,36l; Vice- 
Consul Heathcote to Barclay, Monastxr, 13 July,1908, en­
closure in Barclay to Grey, no.400 con.,Therapia,20 July, 
1908, F .0.371/544/25649; Knight, 151. Mente?e gives 
7 July as the date of the assassination, ibid.
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The meeting that Niyazi had called for 28 June
met at the house of a certain Haci Aga. At this meeting
Niyazi announced his intention to proclaim open revolt
against the Palace and to fight for the re-establishment
of the constitution. The problem was discussed and the
l6date for the insurrection was set for Friday, 3 July.
When the meeting was over Niyazi sent Ceraal Efendi to
Manastir nto appraise the central Committee in that town
of Niyazi*s plan and to obtain permission to carry it out.
•.• Within two days Cemal returned ••. with the required
permission from the central Committee and Niazi made
17preparations for the fateful Friday." He informed
other local conspiratorial units of his plan and gave
18them their instructions.
16. Kuran, 465; Mente^e, ibid.; Knight, 154.
17* Knight, 157* Ahmed Niyazi, Hatxratx Niyazi,(1910).236.
It is important to remember that Niyazi1s memoirs were 
written after a decision had been taken to do so at the 
1908 Congress of the CUP. See T.Z.Tunaya, Tiirkiyede Siyasi 
Partiler 1859-1952,(1952), 207* clause 4. Though these 
memoirs are valuable as a source for this period, their 
political bias must not.be forgotten: to exaggerate the 
role of the Committee in the insurrection, and to make it 
appear as if the movement was directed at all times and 
through all stages by the CUP. This is also true of all 
other Unionist memoirs. But the Committee was most con­
scious of history and even considered having an official 
history of the movement specially written. But on account 
of the turbulent times this project never materialised.
See Huseyin Cahit Yalipin, Talat Paga, (1943), 8 .
18. Ismail Hakkx Uzun9ar$xlx, 11908 Yxl3tnda Ikinci Me^rutiyetin 
Ne Suretle Il&n Edildigine dair Vesikalar', Belleten, 
xx/77,(1956), 153-4 .
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On 3 July, while most of the officers of the
garrison were away at Friday prayers, Niyazi and his
men helped themselves to arms, ammunition and the
treasury chest and took to the hills. Niyazi took
with him about 200 regular soldiers and about the
19same number of irregulars and civilians. Among
the civilians with Niyazi there was Hoca Cemal the
Mayor of Resne, Tahsin Efendi the tax-inspector, and
20Tahir Bey the Police Commissioner. The purpose of 
including civilians was to try and set up an adminis­
tration which would be able to gather taxes and administer 
justice. Niyazi seemed to visualise a long drawn out 
struggle against the Palace.
On the day of his flight from Resne Niyazi issued
certain manifestos to the authorities of the local towns
21as well as to the Vali of Manastir and Hilmi Pa^a.
It is interesting that in all these manifestos Niyazi 
spoke, not as a representative of the CUP as one might
J-9* Niyazi, 236; Uzun^ar^ilx, ibid. , 107-8; D a n i p e n d , iv, 361;
Kuran, 465 Tf•> Military Attache Surtees to Barclay, 
Constantinople, 9 July, 1908, enclosure in Barclay to Grey, 
no.378 con.,Therapia, 9 July,1908, F .0.371/544/24315;
Cevat, 159? Knight, 153 ff.
20. Uzux^ar^xli, ibid.,108; and Heathcote to Barclay, Manastir, 
5 July, 1908, enclosure in Barclay to Grey, no.376* ibid.
21 Niyazi, 83 ff.; Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern 
Turkey, 3**d ed.,(l965), 202; Kuran, 465.
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expect, but simply as the leader of "my 200 men". This 
could mean that the Committee had not as yet taken over 
the direction of the insurrection, and that Niyazi had 
taken the initiative on his own. The Committee was 
essentially an urban organisation and it was in the 
towns where it aided the rebellion.
The manifesto of 3 July to the Authorities of 
Ohri stated that the reason for the insurrection was to 
combat "the injustices and inequities which our father­
land has been suffering for many years..., and to force
20
the government to restore the constitution of 1293 (1876)".“
Next day Niyazi issued another manifesto to the authorities
warning them that "the task of feeding and supporting
those working for the sacred cause ... of restoring the
23constitution was incumbent on the people". He appealed
to the local people to furnish his men with their basic
24needs just as they would in wartime. In a separate 
manifesto to the people of Ohri he asked them to stop 
paying taxes to the government and to pay them to his men
22. Niyazi to the Authorities of Ohri, 3 July, 1908, a French 
translation of the original enclosed in Barclay to Grey, 
no.400 con.,Therapia, 20 July, 1908, F .0.371/544/23649.
23. Ibid.,4 July, 1908.
24. Ibid.
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instead. In return he promised to guarantee the security
25of life, honour and property. Finally on 6 July
Niyazi appealed to the Bulgarian community around Resne.
He asked for their co-operation and active help in the
struggle for the constitution, which, he pointed out would
benefit all regardless of race or religion.^ On the
eve of the insurrection Niyazi wrote to a relative to
whom he had entrusted his family: "Rather than live
basely, I have preferred to die. I am therefore going
out now, with two hundred patriots armed with Mausers,
27to die for our country.” Niyazi was not being melo­
dramatic. Death was a more probable conclusion for this 
adventure than salvation of the fatherland.
Niyazi1s example was followed by other junior 
officers - Sadik Bey, Captain Habib, Ziya, Fahri, and Ibrahim 
§akir to mention a few - the most notable of all being 
Major Enver, a young officer attached to Hilmi Pa9a rs
25. Niyazi to the People of Ohri, 4 July, 1908, ibid.
26. Niyazi to the Bulgarians of Resne, 6 July, 1908. Trans­
lation from the Bulgarian original enclosed in ibid. 
no.4o8, con.,Therapia, 22 July, 1908, F .0.371/544/25912. 
This manifesto is not dated, but Knight, 179 ff•* refers 
to the same manifesto and dates it 6 July.
27* Niyazi, 73; B.Lewis, 204.
- 20 -
staff, Eyyub Sabri, another junior officer who
acquired a reputation as a hero of the movement, is
said to have joined Niyazi early in July, In fact he
did not take to the hills around Ohri until 20 July,
29three days before the constitution was restored. The 
real importance of this military rising on a minor scale 
was that it soon involved the CUP. Without this in­
itiative the Committee might have remained dormant for 
some time to come; but the Sultan*s counter-measures 
forced it to act. The Committee’s first act of part­
icipation was its manifesto of 6 July "to the Vali of
* 30the illegal government" in Manastir, Thereafter the
initiative passed into the hands of CUP organisations
in the towns of Macedonia where the outcome of the
constitutional movement was decided,
"When the news of Niyazi's insurrection reached
Istanbul, the Palace became aware of the extent of the
constitutional movement. To begin with the Sultan and
28. Niyazi, 236; Kuran, 466; Knight, 183; Heathcote to
Barclay, enclosure in Barclay ..., no.400, op.cit.; see 
also Ramsaur, 134; and Enver *s letter in the Neue 
Freie Presse, 8 July, 1908, quoted in the Times of 
16 July.
29- Uzun9ar^ili, Bell., 77i l6l-4.
30. Text of the manifesto in Tunaya, 137-9; French trans­
lation in Barclay no.408, op.cit.; Cevat, 159-
- 21 -
his advisers had looked upon the situation in Rumelie
as the work of a discontented group. They had been
content to crush the conspiracy by means of the secret
police. But now that the conspiracy had become a
rebellion, the Sultan called in the army to crush it.
The first reaction of the Palace was to begin an
enquiry and to learn exactly what was happening around 
31Manastir. Meanwhile General ^emsi Pa^a was ordered
to proceed to the scene of the rebellion, and to crush
32
the movement with all means available. On 7 July
^em^i Pa^a was passing through Manastir on his way to
deal Vith the rebellion. He had just telegraphed his
plan of operation to the Palace, when as he was getting
into his carriage outside the post-office, he was 
33assassinated. This event has rightly been regarded 
as the first positive step towards the constitution.
It struck a blow at the Sultan’s despotism by killing 
one of his most trusted generals. At the same time it
31. Kuran, 466; Uzw^ar^ili, op♦ cit. , 108.
32. Kuran, ibid; Cevat, 159-
33* Kuran, 469; Cevat, ibid; Uzm^ar^ili, 109-10; B.Lewis,
204; Suleyman Kulpe, Firzovik Toplantasi ve Megrutiyet, 
(1944), 37-45; and Ali Hamdi, ’Fedai Atif Bey ve §emsi 
P a ^ a m n  Katli’, Resimli Tarih Mecmuasi, 65, May 1955, 
3828-31.
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saved Niyazi Bey from pursuit and destruction and gave
the constitutional movement a chance to broaden its
base. It is quite probable that had $emgi Pa^a been
permitted to proceed against Niyazi, he would have
crushed the rebellion.
The assassination of IJemsi Pa^a was a desperate
and dangerous step for the Committee to take. It was
one thing to assassinate a Palace spy, but quite another
thing to kill a general of the Ottoman army. In resorting
to such action, the Committee risked conflict with JjJemsi
Papa’s men. After the assassination, the British Consul
in Manastir wrote:
,fFor a time there was great excitement in the 
town, especially as to the probable action of 
the late General’s own men, a body of some 
thirty Albanians armed with mausers and appar­
ently dressed as soldiers, but, as I am assured, 
not belonging to the army. There was, of course, 
good reason to fear that the band of bashi- 
bozouks might wish to avenge their master....”
The CUP was greatly alarmed at the measures which
might be taken to crush their movement. To the rank and
file in the army the rebellion at Resne was presented as
a Serbian insurrection, while the CUP was presented as
being pro-Christian and anti-Islam. To the Powers, the
Heathcote to Barclay, Monastir, 8 July, 1908, enclosure 
in Barclay to Grey, no.3&8, con.,Therapia, 15 July,1908, 
F. 0.371/5^/25086.
35• Knight, 196.
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CUP was described as a nationalist movement which was 
both anti-Christian and anti-European. The ba^i-bozuks 
(civilian irregular troops) with §emsi Papa's force 
were to be used against the Christian population in 
Macedonia either to bring about a civil war or a 
massacre of the Christians, in both cases making foreign
7 £
intervention inevitable.
Right from the start the CUP worked to destroy
its anti-Christian, anti-foreign image. On 12 July, a
captain in the army, a member of the Committee, visited
the British Consul in Manastir:
”He declared that no hostile action whatever is 
intended against the Christians. His object 
in calling on me was to enquire what would be 
the view of the matter taken by the British 
Government, especially if some Constitutional 
Government could be settled here locally.
He laid great stress on the desire of his party 
to return to the traditional policy of friend­
ship with Great Britain, and in this connection 
he said that no enquiries of this nature were 
to be addressed to the Consulates of the other 
Powers here.” 37
On the same day the Committee at Manastir sent mani­
festos in French to all the Consulates of the Great 
Powers. The manifestos pointed out that agents of the
36. See the Committeefs denial of these charges in their mani­
festo to the European Consuls in Manastir, enclosure in 
Barclay..., no.4o8, op.cit.
37. Heathcote to Barclay, Monastir, 13 July, 1908, enclosure 
in Barclay..*, no.^00, op.cit.
Palace were active in sowing seeds of distrust amongst 
the diverse elements of the Empire and the CUP had 
counteracted these. The fundamental aim of the 
Committee was to have the Constitution of 1876 restored. 
The Committee was in no way hostile to the non-Muslims, 
whose rights it would guarantee constitutionally. If 
it did use force it was only against the enemies of 
liberty and in self-defence. It was averse to blood­
shed but feared that the Government at Istanbul might 
precipitate a massacre of the non-Muslims and place the 
responsibility for it on the Committee. The CUP bands, 
far from attacking villages had protected them from the 
incursions of other bands, and they had always propagated 
fraternity amongst all the elements. The Government 
had shown its complete lack of scruples by despatching 
ba^x^bozuks with §emsi Pafa. The employment of ba^i- 
bozuks who understood no law and only sought to pillage, 
proved the mistake of the Great Powers in giving
7 o
friendly counsels to the Porte.
The replacement for ^emsi Pa^a, Marshal Osman 
Pa^a, arrived in Manastir on 12 July, 1908. But he 
proved to be ineffective against the Committee because 
his troops were no longer loyal and refused to fire on
3 8 . Manifesto, Barclay..., no.^08, op .cit.
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their comrades. At the same time the supporters of the
39Government in the administration were becoming demoralised. 
The Committee, meanwhile, was consolidating its position.
The Bulgarian population in Ruraelie was by and large on 
the side of the Committee. The Muslims were slowly 
won over too. By mid July, the Committee's position 
in Rumelie seemed impregnable. About ten days before 
the Constitution was restored, Hilmi Pa^a wrote to the 
Palace that almost all of the officers of the Third 
Army were connected with the CUP. He advised the Sultan 
to release the two officers he was holding on suspicion 
of conspiring against the Palace, or events in Macedonia 
would take a turn for the worse. The two officers were
4 o
duly released. The Committee kept the forces loyal 
to the Sultan in check by a policy of terrorism. On 
6 July, Hakki Bey, a member of Mahir Papa's enquiry 
commission was assassinated in Salonika. On 10 July, 
the army chaplain from Manastir was shot in Salonika 
en route for Istanbul. Two days later, Sadxk Pa^a, 
the Sultan's A.D.C. was shot aboard the ship Sidon 
going to the capital. Osman Hidayet Pa^a, Commandant
39. Annual Report, 1908, enclosure in Lowther, no.105, 
op.cit.; Cevat, 159-
40. Hilmi Papa's letter in Uzun9ar$ili, Bell. , 77» 135; other 
officials also wrote to the Palace about the serious 
situation in Macedonia. See Cevat, ibid.
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of* the Manastir garrison was shot while reading a
4lproclamation from the Sultan. The situation seemed 
to be out of the Sultan’s control. He tried to restore 
his authority by sending loyal troops from Anatolia 
against the rebels. Between 15 and 24 July, 18,000 
Anatolian troops were sent, but they proved to be no
k2more effective than the Macedonians.
On 20 July, the Muslim population of Manastir
rose in support of the constitution and seized the
43military stores. The Vali of Manastir, Hifzi Pa^a,
had already written to the Palace and said that further
resistance to the constitutionalists was futile and that
the Sultan should restore the constitution. He had
been rebuked for his advice and he had therefore tendered
kkhis resignation. Risings took place at Gribava, Elasma, 
Kizano, Koyler and JjJerifiye, and the Albanians assembled 
at Firzovik in the province of Kosova and took an oath 
to restore the Constitution. They sent a1* ultimatum 
to the Sultan demanding the restoration of the Constitution
41. Mente^e, Cumhuriyet, 17 Oct.,1946; Dani^mend, iv,36l; 
Barclay to Grey, no.425 con.,Constantinople,28 July,1908, 
F.0.371/5W26958.
42. Cevat,159; Annual Report.1908.00.cit.: Uzuncar^ili,Bell., 
77,111; Buxton, 52; an$ Pears,203, write that the Committee 
had sent Nazim Bey to Izmir, where he infiltrated the ranks 
of the army in the guise of a tobacco seller (or hoca)
and subverted the troops.
43. Annual Report, ibid.; Knight, 218-9*
44. Cevat,160; Barclay to Grey, no.176 con.,Constantinople,
23 July 1908, F.0.371/544/25618; Knight, 192-5*
- 27 -
of 1876, threatening to march on Istanbul to depose
45him if he did not do so*
The Firzovik Incident, generally regarded as an 
important landmark in the struggle for the Constitution, 
had very strange origins. It began as a demonstration 
against an excursion, planned and organised by the 
Austro-Gerraan Railway School, to the village of 
Sarayi^te, renowned for its natural beauty. The work­
men who had been sent ahead to prepare the picnic site 
were driven out, and the demonstrations continued
46against the local Ottoman officials. The Austro- 
German excursion was cancelled but the news of the 
demonstrations at Firzovik reached the Vali of Kosova,
Mahmud JJevket Pa$a. He sent the commander of the Kosova 
Gendarmerie, a certain Galip Bey to investigate. Galip 
Bey, who happened to be a member of the CUP, informed 
the general headquarters of the Committee of the pre­
vailing situation, and asked them to exploit it in favour 
of the constitution. The Albanians were completely
45. Kul9e, Firzovik..., 60-1; Tunaya, 139-41; see also Tunaya, 
Hurriyetin tl&nx, (1959) 1 7? Uzu^ar^xlx, Bell., 77, 124-3; 
Cevat, l6o .
46. Vice-Consul Sotow to Consul-General Lamb (Salonika),
Uskub, 11 July, 1908, enclosure in Barclay to Grey,
no.393, con.,Therapia, 17 July, 1908, F .0 .371/544/25304; 
see also Kiilce, Firzovik. . . , passim, and Uzun^ar^xlx,
Bell.,77, 124-5.
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unorganised, but amongst them was a certain Haci £>aban 
Efendi, a supporter of the CUP. He took charge of the 
disorganised rabble and harnessed it into a demon­
stration in favour of the constitution. The result 
was the demand for the constitution and the ultimatum 
to the Sultan.^
The situation in Macedonia was now completely 
out of the Palace’s control. Hilmi Pa^a again sent 
a cipher telegram to the Sultan on 22 July explaining 
the gravity of the situation. He reported that the 
mission of Mu^ir $ukru Pa^a and Birinci Ferik Rahmi 
Pa$a to Rumelie had revealed nothing new. He there­
fore suggested that the Sultan send one or two chosen
ministers and vezirs who could examine the situation
48on the spot and suggest the remedy. However, by 
22 July it was too late for such measures; the 
Committee had decided to proclaim the constitution.
Having established it in Macedonia they hoped to extend 
it to the rest of the Empire, by force if necessary.
As a prelude to a peaceful proclamation, Eyyub Sabri
49and his men kidnapped Marshal Osman Pa^a from Manastir,
47. Uzun9ar$ili, 125-6; Cevat, 160.
48. Uzm^ar^ili, 135-6 .
49. Ibid.,l6l-4; Cevat, 160.
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50and next day (23 July) the constitution was proclaimed.
On the same day, only a few hours later, the constitution
was proclaimed in some of the other towns, such as
Pre^ova, Kopriilu, Uskup and Serez* A description of
a typical proclamation has been left by the British
51Vice-Consul at Drama:
nBy the usual train from Salonica there arrived 
at Drama at or about 1.30 p.m. a hundred soldiers 
and about twnnty officers commanded by a young staff of 
ficer named Rushen Bey .... Rushen Bey delivered 
a speech in which he laid great stress on the 
absolute necessity of establishing a constit­
utional government if the Turkish Empire was 
to be saved from utter ruin, on the abolition 
of the distinction between race and creed under 
the Ottoman Government and gave the words 'La 
Patrie, Liberte, egalit£, fraternite* as their 
motto. He then turned to the soldiers and said:
You are now going into the town to proclaim a 
constitutional government; anyone who resists, 
no matter what his rank and position, is to be 
shot dead. .
Meanwhile, in the Konak, in the mosque, and 
in the Greek church, the great majority of the 
population, both Greek and Mussulman, had been 
swearing fidelity to the Constitution....
Finally at 4 p.m. it was proclaimed that the 
constitution was accepted, and telegrams were 
sent to the Sultan, signed greatly against his 
will by Zia Pasha, the mutessarif."
Salonika, though the ideological centre of the
constitutional movement and the head-quarters of the
50. Ibid. (both), Tunaya, l4l-2.
51. Bonham to Barclay, Drama, 23 July, 1908, enclosure in 
Barclay to Grey, no.423, con.,Therapia, 28 July,1908,
F .0.371/544/26956. See also Uzun^ar^ili, ibid.,168-70.
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Committee of Union and Progress, was the last important 
town in Macedonia to proclaim the constitution. The 
Committee had planned to proclaim the constitution in 
Salonika on 27 July if circumstances permitted. But 
the march of events was so rapid that the date was for­
warded to 23 July. On the morning of 24 July, Hilmi Pa^a 
received a telegram from the Grand Vezir, informing him 
of the Sultan’s decision to accede to the wish of his 
people and restore the constitution. A little after 
9 a.m. Hilmi Pasa read the Sultan's irade (proclamation)
proclaiming the constitution to the salute of a hundred
52and one guns•
Events in the capital followed a different pattern.
After §emsi Papa's assassination and the refusal of Ana­
tolian troops to crush the rebellion, the Palace became 
demoralised and gave up the policy of repression for one 
of conciliation. In the classical manner this change was 
manifested by the dismissal of the Grand Vezir - and in this 
case the 'Minister of War' as well. On 22 July Damad 
Ferid Fa^a and Riza Pa^a were dismissed and Said Fa^a was
appointed Grand Vezir with Omer Rusdu Pasa as Var Minister 
53(serasker). The Sultan could now make concessions
52. Said Faya's telegram to Hilmi Pa^a, enclosure in Barclay 
to Grey, no.430 con.,Therapia,29 July,1908, F,0.371/545/ 
26961. See also Annual Report, 1908; and Steeg to Louis, 
op.cit., D .D .F .,XI, no.419, 719-22.
53• Hatt-i Humayun appointing Said Fa^a in Sabah,23 July,1908. 
See also Uzunpar^ili, Bell,771136-8; Cevat, 160 and 
Barclay, ibid .
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without loss of face; it would appear as if Ferid Pa^a
had been the stumbling-block. After the constitution
was established Abdulhamid took the credit for it,
telling Midhat Pa^afs son that "the constitution had
been established for the good of the country and the
nation (in 1876).... But traitors withdrew it and
5kdeceived him.H Further discussions took place
on the night of 23 July, and telegrams from Macedonia 
were read reporting the proclamation of the constit­
ution. Faced with what amounted to a fait accompli, 
the Sultan decided to accede to the demand of the 
rebels and Hilmi Paj^a was informed accordingly.
On the same day an Imperial Irade was issued in Istanbul
restoring to the Ottoman Empire the Constitution of 
5 51876. A new era had begun.
5k, Midhat, H a t i r a l a n m , 197*
* 9
55• Hatt-i Humayun restoring the constitution in Sabah,
25 July, 1908 and its translation enclosed in Barclay to 
Grey, no.179, tel.con.,Constantinople, 2k July,1908,
F . 0.371/5^/25753 ; Uzun9ar^ilx, Bell., 77, 138-^3. See 
also Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, Turk Inkilabi Tarihi,i (19^0), 
2^0 ff.
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CHAPTER II
THE CONSTITUTIONAL REGIME AND THE COUNTER­
REVOLUTION OF 1909
The proclamation of the Constitution on 23/2** July
1908 was a success beyond all expectations of the Committee
2
of Union and Progress. But as a result of the Sultan*s
sudden capitulation, the country and its administration
3
were thrown into confusion. The government was completely 
demoralised and administration virtually came to a stand­
still. Members of the Cabinet no longer knew what powers
k
they had, and therefore lost all sense of initiative. 
Meanwhile the people, now knowing what freedom meant, 
thought that all the old institutions of law and order 
had come to an end. Having suffered injustices for so long,
1. The text of the Irade (Imperial decree) proclaiming the 
constitution and inviting the Chamber of Deputies to 
assemble is given in A . S . Gozubiiyiik and Suna Kili, Turk 
Anayasa Metinleri (1957)* 59-60. Sabah, 25 July,1908.
2. Huseyin Cahit Yalpm, Talat Pasa, (19**3)> 16; also Alfred 
de Bilinski, The Turkish Revolution, The Nineteenth Century,
LXjCV,1908, 353- **The re-establishment by Abd-ul-Hamid of
the Constitution ..... came as a surprise to everybody,
not excepting the chiefs of the Young Turk party, who 
did not expect such a sudden fruition of their patriotic 
labours.n
3= Ali Fuat Turkgeldi, Gorup jgittiklerim, (1951)? !“**»
Yal^xn, Talat Faga, 16-17.
Turltgeldi, 2-3; Yalfin, 18.
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they decided to take natters into their own hands* The
people of Trebizond demanded the dismissal of their vali,
or threatened to drive him out themselves. Fearing the
consequences if he refused, Memduh Pasa, the Minister
of the Interior, accepted their demand and dismissed 
5
the vali. In the capital itself, there was no authority 
capable of controlling the people who had decided to 
punish members of the old regime. In this situation 
there was grave danger of the country drifting into 
anarchy, unless some form of authority was quickly 
established.
The CUP was the only body with sufficient author­
ity and prestige to control the situation. Tfithin a few 
days of the proclamation, the Committee tried to bring 
about the destruction of the Palace clique and the vast
5. Tiirkgeldi, 4. There are many examples of people in 
the provinces taking the initiative against corrupt 
officials. In Bursa, Yildiz spies were arrested and 
driven out and the vali, Tevfik Bey was given a list of 
corrupt officials whose dismissal was demanded. See
M r .Gilbertson to H.C.A.Eyres, Broussa, 28 July, 1908,
F .0.195/2280. Similar action was taken in Konya, and 
the British Vice-Consul pointed out that in some cases 
it was the political offenders sent into exile to far- 
off provinces by Abdulhamid, who led the people.
See Vice-Consul Dough ty-T.fy lie to Mr. Barclay, Konia,
27 July, 1908, F .0. 195/2280.
6 . Yal^m, 17*
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7
espionage network. On the advice of Said Pa^a, the 
Grand Vezir, the Sultan proclaimed a general amnesty
g
for all political prisoners and exiles. Within a short 
time, the Committee had succeeded in clearing the admin­
istration of corrupt officials and in replacing them
9
with more liberal men.
At this stage it seemed quite possible for the 
Committee to assume power directly. The traditional 
authority of the Sultan had collapsed, while the Committee 
had the prestige of having carried out a successful in­
surrection and the mystique of a secret society. But 
the Committee did not do so. Instead it left power in 
the hands of the existing Cabinet, and set itself up as 
a vigilance committee safeguarding the constitution, 
exercising its power and influence only when it felt the 
necessity. The Committee*s critics have charged it with 
intervention in government, of exercising power without
7* Midhat $ukru Bleda, "Bir Canli Tarih Konusuyor", Resimli 
Tarih Mecmuas^J , (June 1953)»2392; Uzun^qir^xlx, Bel3L.3.x/77, 
1956, 172-4 , gives the text of the proclamation ending 
espionage, Kr.Barclay to Sir.E.Grey, no.199 telegraphic 
confidential, Constantinople, 29 July, 1908, F.0.371/5^/ 
26307. File 5 ^  is full of detailed reports of the 
first days of the constitution.
8 . Uzun9ar^ilJ, ibid.
9. Annual Report, 1908, 5-7> ’
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responsibility.10 Though there is much truth in this
charge, it does not explain why the Committee acted in
this way.
The explanation lies in the social background of*
the Young Turks and their basic conservatism. They were
by and large conservative in outlook with little or no
interest in promoting social change 11 The CUP was a
direct extension of the reform movement of the nineteenth
it was concerned only with the problem of how to save the
10. Kamil Papa's interview in Neue Freie Presse, l8 February, 
1909, cited in Fortnightly Review. 64, 1909t 397-6. Also 
Yal9in, Talat Pasa. 20. Bleda, o p . c i t n.7.
11. Bleda, Ibid. H.C.Yalfin, 'l908 inkilabl Inkilap^i Degildi', 
Y a k m  Tarihimiz. 2, no.19, 179-60. This title is revealing 
though the contents of the article do not deal specifically 
with the social issues. B.Lewis, Emergence ... 208. - 
The importance of the 1908 ’revolution’ is not that it was 
revolutionary in profession, it was not. In fact it wanted 
to restore a constitution which had already been granted
in 1876. Its importance as a revolution only emerged 
later on, when by its pragmatic policies it was able to 
introduce reforms which were a little short of revolution­
ary, and which had a profound effect in the period that 
followed.
12. The best study of the Young Ottomans is the Turkish pol­
itical scientist, Serif Hardin’s, ’The Genesis of Young 
Ottoman Thought♦,(1962).
There is also E .E .Ramsaur's , The Young Turks; Prelude to
the Revolution of 1908, Princeton, (1957), and
T.Z,Tunaya, Tiirkiye ’ de Siyasj Partiler, (1952), 89-157*
century, especially the Young Ottomans, 12 and like them
- 3.6 -
_  13 *
Empire. Fundamentally the Young Turks provided the 
same answer as the Young Ottomans of the i860's and 17 0 1s ; 
to introduce constitutional governiaent, thereby curbing i
i
the power of the Sultan, and at the same time satisfying 
the aspirations of the minorities by giving them equal i
14rights within the law. Socially the Young Ottomans
had been in a position to assume power once they had
forced the Sultan to concede the constitution. They did,
after all, come from "a ruling elite, prepared by education
15to command and to govern.” The Young Turks shared their ! 
social values but not their social position. During
the period of Abdiilhamid' s despotic rule, the base of \
\
the reform movement had become much broader. This was \
16 'brought about by Abdulhamid's reforms. Whereas the
Young Ottomans were members and products of the ruling
13. Tunaya, .. .Partiler *,167-74, briefly discusses the 
different solutions that were offered in answer to - 
How can this state be saved? See also B.Lewis,
Emergence.., 208-9.
14. The Young Turks rather naively thought that all the com­
plaints of the different elements came from maladminis­
tration, oppression and a lack of freedom. If all these 
causes of discontent were removed through the constit­
ution and parliamentary government, the Turkish nation 
would be saved. Yal9in, Tal&t Paga, 14. Yal9in concludes: 
"They had never seen in their lives what a parliament 
looked like, or how it met and discussed. But they 
secretly believed in the Constitution and the parliament 
as one believes in a mighty talisman," - ibid.,14.
15. B.Lewis, 201; Hardin, Genesis...; deals with the social 
background of the prominent "Young Ottomans”. See also 
Mardin's article in MEJ, XIV,(1962),169-82.
16. For Abdulhamid's reforms see B.Lewis, 174-90.
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institution, the Young Turks belonged to the newly
I
emerging professional classes; lecturers in the recently
founded government colleges, lawyers trained in western
law, journalists, minor clerks in the bureaucracy, and
junior officers trained in the western-style war colleges.
17Most of them were half-educated and products of the 
state schools. The well-educated ones had no experience
i
of administration and little idea about running a gov­
ernment. There was not a single experienced statesman 
amongst them.18
The Young Ottomans, belonging to the ruling elite, !I
i
thought they could save the Empire if they were given the j
19 1opportunity to govern. The Young Turks, a generation ^
20 \
later, did not see in themselves the capacity to rule, 
therefore they never considered taking up high governmental \
i
21 •»posts. Huseyin Cahit Yal^m, a CUP deputy for
Constantinople and a prominent journalist wrote:
"This country could not have accepted a young man 
without rank, decorations, a beard, glory and 
reputation, rising to the Grand Vozirate. ..
Since the public opinion of the country was such, 
and since they /i,he Young Turks7themselves were 
made up of the same stuff, it would be unfair to
17 Kemal H.Karpat, Turkey * s Politics (1959), 14, n.31;
Yal9in, Talat Paga, 13-l4.
18. Yal9in, 13-14.
19• B.Lewis, 201.
20. Yal9in, 14.
21. Ibid., 34.
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blame them /for not assuming power7........ In
July 1908, "the CUP could not proclaim a captain 
or a major Minister of V7ar, nor Tala.t Bey, a head 
postal clerk, Grand Yefcir Conditions and cir­
cumstances made this impossible. ... If this in 
fact had happened, anarchy would surely have broken 
out in the country..• The members of the CUP ^
realising this, did not take up positions of power.11
22. Ibid.,3^-5* - The importance of the social issues seems 
to have been underrated or ignored in the study of the 
Young Turk period. The social climate prevailing in 
the Ottoman Empire was undoubtedly one of the main factors, 
though it remained latent, which prevented the Young Turks 
from assuming power openly and completely. M r . F .Graves, 
the Times correspondent in Constantinople at the time, 
aware that European classes were not applicable to Ottoman 
society, nevertheless describes the Young Turk movement as 
essentially ’’upper middle class”. He wrote that ’’the high 
officials, generally speaking, were hostile to the move­
ment.... The lower classes ... were, as a rule, in­
different, It was among the junior officers of the array 
and navy, the middle and lower grades of the civil service, 
the professional classes, and the ulema, that the move­
ment for reform carried all before it.” The Times.
2k August, 1908, -. Mr.Noel Buxton, President of the 
Balkan Committee, visited Istanbul in December 1908.
On his return to London he informed Louis Mallet at the 
Foreign Office that ”it would be impossible for men so 
young as they,/the Young Turks7- to take office in Turkey". 
Louis Mallet *s~Minute, F .0.371/761/8892. In an interview
with Mr.Hohler, First Secretary at the British Embassy, 
Istanbul , Cavit Bey, a prominent Young Turk, later
Minister of Finance said that the Young Turks "were all 
young men who lacked experience in administrative work, 
however much they might have studied; also the respect, 
which in all countries is conceded to age, is far greater 
here than elsewhere”. Lowther to Grey, no.38^ con., Pera,
26 May, 1909, F.0.371/772/20299. - After the fall of Kamil 
Pa$a in February 1909, opponents of the CUP approached Sir 
Gerard Lowther and sought British aid "to help them rid 
themselves of this new despotism of men who, they say, have 
not even the traditions of the Sultanate and Kaliphate”. 
Lowther to Grey, no.151, con, Pera, 3 March, 1909;
F .0 .37l/76l/89l4; - That this ’class issue’ never came 
out into the open was due partly to the conservatism of 
the Young Turks, and partly to their awareness of their 
own social shortcomings. See also Mandelstam, Le Sort de 
l 1Empire Ottoman,(1918), 2 k.
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The CUP also lacked the organisation required to 
assume power. Any organisation it had was centred in the
/’
23Macedonian provinces with headquarters at Salonika.
When the insurrection succeeded, the limited number of 
branches in the rest of the Empire were quite unprepared
2kto take control of the administration. During the period
of despotism there had been many secret societies. But
because of the repression and because of their very nature,
25
they were scattered, isolated and unknown to each other.
Once the constitution was proclaimed they all came out
into the open, with different policies and without any
26recognised leadership. Under these conditions the
Committee was unable to assume power openly, and power
was left formally in the hands of the official government
of Said Pa$a. In reality, this power became the bone of
contention between three forces, the Palace, the Porte and
27the Committee.
23. See below, Chapter I .passim.
24. Yal9in, Talat Pasa, 16.
25. Ibid., 12.
26. Ibid., 12. - A.Sarrou, La Jeune Turquie 34-5, relates 
how, immediately after the revolution, the CUP sent a 
delegation to see the Sultan. Abdulhamid agreed to see 
the president of the delegation, only to be told that 
the Committee had no president.
27. H.C.Yal9in, »Kudretsiz Bir Hukumet,Muvesvis Bir Padi^ah^ 
Yakin Tarihimiz. II/l6 , 75*
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The first encounter between the executive and
the Committee took place early in August. It took
place over the right to appoint the Ministers of War
and Marine. Article 27 of the 1876 Constitution vested
this prerogative in the person of the Grand Vezir his
appointments having to be sanctioned by an Imperial 
28Irade. The Sultan appointed only the Grand Vezir
and the ^eyhulislam.^ Article 10 of the Hatt-i-Humayun
of August 1, gave the Sultan the right to make all four 
30appointments. The issue was not merely constitutional; 
its implications went much deeper. It meant that the 
person who appointed the two ministers of the armed 
forces, controlled the armed forces themselves. The 
Committee, having its main support from the junior 
officers of the army and navy, realised that its position
28. Gozubiiyiik and Kili, Anayasa, 27*
29. Ibid.
30. The text of the Hatt-i-Humayun in Tanin, 2 August 1908 
and Sabah, 2 August, 1908, The other fourteen clauses 
of the charter guaranteed the inviolability of domicile, 
freedom from arbitrary arrest, the grant of permission 
to travel abroad, and to form commercial associations 
with foreign subjects. It announced the equality of 
all Ottomans, without distinction of race or religion, 
and proclaimed full liberty. It announced that pro­
jects for the reorganisation of ministries, particularly 
the ministry of war, and provinces would be prepared 
and submitted to Parliament.
-  41 -
would be undermined if the Sultan succeeded in estab­
lishing a foothold in their preserve. They therefore 
opposed Clause 10 of the Hatt most fiercely and attacked 
Said Pa^a for having drafted it. Said Pa$a and his 
Minister of the Interior, Memduh Pa^a were already re­
garded with suspicion for having released common criminals 
along with political prisoners, and also for allowing
31some of the corrupt officials of the old regime to escape.
The Committee had seen these acts as attempts to discredit
and endanger the revolution. Clause 10 confirmed their
. . 32suspicions.
The Committee was not alone in opposing Said Pa$a 
and Clause 10. Cemaluddin Efendi, the $eyhulislam, also
found it both unconstitutional and contrary to the oath
. 33
Abdulhamid had sworn, promising to uphold the constitution.
In the Cabinet, Said Pa^a justified the clause on the
ground that since the Sultan was Commander-in-Chief of
31. Turkgeldi, 3. According to Turkgeldi, Memduh Pa^a 
only intended to release political prisoners. But at 
the instigation of Baba Tahir, owner of "the Malumat", 
ordinary criminals threatened violence if they were not 
released. Memduh Pa^ft, wishing to avoid further trouble, 
gave the order to release all criminals. Ibid.,2-3*
'Kanunu Esasi Ve Yeni Hatt-i Humayun*, Tanin, 3 August, 1908, 
4 August, 1908. Yalpm, Talat Paga, 17, gives the CUP 
side of the story. Also Lowther to Grey, no.208, tel.-con. 
Constantinople, 2 August 1908, F.0.371/544/26789*
32. Turkgeldi, ibid,, 3.
33* £>eyhulislam Cemaluddin Efendi, Hatirat-jL Siyasiye (1917), 
10-12.
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the arned forces, it was within his sacred rights to
34
appoint the two ministers. His critics in the Cabinet
argued that these offices were not military but civil,
and in the past civil servants like Celal Pa$a had held 
35them. Unable to accept Said Pa$afs explanation, the 
$eyhulisllun sent in his resignation, but the Sultan re­
fused to accept it. Said Pa^a faced with such determined
7 £
opposition decided to resign himself.
Even before 1 August, the Committee had asked the
Sultan, through Huseyin Hilmi Pa$a, to be permitted to
send a deputation to the capital in order to discuss the 
37situation. Permission was reluctantly granted and a 
deputation composed of Talat, Cavit and Rahmi Beys
7  Q
arrived from Edirne on 1 August. They had a long 
interview with Said Pa$a, but the latter was so rude
and outspoken that he even shocked his Minister of the
39 **Interior, Haci Akif Bey. They then saw Kamil Pa^a and
3^• Ibid. To M r .Fitzmaurice whom he saw on 10 August, he
said he had to humour the susceptibilities of the Sultan 
by not insisting on devolving the right to command the 
land and sea forces, theoretically vested in His Majesty, 
on ministers appointed by the Grand Vexir* See Lowther 
to Grey, no.459, con.,Therapia, 10 August, 1908; F.0.371/ 
5^5/28455* - For Said Pasa*s defence, see The Levant Herald, 
25 August, 1908,
35* Cemaluddin, ibid.
36. Ibid., Ali Cevat, 8 .
37* Uzun9ars1.il, Bell. 77; 1A8-9.
3 8 . Ibid; and Lowther to Grey, no.448, con. Therapia, 4 August, 
T 90H; F.0.371/5^5/27644.
39* Turkgeldi, 5*
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asked that Recep Pa$a, Vali of Tripoli (North Africa) be
40made War Minister in his ministry. Finally the deputation
visited the Sultan and asked for the formation of another
ministry under Kamil Pa^a, with Recep Pa^a as Minister
of War, and the revision of the Hatt-i-Humayun of 1 August.
Although Kamil Pa^a had accepted Recep Pasa, the Sultan
4i
refused to do so. He regarded Recep Pa^a as being too
ambitious and independent and therefore preferred Riza
Pa^a as Minister of War. But under the pressure of the
Committee and through the persuasion of Cemaluddin, the
4 2
Sultan finally gave in.
Said Pa^a resigned on 5 August and KSmil Pasa
was appointed Grand V ezir on 6 August and asked to form
43
a Cabinet. Next day, there appeared in the Sabah a 
declaration by the Committee promising full support to 
the new Cabinet, and asking the people to co-operate in 
maintaining law and order so as not to provoke foreign
40. Uzunsarsili, op.cit.
41. Cemaluddin, 12.
42. Ibid., for Abdulhamid1s assessment of Recep Pasa see 
Cevat, 8-9 and 10-11.
43- For Said Pasafs resignation and Kamil Pasa's appointment
see Tanin and Sabah of 6 and 7 August 1908; Cemaluddin,
12-13; Cevat, 8 ; French translation of Hatt in Lowther 
to Grey, no.473, con., Therapia, 12 August, 1908,
F.0.371/545/28469-
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44criticism. Thus ended the first attempt to end the 
anomalous situation. Co-operation between the Committee 
and the Porte frustrated the Palace1s attempt to mono­
polise power once more. Henceforth power passed into the 
hands of the Porte, while the Committee continued to play 
the role of guardian of the Constitution, though still 
not taking an active part in the administration of the 
Empire.
The business of government and reform began with
Kamil Pa^afs ministry. Most of his ministers, except
two, were new men, described by the British Ambassador
as "men of experience, ability and energy, enjoying the
45popularity of all classesV There was sill, however, 
no: one from the Committee.
On 16 August, Kamil Papa's programme appeared in the
46press. It stated that he resolved to govern according 
to the Constitution. But since it was not possible to wait
44. Lowther, ibid.; Sabah, ibid.
45* Lowther to Grey; no.473, con.,Therapia, 12 August, 1908; 
F .0.371/545/28469. The two men Kamil retained from Said 
Papa's Cabinet were Cemaluddin Efendi ($eyhulislam) and 
Tevfik Pa^a (Minister of Foreign Affairs). For a list of 
the Cabinet see Turkgeldi, 5 and Cevat, 190-91*
46. Text of programme in Sabah, 16 Aug.,1908, 'Meclisx
Vukelanxn Programx1; translation enclosed in Lowther to 
Grey, no.494 con., Therapia, 18 Aug.,1908, F.0.371/ 
546/29298.
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for the Chamber of Deputies to assemble before executing 
this programme, he intended to modify certain laws of 
the old regime which were not in conformity with the 
Constitution.
On account of the gravity of the financial 
situation, existing financial laws would be reformed and 
a rational budget prepared for the coming year. All 
ministries would be reformed and surplus functionaries 
would be pensioned off. The army and navy would also 
be reorganised.
Since reform would require a larger expenditure, 
the existing system of taxation would have to be reorganised 
and resources allocated more rationally. Commercial 
treaties would be revised.
In the spirit of progress, a programme for the 
development of commerce, industry, public works and 
agriculture was under preparation. Scientific progress 
and education would be encouraged and a law guaranteeing 
the rights of property would be passed. In the spirit of 
equality guaranteed by the Constitution, military service 
would be extended to all Ottomans, including non-Muslims.
The Government, already enjoying good relations 
with all nations, would base its policy on the maintenance 
of these good relations, as well as the maintenance of
- 46 -
the integrity and honour of the Ottoman Empire, The 
Government would work to bring to an end, with the consent 
of the interested Powers, the privileges and rights, 
outside the scope of international law, enjoyed by 
foreigners in the Ottoman Empire by virtue of the 
Capitulations. To do this the Government would make 
great efforts to bring all branches of administration 
to a point where they would inspire confidence amongst 
all and therefore would make the privileges enjoyed by 
foreigners unnecessary.
Kamil Papa's programme was nothing less that the 
proclamation of intent to reform the Ottoman Empire into 
a modern centralised state. This intention had been 
stated on earlier occasions, notably in 1839» 1856 and
1876. But little had been done to translate intent into 
action. By 1908 the situation had changed both in the 
Empire and the rest of the world. Within the Empire, the 
threat of secession by the non-Turkish elements was 
growing day by day, bringing with it the menace of foreign 
intervention. In Macedonia, where this threat was stronge©tt 
there emerged a new social group which saw reform, not as 
a means of preserving its power as an elite, but as a
47. See also the CUP *s official programme for 1908, in 
Tunaya, Partiler, 208-10.
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means of* saving the state and bringing it in line with 
the modern world. With its broader social base, this 
group was less compromising in its relations with the 
traditional elements and their values, and accepted 
more readily the necessity of cultural and social change 
as an essential part of modernisation. Externally,
Japan*s success in becoming and being accepted as a modern 
power by the rest of the world, was possibly the most 
influential factor in raising Turkish hopes in 
modernisation,^
The Young Turks set out to streamline the entire 
system of administration. The traditional Millet system 
"whereby the individual carries his law from place to 
place11, being incompatible with the centralised state,
49
was sentenced to death. All Ottomans, regardless of 
ethnic origins or religion, were granted the same rights 
and duties. Extra-territorial rights enjoyed by for­
eigners, being incompatible with the idea of one law for
48. The Young Turks already saw themselves as the ’Japan* of 
the Near East, and in November 1908 asked the English for 
an alliance, using the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as a 
precedent. See Ahmed Riza and Nazim Bey’s interview with 
Grey in Grey to Lowther, private, London, 13 November,1908; 
F.O.8OO/I85A (Grey Papers). The Young Turks also con­
sidered obtaining Japanese experts instead of European 
ones to help them with the task of modernisation. But 
nothing came of it. See Yeni Gazete , cited in Lowther
to Grey, no.546, con., Therapia, 6 Sept.,1908, F.0.371/ 
559/31790. Sir Charles Hardinge commented that "the idea 
would be deeply resented by several of the Great Powers.11 Ibi<
49. R.E.Ward and D.A.Rustow, Political Modernisation in Japan 
and Turkey (1964), 3-40
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all, were attacked. But the success of this programme 
hinged on the ability of the new regime to put its 
finances in order. But no one realised this more than 
the Young Turks.
Kamil Papa's programme established a climate of 
optimism and it remained only for Parliament to justify 
it. Meanwhile the Government worked at half-speed, 
only carrying out measures necessary to keep the ad­
ministration going. The Palace had followed the policy 
of appeasing its opponents and rewarding its followers 
by giving sinecures. As a result, almost all departments
of administration were overcrowded with incompetent and
50corrupt officials. In the interest of both efficiency
and economy, Kamil Pa^a made large reductions in the
51administrative personnel in almost all departments.
This measure caused considerable dissatisfaction, and
52even within the Cabinet all members were not in favour.
50. Nazxm Bey's interview in Pester Lloyd, 12 May, 1910, 
enclosure in Mr.C.Howard to Grey, no.40, con., Budapest,
14 May, 1910; F .0 .371/1010/19028. Also Annual Report, 
1908, 58-9,chJ, in.I.
51. A list of dismissed officials was published in The Levant 
Herald, 10 Aug.,1908; also sed Annual Report, 1908, 58-9.
52. Ekrem Bey, Minister of Evkaf and later of Education, also
a prominent writer, poet and critic, resigned from the *
ministry because he,disagreed with this policy of massive 
purges. See Fahir Iz, 'Ekrem Bey*1, El£.
-  -
The Young Turks, however, preferred to spend a few thou­
sand pounds to pension off incompetent and corrupt
officials since retaining them reduced efficiency and
53could cost much more in the long run. This policy 
took many years to execute. By May 1910, ffabout 80 per
54
cent of the Government appointments had been reformed.
The new regime faced its first major crisis in
October 1908. On the 5th, Bulgaria declared her
independence. Next day, Austria-Hungary announced the
annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to her Empire. A
few days later Crete announced her decision to unite 
55with Greece. There was little that the Porte could do
but protest to the signatories of the Congress of Berlin,
since the first two actions were a violation of that
treaty, and the position of Crete was also guaranteed by 
56the Powers. The Powers soon made it known that they
53* Nazim Bey's interview; F .0 .371/1010/19028; op. cit» n.S'o ♦
5^. Ibid.
55. Hikmet Bayur, i, (19^0), 2^5 ff• , deals with these problems 
from the Turkish side. Foreign Office correspondence 
dealt extensively with these problems too in F,0.371/550 ff. 
and F.0.371/7^7 ff.
56. Lowther to Grey, no.29^, con.,Constantinople, 5 0ct.,1908;
F.0.371/550/3^51^.
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57would not intervene on Turkey's behalf.
These hostile acts aroused great indignation through­
out the Ottoman Empire, There were violent articles and
much sabre-rattling in the press, but the only positive
5 A
action taken was the boycott of Austrian goods. As
the crisis coincided with the month of Ramazan, the
Cabinet was not meeting and therefore the matter was not
59officially discussed. Kamil, however, convened a 
meeting at his home and informed his ministers of his 
attempts to form alliances with Serbia, Rumania and 
Greece. Serbia had been in favour, Rumania against, and
6oGreece ambiguous. Kamil then asked his War Minister if 
the army could be mobilised for war. Ali Riza Pa^a gave 
a negative answer, and it was therefore decided to seek
57- Grey to Lowther; no.284, con., Foreign Office, 5 Oct.19085 
F .0.371/551/34595• The British Government was the only 
one favourably disposed towards the Porte, and the 
Porte was guided by her advice. Grey informed Rxfat 
Pa^a, the Ottoman Ambassador in London that Britain 
would not recognise Bulgarian or Austrian actions 
until she knew the opinions of the other signatories, 
especially Turkey. He advised the Porte against war 
and promised to support Turkish proposals for compensation.
58. Turkgeldi, 10-11.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.,11.
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a political solution. The Porte sent telegraphic
protests to the Powers and asked them to safeguard the
6 2interests of Turkey by summoning a conference. On
7 October, Kamil telegraphed the Macedonian provinces
enjoining them to see that there was no violence against
Bulgarians residing in the Empire, or any incidents on 
63the border. In the capital he called a press con­
ference and asked all papers to be moderate and keep
6kdown tension. By and large the Porte took a moderate 
line and the situation continued to smoulder for the 
next six months, ending with compensation for the Ottoman 
Empire. The effect of these foreign complications on 
the internal situation, however, was of much greater 
importance.
The crisis in the Balkans provided some of the
61. Ibid.,12, Riza Papa's actual answer was: "We don’t 
even have shoes for our soldiers to wear." The British 
Ambassador gave another reason for not declaring war;
"the necessity of keeping large bodies of troops here 
to crush any possible reactionary movement". Lowther 
to Grey; no.296, con.,Constantinople, 6 Oct.,1908;
F .0.371/551/3^666.
62. Lowther to Grey; no.301, con.,Constantinople, 7 Oct.1908; 
F.0.371/351/3^753.
63. Ibid.
6k. Ibid.
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disaffected elements with an opportunity to attack the
new regime. The first manifestation of reaction took
place on 7 October, and not surprisingly, it took a
purely religious form. A large Ramazan crowd led by
Hoca All Efendi, better known as "Blind Ali" (Kor Ali),
marched to the Palace. He asked to see the Sultan, and
when Abdulhamid appeared at the window, Ali Efendi
asked for the constitution to be abolished, for the
JJeriat to be restored, and for the Sultan to lead his
65flock once again. He also asked for the closing down
of drinking houses, the prohibition of photography, and
66an end to Muslim women walking around in the town.
Reactionaries were busy in other parts of the capital
as well. In Ayasofya they posted up placards abusing
the Seyhulisl&m and calling upon true believers to
murder him as the exponent of theories subversive to
the dominant faith of which he was supposed to be the 
6 7
guardian. They created scenes in mosques and theatres
65. Ali Cevat, 15-6; Tunaya, Ialamcilik Cereyani,(1962), Kor 
Ali Vakasi, 129-30; H.C.Yalpm, l31 Martin Provasi Ve 
Kendisi’, Yakin Tarihimiz, 1, 136-7 ? also K6fr Ali, Tanin, 
9 Oct•,I90SL
66. Cevat, 16.
6 7 . Lowther to Grey, no.670, con.,Therapia, "Lk Oct.1908;
F . 0,371/560/36131. See also Y a l p m  and Tunaya, op. cit.
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and even attacked Kuslim women in the streets on the
pretext that., as a result of the new liberal regime,
68they were not properly veiled. Meanwhile Murad Bey,
a notorious character from the pre-constitutional era
and editor of the Mizan, formed an anti-constitution
group in league with a Nazif Sururi and Cemil Molla,
the son of a former JJeyhulislam. ^  This conspiracy
was discovered by the Porte and Murad Bey was arrested
70and exiled while his accomplices were imprisoned.
The final and potentially the most explosive
act of the October reaction was the mutiny. the
71
Ta^ki^la barracks. This mutiny was triggered off
by gn order from the Commander, transferring the 7th
and 8th regiments of the 2nd Division of the Imperial
72Guards Corps to Jedda. Some 86 soldiers who were
68. Lowther, ibid.; Turkgeldi, 11, relates how Kor A l i 1s men 
smashed the sindows of the $eyhulisTam's carriage.
69. Turkgeldi, 12. For a more detailed account of the con­
spiracy and the past activities of these men, see Lowther, 
ibid.
70. Turkgeldi, ibid.
r  *
71. Ali Cevat, 19-20; Yal9in, Provasx, op.cit;Knight,
•• Awakening. 264 ff. gives a contemporary account from 
the Young Turkish point of view. Foreign Office corres­
pondence, both from Constantinople and from the Military 
Attach^ deal with this incident in some detail. See 
F.0.371/544 and F .0.195/2290.
72. Cevat, 19; Major Surtees to Lowther, 54 M.A., 
Constantinople, 2 November, 1908; F .0.195/2290.
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about to be posted to Jedda refused to go and demanded
73immediate discharges from the army. They piled up 
their arms outside the barracks and refused to obey the
*r 7 k
orders of their general, £ukru Pa^a, to go back in.
The CUP had already issued, in the gurayi Ummet
of 22 October, a proclamation stating that it was
allied to the army and was therefore able to crush any
75reaction that might take place. On 31 October, the
76
day of the mutiny, the CUP issued another proclamation. 
The Committee blamed the mutiny on the fact that the 
rebellious troops had been pampered by the Palace and 
therefore had no discipline. It demanded severe pun­
ishment for the 86 soldiers who had violated military
77discipline by disobeying orders. Mahmud Muhtar Pa^a,
Commander of the 1st Army called in loyal troops from
the Macedonian battalions, and the mutiny; was crushed
78at the cost of three killed and as many wounded.
73* Cevat, ibid; Surtees, ibid.
7^- Ibid: Ibid.
75. Surayi Ummet, 22 October, 1908.
76. A proclamation from the CUP , concerning the Ta^kji^la 
incident, 31 Oct.,1908, in Ikdam, 1 Nov.,1908.
77. Ibid.
78. Cevat, 19.
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Muhtar Pa^a wanted to make an example of these men by-
hanging their corpses for public inspection. But this
caused alarm at the Palace and the Porte, and Kamil
Pa$a virtually gave him the choice of revoking his
decision or resigning. Muhtar Pa^a revoked his decision.^
The reaction was suppressed without undue
difficulty largely because it had been spontaneous and
lacked both leadership and organisation. Since the
success of any reaction would have favoured only the
Palace, the Porte became the ally of the Committee to
prevent any such contingency. The Porte dealt promptly
with men like Murad Bey, who might have given sophis-
80tication and leadership to the reactionary movement.
K&mil Pa^a was extremely confident of his position and
underestimated the potential power of the Committee. He
"never thought it capable of seizing the absolute power,
•.. and /he7 used it as a weapon of defense against 
the Sultan."
79» Cevat, 19-20.
80. When Murad Bey was exiled, it was decided to pay him
his salary while he was away. Turkgeldi, 12.
o * 1ol. Ismail Kemal, The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey, (1920),
323.
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The only reason for co-operation between the
Committee and Kamil was political expediency. The
Committee, unable to take control openly, needed someone
independent of the Palace and at the same time liberal
in outlook, to rule instead. K3mil was willing to
tolerate the Committee while it continued to neutralise
the Palace. But this delicate balance could not be
maintained indefinitely because both parties could win
the dominant position only at the expense of the other.
The Committee was counting on doing this by
winning the elections and gaining control of the Chamber
of Deputies. Immediately after the July Revolution the
Committee sent out emissaries to the provinces to explain
the nature of their movement and to set up organisations
82for securing the election of their candidates. The
Committee also tried to reach agreements with the non-
Turkish communities on their candidates who would stand
for election, and in many cases it was successful in 
8 ^
doing so. Candidates were usually elected with the
82. Annual Report, 1908, op.cit., Ch.i, n.i.
83. For the Committee's compromise with the Greeks see Fazli 
Bey's interview with the Greek Patriarch in Lowther to Grey; 
no.535, con.,Therapia, 1 Sept.,1908; F .0.371/5^6/30971.
The Armenians had also decided to co-operate with the CUP 
See M r .Fitzmaurice's interview with Patriarch Izmirlian in 
Fitzmaurice to Lowther, no.5^D, 30 Nov.,1908; F .0 .195/ 2281. 
For agreements in Macedonia see Consul Lamb to Lowther in 
Lowther to Grey, no.6^7 con.,Therapia, 9 Oct.,1908,
F .0 .371/5^6/36109.
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approval and support of the Committee, and it was
84difficult to win a seat without this support. Most 
of its nominees were usually selected from among pro­
fessional men in the towns and landed proprietors in
85the countryside. But in spite of, or perhaps because
of the Committee's active role in the elections of 1908,
all elements in the Empire were fairly well represented
86and satisfied with their representation. Out of 275
Deputies, there were 60 Arabs, 25 Albanians, 23 Greeks,
8 7
12 Armenians, 5 Jews, 4 Bulgars, 3 Serbs and 1 Vlach.
84. Andre Mandelstam, Le Sort de L'Empire Ottoman,(1917)< 17*
85- Knight, ..Awakening, 28l. Huseyin Cahit (Yal9in) was 
chosen by the CUP to stand for election as one of its 
candidates for Constantinople. Until then he was not a 
member of the Committee. See H.C.Yal^in, "ittihadi 
Terakki Cemiyetine Nasil Girdim?", Y a k m  Tarihimiz,i , 23-4.
86. By and large the non-Turkish elements were content with 
the way the elections had been conducted. See Lowther to 
Grey, no.793, con., Pera, 23 Nov.,1908, F .0.371/546/41691. 
The Greeks, however, were the exception. They complained 
against the irregularities committed by the Committee at 
their expense. Lowther to Grey, no.801, con.,Pera, 24 Nov., 
1908, F.0.371/546/41699. H.C.Yal9xn wrote that if the
CUP had not intervened in the elections in Constantinople, 
it is doubtful if there would have been a single Turkish 
deputy from there. He wrote that the Greeks were very well 
organised and had a long experience in electioneering; see 
"Turkiyeyi Ya^atmak Ve Batirmak Istiyenler1,’ Y a k m  Tarihimiz, 
i, 214.
87. Mandelstam, l6 . Hilmi Kamil Bayur, Sadrazam Kamil Pa$a - 
Sjvas-iHayati, (1954) , 296, gives 142 Deputies, 60 Arabs,
25 Albanians, 23 Greeks, 12 Armenians, 5 Jews (Musevi),
4 Bulgars, 1 Ulah (Vlach).
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Apart from the CUP, the only other party to
contest the elections was the Liberal Union /Osmanli
88Ahrar Firkasi7» It was officially founded on 14
89September, 1908, and therefore had very little time
to organise itself for the elections* In the elections
which were held in late November and December, the
Liberals failed to win a single seat in the cegital,
even with such illustrious candidates as Prince
90Sabaheddin and K&mil Pa^a. Their only candidate,
91Mahir Said Bey, came from Ankara. In March 1909*
Manyarsizade Refik, the Committee’s candidate for
Constantinople, died and his seat in the Chamber fell
vacant. In the by-election both parties fought for
the seat, and the Liberal’s candidate, Ali Kemal, a
92prominent journalist, was defeated by Rifat Pa^a.
88. Tunaya, *• Partiler, 239 ff•
89. Ibid., 239.
90. Tunaya, Elections in Turkish History, Middle Eastern 
Affairs, April 1954, 117* and Cumhuriyet, lfi Feb .Vl954• 
Also see Tunaya, . .Partiler, 241; R . E .Kocu, ’Tiirkiyede 
S e 9irain Tarihi, 1876-I950", Tarih Dunyasi, i (1950), l8l.
91= Tunaya, ..Partiler. 241.
92. Ibid., 241, n.8.
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The Committee’s supremacy in the Chamber seemed assured.
It strengthened its position in Parliament by weakening
the Sultan’s control over the Senate. Article 60 of*
the Constitution gave the Sultan the prerogative of*
93appointing Senators. But in December 1908, the
Committee put sufficient pressure on the Sultan to
force him to exclude from the Senate, men with tarnished
reputations under the old regime.
According to Article ^3 , Parliament should have
95assembled on 1 November. But on account of the
difficulties of organising the elections, there was a
delay of over a month and a half. Finally, when
Parliament opened on 17 December, all the deputies still
96had not arrived. ’’His Majesty the Sultan, contrary to
all recent custom, and also contrary to the somewhat
general expectation, came to Staraboul by land, .... .
He entered the Chamber, and His Majesty’s First Secretary
97read the Speech from the Throne.”
93* Gdzubuyiik and Kili, 31*
9^. Lowther to Grey, no.873, con.,Constantinople, 19 Dec.,1908, 
F,0,371/5^6A5087. Ful1 list of Senators enclosed.
95- Gozubuyuk and Kili, 29•
96. Babanzade Ismail Hakki, 'Tarihl bir Gun’, Tanin, 18 Dec. 
1908. H.C.Yalpm, ’’Me^rutiyetin Ilk Mebtislar Alayi,” Yakxn 
Tarihimiz, i, 390. Lowther to Grey, no.686, con.,Pera,
17 Dec.,1908, F .0.371/5^6/44631.
97• Lowther, ibid. Cevat, 28-9* Kamil Pa^a,writes Cevat,
threatened to resign if the Sultan did not personally go tc 
the opening of Parliament, 28. The text of the Speech in 
Takvim-i Vekayi, l8 Dec.,1908; Tanin 18 Dec.,1908.
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In his speech, the Sultan explained why he had 
prorogued Parliament in 1878. He claimed that his ad­
visers had pointed out to him the difficulties of con­
stitutional government. They had recommended that the 
execution of the constitution ought to be postponed 
until the people were ready for it. The Chamber had 
then been prorogued and its reassembly deferred to a 
time when people were better educated. To improve 
education, he said, he had established schools all 
over the Empire and the level of education had been 
raised. When the people again expressed their desire 
for the constitution, "being satisfied that the fulfil­
ment of this wish would promote the present and future 
happiness of my Empire and Country, I proclaimed the 
Constitution anew without hesitation, in spite of
98those who hold views and opinions opposed to this".
He concluded by expressing an absolute and unalterable
99decision to govern according to the Constitution. 
Abdulhamid was obviously trying to improve his standing 
with Parliament by placing the blame for his past 
misdeeds on his advisers. If this was his aim he
98. Takvim-i Vekayi, ibid.
99. Ibid.
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achieved considerable success. On 31 December, he 
entertained the deputies to dinner at the Palace.
According to one account, he won over a large number 
of them, including his most uncompromising critic and 
opponent, Ahmed R x z a , ^ ^
Both Chambers replied to the Sultan’s speech.^^
Both praised the Sultan for his wisdom and generosity 
in restoring the Constitution, and condemned his ad­
visers for having misguided him. The Senate alone 
called attention to the importance of the Cretan question,
which was totally ignored by both the Sultan and the 
102Chamber. With regard to the conflict with Bulgaria
and Austria, the Chamber promised assistance and support 
to the Cabinet in seeking a solution consistent with 
the honour and the rights of the nation. Internally 
it promised to strive to put in order the finances of 
the Empire, and also to give attention to establishing 
security and peace so that means of prosperity and 
happiness would be insured to everyone in the Empire.
«/ *100. H.C.Yal9xn,»Sultan Hamidin Ilk ve Son ZiyafetiJ Yakxn
Tarihimiz, 1, 46-7; also Lowther to Grey, no.29, con., 
Pera, l4 Jan.,1909, F .0.371/760/2283.
101. The Senate's address was read on 26 December, and 
appeared in Takvim-i Vekayi, 27 Dec.,1908* The 
Chamber’s address was read two days later and 
appeared in Takvim-i Vekayi, 29 Dec.,1900*
102. Takvim-i Vekayi,27 Dec.1908. Lowther thought that this 
omission seemed to indicate that Turkey proposed to ignor. 
the Cretan declaration, and to rely on the Protecting 
Powers for a settlement of the question in a manner fav­
ourable to herself. Lowther to Grey.no.686 t op;c i t 96 -
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The Chamber stressed the need for a uniform justice
as well as free patriotic education in the public
schools. In conclusion Cavit Bey read:
•Nothing but love of fatherland and nation 
comes from our hearts. Our whole aspiration 
is to do good work for the state and nation.
Our guide is the torch of equality and union; 
our aim, justice and right. We have undertaken 
to uphold the rights of thirty million people.
In discharging the duty delegated to us, we 
have no other anxiety than the reorgach of 
conscience and the fear of God.91
With the opening of Parliament and with the
establishment of a constitutional regime, the Sultan
ceased to count as a power to be reckoned with. The
Committee, at least, no longer regarded him as a
possible threat and were content to let him continue
104as a constitutional ruler. Power was for the time
being divided between the Porte and the Committee, and 
had the Porte exercised a little patience, the Committee 
may have eliminated itself on account of factionalism 
within the society. Kefmil, however, resented inter­
ference in government from the CUP, especially as it
103. Takvim-i Vekayi, 29 Dec.,1908.
104. Ahmed Riza and Nazim Bey’s interview. Grey to Lowther, 
pr., London, 13 Nov.,1908; F .0.8OO/I85A .
- 63 -
105was a body with no legal standing in the country.
He had strongly resented Ahmed Riza and Nazim Beyfs 
mission to European capitals where they spoke as if 
they represented the Ottoman Government, When the 
Committee entrusted Kamil Pa^a with the entertainment
of the Balkan Committee, without even consulting him,
a 107 
Kamil was offended and insulted. Essentially it
was the question of a new force challenging the position
of the traditional one; the traditional element could
not but resent this intrusion into its domain.
Kamil Pa^a had never attached much importance
to the CUP. Even after its success in the Istanbul
elections, Kamil did not think it would be able to
108command a majority in Parliament. Kamil had seen
0
105* The Ikdam, the principle organ of the Liberal Union 
accused the CUP of being an illegal body interfering 
with the government, and challenged it to become a 
political party instead#of a secret society. See 
•Cemiyetler, Fxrkalar1, Ikdam, 13 Feb.,1909* The 
Committee had already decided to form a parliamentary 
party, though it continued to maintain the secret 
organisation as well. See Article 3 of 1908 Congress, ' 
Tunaya, Partiler, 206.
106. Lowther to Grey, no.855, con.,Pera, 13 Dec.,1908;
F .0.371/546/43987• As an example of this mission 
see above, n. 48.
107* Ibid.
108. Lowther to Grey, no.415, con.,Constantinople, 12 Dec., 
1908; F.0.371/557/43443.
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the Committee only "as a weapon of* defense against 
109
the Sultan". The Sultan had been the only real
danger to the power of the Porte in the past, and 
Kamil saw him as the only danger in the future. He 
had never thought the Committee capable of seizing 
absolute p o w e r , h e  obviously calculated that it 
would present no problem after it had been used to 
eliminate the Palace. Meanwhile Kamil appeased the 
Committee by making ministerial changes. On 30 November, 
he brought in Manyasizade Refik, the first Unionist to 
enter the Cabinet, as Minister of Justice. Huseyin 
Hilmi Pa^a, who had made a reputation for himself as 
a liberal and who had sympathised with the Young Turks 
while he was Inspector-General of Macedonia, became 
Minister of the Interior.
The Committee was not entirely happy with Kamil 
Pa^a either. During the months of November and December, 
while elections were being held, Kamil threw in his lot
109* Ismail Kemal, Memoirs, 323*
110. Ibid.
111. Lowther to Grey, no.408, con.,Constantinople, 30 Nov., 
1908, F .0 .37l/56l/4l872; also same to same, no.8l8 ,con., 
Constantinople, 2 Dec.,1908, F .0.371/561/42605.
Also Times, 1 Dec.,1908.
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112with the Liberal Union. Therefore throughout these
months, the Committee press attacked the Grand Vezir,
accusing him of failing to carry out his promise of
internal reform, of "slackness and inefficiency both
in domestic and foreign policy, and of an attempt to
113transfer the despotism of the Palace to the Porte."
He was rightly held responsible for failing to come
114to an agreement with Bulgaria and Austria, because 
Kamil was using these negotiations to strengthen his 
hand in Parliament and to constitute a Cabinet of his
~ i:l5own choice.
In spite of all the criticism, there is no 
evidence that the Committee wanted to bring about 
Kamil*s downfall. Talat had informed the British 
Ambassador that the Committee "had great confidence 
inKiarail Pa$k^, who had wide experience and great 
moderation of views, though unfortunately he was 
somewhat old, though still possessing much energy.
...... They had every intention of doing their best
112. Ismail Kemal, 321 ff.
113* fLan Atik bir Sadrazaia1 , gurayx Ummet,15 Dec.,1908T 
and Lowther to Grey, n o .894,ccn.,Pera, 29 Dec.1908, 
F.0.371/760/330.
11A, Ibid.
115* Ismail Kemal, 324.
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to maintain him in p o w e r . T h e  Committee had good 
reasons for retaining KSmil. He was an old and exper­
ienced statesman with liberal views and independent 
ideas• He was respected by almost everyone and actively 
supported by the British Embassy. This last factor 
was important because at this stage and indeed up to 
the Balkan ¥ars, the Young Turks leaned on England 
more than on any other power. Therefore, if the 
Committee were critical of K&mil, it was because he 
was disregarding their policies and trying to end 
their influence. Rather than overthrow him, they 
preferred to retain him providing he did not try to 
become all-powerful.
On 13 January, 1909* Hiiseyin Cahit, Deputy for 
Istanbul and said to be a most fervent critic of K&mii, 
interpellated the latter on his policy since he assumed
office. KAmil Papa’s statement was read before the 
117Chamber. Even Huseyin Cahit was satisfied with the
explanations and the Cabinet received the vote of 
118confidence. Dr. Arif Ismet Bey, Deputy for (^anakkale
116. Lowther to Grey, n o .5^1jcon.,Therapia, 2 Sept.,1908,
F.0.371/559/31787.
117. 12th Session, 2nd sitting,13 Jan.,1909, in Takvim-i Vekayi 
16 Jan.,1909. Huseyin Cahit, 'Sadrazam Pa^anin Izahati’, 
Tanin, 14 Jan.,1909. Ali Kemal, ,TKamil Pa^anin Beyanatx’1, 
jkdam, Ik Jan.,1909.
118. Turkgeldi, 17-18; Huseyin Cahit, ibid.
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summed up the general feeling in the Chamber when he
said that "the Grand Vezir is Young Turkey *b only
119experienced vezir". The interpellation and the
subsequent vote of confidence was seen by the oppo­
sition as a great triumph for themselves and therefore 
a defeat for the Committee, It distorted the relations 
between K3mil and the Committee and made them appear 
like an open struggle for power.
The almost unanimous vote of confidence seemed 
to justify Kamil*s estimate of his own position in 
the Chamber. But it also led him to underestimate the 
Committee*s strength. If the Liberal Union saw this 
event as a defeat for the CUP, the CUP did not see it 
as a victory for the Liberal Union. There was a 
faction in the Committee which wanted to see K&mil 
Pa^a overthrowh. But the Committee as a party had 
decided not to make the interpellation a party issue,
**A deputation composed of Enver Bey and Talat Bey, the 
Vice-President of the Chamber, called on the Grand 
Vezir to inform him that the Committee as a body dis­
associated itself from the hostile attitude towards
120him taken up by some of its members." Kamil saw
119. Ibid., 18.
120. Lowther to Grey, no.29, con.,Pera, 14 Jan.,1909,
F.0.371/760/2283.
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this as a sign of weakness. Thus with the Chamber
behind him and the negotiations with Bulgaria and
Austria still continuing, Kamil decided that it was
a favourable moment to strengthen his position by
appointing his own men to the posts of Ministers of
War and Marine.
Kamil Pa^a made these changes on 10 February.
Nazim Pa^a, Commander of the Second Army stationed at
Edirne, replaced Ali Riza Pa^a as Minister of War.
Vice-Admiral Huseyin Husnu Pa^a replaced Arif Pa^a
122as Minister of Marine. These changes were com­
municated to the Palace, and the Sultan was asked to 
issue an irade sanctioning them immediately. If the
Sultan wanted to interview his new Minister of War,
123he was available at the Palace. On receiving this
urgent request Abdulhamid issued the inade at once,
though he remarked to his First Secretary: fTI know
124Kamil Pa$a, this man wants to become a dictator.11
121. Ismail Kemal, 324.
122. H.K.Bayur, ...Kamil Paga..., 293, ^ * 5  Turkgeldi,18-95 
Cevat, 35; F.McCullagh, The Fall of Abd-ul-Hamid,(1910), 
33 ft** Detailed account in Lowther to Grey, no.93, con., 
Pera, 11 Feb.,1909, F .0.371/760/6295.
123* Cevat, 3 6 ; Ismail Kemal, 324 suggests it was chance that 
Nazim Pa^a w&s to pass through Istanbul at the time.
124. Cevat, 3 6 ; McCullagh, 32.
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The result of these changes was a crisis of
the first magnitude. On 12 February, Hilrai Pa^a
tendered his resignation, protesting that he could
not be a member of a Council of Ministers in which
the President made such changes without consulting
125his colleagues. His resignation was followed by
126those of Hasan Fehmi, Manyasiz&de Refik and Ziya Pa^a.
On the same day a Salonika paper carried the story
that Abdiilhamid had been deposed and Yusuf Izzettin
127had become Sultan. In the capital, there was only
a rumour of such a plot, implicating the ex-Minister of
War. The Committee was quick to deny this and issued
128a proclamation saying so. If the purpose of these
125. Ismail Kemal, 324.
126. Turkgeldi, 20. Ziya Pa^a had intended to resign from the 
Ministry of Finance because he found his task too 
difficult, ibid.
127- Cevat, 3 6 .
128. Cevat, ibid.; text of the Committee’s proclamation in
Ikdam, 13 Feb.,1909; also see The Times, 15 Feb.,1909- 
The rumour of a plot seems to have been quite wide­
spread in the capital, and Lowther took it seriously.
See Lowther to Grey, no.93, op.cit. Kamil Pasa later 
denied his belief in the existence of any conspiracy, 
but claimed that as head of the Government, he was 
bound to take notice of rumours. Interview in Neue 
Freie Presse of 18 Feb.,1909, given in Fortnightly 
Review, LXXXIV, 1909, 397-8.
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rumours was to create a diversion and draw attention
off the ministerial changes, it failed miserably. The
Committee was most alarmed at Kamil's action and was
determined to take him to task in the Chamber. The
Tanin described Kamil Papa's action as a coup d'etat,
an encroachment on the rights of Parliament, and a
129violation of constitutional principles.
The Chamber assembled on 13 February to
interpellate Kamil Pa^a on the dismissal of the two
ministers. Amid the great excitement in the Chamber
that eventful Saturday, it was rumoured that KAmil
130would not appear to answer the interpellation.
Nevertheless the Grand Vezir was summoned to appear
before the House and give his explanation. But Kamil
replied that as the change of the Minister of War
was connected with the important foreign complications,
he could not give any explanation immediately, and
therefore asked for the interpellation to be postponed
129* The Tanin, 12 Feb.,1909 and 'Me$rut£ Idareye Muhim 
bir Darbe', gurayi Ummet, 12 Feb.,1909-
130. 21st Session, 13 Feb.,1^09 in Takvim-i Vekayi,l8 Feb.,
1909 and 19 Feb. 1909; Ikdam, 14 Feb. ,1909; H.C.Yal^n, 
Deniz Kuwetlerinin Zoruyla fekilen Sadrazam, Yakjtn 
Tarihimiz, ii/l4, 46-7- The proceedings of that day 
are also described in Turkgeldi, 18-21; and Lowther to 
Grey, no.102, oon.,Pera, 15 Feb.,1909, F .0 .371/760/7050.
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131until Wednesday the 17th, The Committee saw the
postponement as a political manoeuvre designed to win
enough time to prepare the press and strengthen his 
132position. The Chamber rejected this explanation,
probably influenced by the two petitions sent by the
fleet anchored off Besiktas, demanding an explanation
from the Grand Vezir, and assurances that the Constitution
133was in no danger. Another invitation was sent and
declined. The Chamber then decided to have a vote of 
no confidence against the Grand Vezir. While all this 
was going on, a third note arrived from K&mil Pa^a.
K&mil claimed his right under Article 3& of the Con­
stitution, to postpone any explanation until the 17th.
He claimed he had to do this on account of considerations 
of foreign policy, and threatened to place his resignation
131. For a pro-Kamil account of the crisis see H.K.Bay&r,
. . .K&mil Paga, 293 Tf. and 301; Yalpm, ibid. ; Ismail 
Kemal, 325 relates that when the message from the 
Chamber reached him K&mil was in conference with the 
Austrian Ambassador and therefore could not go to the 
Chamber at once.
132. Yal9in, ibid.
133. Yalpm, ibid. The officers of the First Army, commanded 
by Nazim Pa^a, the new Minister of War, also sent a 
telegram saying while they respected Nazim Pa$a as their 
Commander, they refused to accept his appointment as 
Minister of War, ibid.,^7. Turkgeldi, 19-
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before the Sultan if the Chamber continued to pursue
the matter. He warned the Chamber that if he were
forced to resign, he would publish his explanation
in the press and the Chamber would have to bear the
responsibility for any prejudice that might be caused
134to the state. The threat came too late and the
Chamber passed the vote of no confidence by 198 to 8
"I 7 C
votes. Keimil Paga, meanwhile went to Ifeyhulislam
Cemaluddin and both decided to offer their resignations. 
But even this was too late, because when Cemaluddin 
offered his resignation to the Sultan, the latter had
•1 ijr C
already accepted his dismissal. After the vote,
Ahmed Riza and Tal&t went to the Palace and informed 
the Sultan of the Chamberfs decision. Next day on 
14 February, Huseyin Hilmi Paga was appointed Grand 
Vezir.137
134. Yal9in, 47; Lowther, no.760, op, cit. , Turkgeldi, 20.
135. Ibid., Ikdam, 14 Feb.,1909.
136. Turkgeldi, 20-1. According to Talat Bey this was a 
package deal; Arab deputies agreed to vote against 
Kamil if the Committee agreed to dismiss the Ifeyhulisl&m, 
No reference to this in Cemaluddin.
137. Cevat, 36-8 . Sabah, 15 Feb.,1909.
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Kamil Papa's fall was a great setback for the 
Liberal Union and all other anti CUP elements. Only 
a month earlier, the Chamber had shown its approval 
of K&mil and his policies by giving him an almost 
unanimous vote of confidence. Yet on the second 
occasion only eight deputies had the courage to vote 
against the Committee; about sixty, according to 
Kamil, were intimidated by the Committee and left the
1 7 O
Chamber without voting. The Committee had shown
its supremacy in Parliament and to defeat it constitu-
139tionally now seemed out of the question. The only
way left was to overthrow it by violence.
During the next two months there was a bitter press 
campaign against the Committee, and the Committee organs 
paid back in the same coin. Kamil's fall was seen by 
the British Embassy and British interests in Turkey as 
a blow to their prestige, and therefore the British press 
also joined in the campaign against the Committee. The
138. Kamil Paga's defense in ikdam, 3 April,1909* 'Sadr-i 
Sabik K&mil Paga Hazretlerinin Izahnamesi', and Tanin 
anc* Serbesti, 4 April, 1909* French translation enclosed 
in Lowther to Grey, no.249, con.,Pera, 6 April, 1909,
F.0.371/761/13689.
»
139. Ismail Kemal told Sir G.Lowther that the Liberals could 
only be sure of fifty votes in the Chamber. Lowther to 
Hardinge, n o .16, p r .,Constantinople, 2 March, 1909; 
F.0.800/l84, (Hardinge Papers).
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Levant Herald, an English language paper in Istanbul,
generally associated with the British Embassy, defended
Kamil stoutly and attacked the Committee, thereby
provoking some of its members to demand the expulsion
140of its editor. The opposition was quick to exploit
the British attitude towards the Committee and was
greatly encouraged by it. Anti-CUP articles in the
English press "were welcomed by large sections of the
population and were reproduced with comments by anti-
l4l
Committee organs1’.
In view of their weak position in the Chamber, 
the opposition set out to strengthen their position 
by winning over the British Embassy. Members of the 
opposition visited the Ambassador and kept him informed 
as to the political climate prevailing in the country, 
or more especially in the capital. Sir G 0Lowther wrote 
in one despatch:
"Many who had concealed their real views began 
to pluck up courage and give expression to 
disgust at the unconstitutional and violent
140. Annual Report, 1909, ^ in Lowther to Grey, no.55, con., 
Pera, 31 January, 1910; F ,0.371/1002/4235.
141. Same to same; no.151, con.,Pera, 3 March, 1909,
F .0.37l/76l/89l4; Annual Report, 1909 and 
McCullagh, 31 and 56.
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action of* those who had brought about Kamil 
Pasha1s fall. Many again, strangely enough, 
look to England to help them rid themselves 
of this new despotism of men who, they say, 
have not even the traditions of the Sultanate 
and Kaliphate, while some Deputies have con­
fidentially approached me to express their 
alarm at the disastrous turn things are taking, 
and to appeal to England to ward off the dangers 
which must inevitably supervene from the dictation 
of a secret Committee. ...
"The organs of the latter are indulging in 
fierce attacks on the pro-Kamil papers, and 
some of their articles have a veiled anti- 
English tinge. The bulk of the public feeling 
is as pro-English as before, and would be 
inclined to set down any internal and external 
trouble or mishap as the consequence of the 
Committee's misgufded and unconstitutional 
behaviour. The Sultan, too, at a recent 
audience confidentially expressed to me his 
deep anxiety at the present situation..."
The Young Turks were aware of the value of 
English support, and conversely the undesirability of 
her hostility. They knew that the British Embassy 
attached great importance to Kamil's ministry, and that 
his fall could certainly be seen as a blow against 
British influence. They tried to counteract this 
impression as well as the opposition’s propaganda by 
informing Sir Gerard that they had opposed K&mil only 
for his unconstitutional acts, and they promised to 
withhold their support from any ministry which might
142. Lowther, no.151, op.cit.; Cevat, 39-4l.
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succeed him unless they pursued Kamil's policy of
143friendship to England. On 14 February, Hilmi Pa^a
declared that his policy towards England would be the
same as Kamil's, and that Turkey would continue to
144act an the advice of* His Majesty's Government.
These manifestations of friendship towards England,
though motivated by political expediency, were far
from insincere. They represented the very basis of
whatever foreign policy the Young Turks had since
July 1908. The Committee's desire to conclude an
alliance with England has already been mentioned else- 
145where. But Sir Gerard refused to respond in a
favourable manner. He adopted a cold and patronising
146attitude towards the Committee.
*
143. Huseyin-'Cahid, 'Kab^nenin Sukutu ve Ingiltere', Tanin,
15 Feb.,1909; Annual Report, 1909, 2 ; Sir Gerard refused 
±0 receive the Committee's deputation, telling them that 
if they had a communication to make they should make it 
through official channels. See 'X', Les Courants 
Politiaues dans la Turquie; RMM.,XXI,(1912), 193*
144. Lowthof to Grey,* ho,53 , telCp cm., Constantinople,
15 Feb.,1909; F.0.371/760/6275.
145. Sir E.Grey, op. cit. , F . 0 .800/l85Ai K|
146. To Sir Charles Hardinge he wrote: ” I have been a little 
cold with the Committee which I think has done them good 
for they are aware that our support is essential - on 
the slightest sign of their doing good work I shall be 
more cordial....” Lowther, no.l6 , op. cit, >1.139.
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The CUP, somewhat apprehensive of the pre­
vailing situation, tried to adopt a conciliatory atti­
tude towards the opposition. To the Sultan, the 
Manastir branch sent a telegram reassuring him of
their loyalty and devotion, and denying the existence 
147
of any plot. Paradoxically it was not the Committee
press which attacked the Sultan, but the Serbesti, an
anti-Comnittee paper owned by the Sultan*s brother
148Resad Efendi. To the Liberals, the Committee
offered a truce, urging them in the name of patriotism
to cease attacking the Committee, and to co-operate in
149
finding a remedy for the prevailing situation.
After all the Liberal Union was no less under attack 
from Islamic elements than was the CUP;*^^ the social
147. W. S.Edmonds to Lowther; Monastir, 16 Feb.,1909, no.145 
sal.; F.0.195/2328.
148. Cevat, 40.
4
149• Huseyin Cahit-, *Ittihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Ahrar
Firkasi*, Tanin, ,28 March,1909, and 1Birle^me*, Tanin, 
12 April, 1909 5 Ismail Kemal, 330-1; Lowther to Grey, 
no,151, con.,Pera, 3March,1909, F .0 .371/761/8914.
150. The Muhammedan Union, see above, always spoke of the 
CUP and the Liberal Union as one, both supporting the 
ideal of Ottomanism, Tunaya, Partiler, 274-5, also 279. 
The Liberals were aware of the danger of reaction and 
in October Mutiny at Taj?ki^la, the jkdam, the most 
prominent of the Liberal Union papers had welcomed 
the suppression of the reaction, see above, n. 76.
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policy of some Liberals went further than that of the
Committee. But the Liberals declared that they would
co-operate only if the Committee ceased to be a secret
organisation and refrained from all interference in the
151affairs of the Government and the army. Ismail
Kemal, who had been sounded by both Talat and Hilmi 
Pa^a, replied: nas it was the Committee and the new
Government representing it that had brought things 
to this passl^ it was for them and not for us /the 
Liberal Union/ to seek for a remedy
Thus the campaign against the Committee con­
tinued unabated. On 6 March, the Serbesti published 
a document implicating the Committee in blackmail to
extract money from corrupt officials of the old 
153
regime. A few days later, the same paper wrote
that Niyazi, one of the heroes of the July Revolution, 
had seceded from the Committee, on account of dis-
151- Lowther, no.151, op.cit.
152. Ismail Kemal, 331»
153* Lowther to Grey, no.l8l, con., Pera, 12 March, 1909, 
F.0.371/769/10792.
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satisfaction. But this was promptly denied by
154Niyazi. The situation was aggravated by the
murder of Hasan Fehmi, editor of the Serbesti. The
opposition held the Committee responsible. The failure
155to find the murderer placed the odium on the CUP.
On 7 April, the funeral was used by the opposition
as a demonstration against the Committee, and it
156also revealed the shape events were taking.
Meanwhile, the Committee and the Government
were trying to strengthen their position through
legislative measures. On 3 March, a law was passed
to the effect that notice of public meetings must
be given to the authorities at least 24 hours prior
157to the meeting. Hilmi Pa^a had intended to have
a law passed curbing the freedom of the press, but
154. Niyazi*s repudiation in Yeni Asir, Salonika, 17 March, 
1909» in Consul-General Lamb to Lowther, no.89* sal., 
Salonica, 18 March, 1909, F .0 .195/2328.
155. Tunaya, Isl&mcilik, 128; Cevat, 46; Lowther to Grey, 
no.259, con.,Pera, 9 April,1909; F .0 .371/774/14539. 
McCullagh, 73-4. On 23-4 McCullagh suggests the 
possibility of the Palace*s involvement in the 
murder. Also Cevat, 40,
156. Ali Kemal,*ilk Kurban*, Ikdam, 8 April,1909; Cavit, 
Tanin, 2,3,Sept.,1943; Halide Edib, Memoirs of 
Halide Edib (1926),276; The Times, 8 April, 1909-
157- Ikdam, 4 March,1909; Lowther to Grey, no.176, con,, 
Pera, 10 March,1909, F .0.371/761/9958.
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the opposition to this was so great, that the debate
158on 25 March, proved to be inconclusive. Finally
as a precautionary measure, the Committee decided to
remove the rest of the Yxldxz Guards and replace them
with Anatolians. But the Arab and Albanian troops,
loyal to the Sultan, resisted, and were subdued by
159the Macedonians.
While the Committee was consolidating its 
position, the reactionary forces were getting organ­
ised too. On 5 April, 1909* the occasion of the
+ *
Prophet’s birthday, the Society of Muhammed (Ittihadi 
MuhammedlL) was officially established; it had been 
operating earlier through its organ the Volkan, and its 
political programme was published on 3 March in the 
columns of its paper.^^ Its doctrines and pro­
gramme of action were clerical and strongly opposed
l6lto the idea of union based on the Ottoman ideal.
158. Cevat, 39; Lowther to Grey, no.223* con.,Pera,
30 March 1909, F .0 .371/761/12788.
159. Cevat, 44-5; The Times, 7 April,1909; Lowther to 
Grey, no.231, con*,Pera, 2 April,1909, F.0.371/ 
769/13671.
160. Kuran, 500; Tunaya, 26l ff.
161. Proclamation and programme of the society in 
Tunaya, 270 and 271 ff.
- 81 -
It stood for the rule of the Seriat, and if there 
were to be any union, it must be based on the ideal
162of Islam. The Society was therefore against the
westernising reformism of both the CUP and the Liberal 
Union. Its propaganda was aimed at the religious 
and conservative elements in the Empire, and through 
its organ, the Volkan, the Society was able to exer­
cise considerable influence on the traditional deputies
l6 ^5
in the Chamber and the rank and file in the army.
It was in this atmosphere that the counter­
revolution of 13 April took place. On the night of 
12/13 April the troops of the First Army Corps mutinied, 
over-powered their officers, and led by softas marched
to the Ayasofya Square, near Parliament, demanding
164the restoration of the Jeriat. The Government had
been long aware of the dangerous situation prevailing 
in the capital. But the actual turn of events took it
162. Ibid.,271, clause 3*
163. Ibid.,263 and Ahmet Hiza Beyin H&tiralari, Cumhuriyet,
1 Feb.,1950.
164. Cevat, 48; the counter-revolution is an event of 
great importance in Turkish history, and is a sub­
ject of journalistic interpretations every year on 
the date of its anniversary. The Foreign Office 
Correspondence dealt with the event in considerable 
detail in F.0.371/770 ff., as well as Consular 
correspondence in F.0.195. For a fuller biblio­
graphy see B.Lewis, 1 Emergence 1 212.
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165completely by surprise. Hilmi Pa^a called a
meeting of his ministers and sent out his Chief of
Police to talk to the softas who were leading the
rebellious soldiers to find out exactly what they
wanted. The more articulate of the softas demanded
the dismissal of the Minister of War and the President
of the Chamber, Ahmet Rxza, as well as the restoration
of the §eriat and the restriction of Muslim women to 
l66their homes. The ij>eyhulisl£m, who was sent by the
Sultan to talk to the soldiers, found their demands
almost identical, save that they wanted a pardon from
the Sultan for their actions.
In the Chamber there was utter chaos. The
Committee deputies had fled for fear of their lives,
and softas and soldiers were everywhere. Hilmi Pa^a,
finding his position untenable, went to the Palace
with his Minister of War and Minister of Education,
l68and tendered the resignation of his cabinet. The
165. Colonel Surtees to Lowther in Lowther to Grey, no.307, 
con.,Constantinople, 28 April,1909,F .0.371/771/16541.
166. Hilmi Papa's report in Cevat, 89-90, no.4.
167. Ismail Kemal, 332.
168. Cevat, 48; ibid.,90-2, document 6 , gives the minutes 
of the resignation. It relates the events of the 
days and explains that it is necessary to resign for 
the good of the country; Yunus N$\li, Extracts from 
'ihtilal Ve Inkil&b-i Osmani* in Cumhuriyet,
4 April, 1959.
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resignation was promptly accepted. The Sultan had 
also accepted all the demands of the soldiers, and he 
despatched Ali Cevat, his First Secretary, to Ayasofya 
Square to read the Sultan’s proclamation both in the 
Chamber and before the soldiers, so that order could 
be restored. The next morning, on 14 April, the
royal order appointing Tevfik Pasa Grar.d Vezir was 
drawn up. In the text the Sultan included the appoint­
ment of the two ministers of the armed forces as his 
170prerogative. Tevfik Pa^a refused to accept office
171under these conditions and the Sultan stepped down.
But in fact, the Sultan had already appointed Mu^ir
172Edhem Pa^a, Minister of War.
The CUP seemed to have been completely routed. \
?
Hilmi Pa§a had resigned; members of the Committee had j 
either fled from the capital or were in hiding, and 
their newspaper offices in Istanbul sacked. The Liberal
i
Union had filled the vacuum. It seems worthwhile to
169. Cevat, 49.
170. Ibid.,57; NSdi, op.cit.; Serbesti. 15 April, 1909.
171. Ibid., Turkgeldi, 28.
172. Cevat, 53-4.
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examine the sudden collapse of an organisation, which 
a few days earlier had appeared all-powerful.
The strength of the Committee was always 
exaggerated, and it never amounted to very much in 
Istanbul. The Committee had enjoyed considerable support 
when it was struggling against the despotism of the 
Palace. But once the despotism was destroyed, only 
the expectations of a very few were satisfied, and 
the dissatisfied elements went into opposition. Like 
many of the independence movements of our own day, i
i
the Committee was split into factions once it had
achieved its basic aim; those members dedicated to the
ideal of reform and the creation of a modern state
173were always in a minority. The Committee had
created a number of dissatisfied elements. There 
was the large number of opportunists who had supported 
the CUP in the hope that they would gain high positions 
when the 'Palace' was toppled. Their ambitions were 
frustrated by the Committee's decision not to assume 
office (in the Government). Larger numbers were thrown 
out of work when Abdulhamid's espionage network was 
abolished and when the ministries were reorganised.
All these together formed a strong anti-CUP group. The
173. Y a l ^ m , YT, ii, 180.
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secular policies of the Young Turks alarmed and
alienated the religious elements. The rank and file in
the army, in particular, complained of not being given
time for ablutions and prayers, and resented being
ordered and sworn at by young officers whom they
174
regarded as mere boys. Thus almost all traditional
elements in Ottoman society were opposed to the Committee, 
none more than the Palace and the Porte. They resented 
the intrusion of men with no authority into preserves 
of power which were traditionally theirs. This may 
account for the ready acceptance of the rebels' demands 
by the Sultan and the Porte. After all the counter­
revolution was the traditional alliance between the 
soldiers and the softas, so reminiscent of the days of 
Janissary r u l e . ^ ^
But because the name of the Society of Muhammed 
is intimately linked with the counter-revolution, the 
movement has been regarded as having been purely re­
ligious, and its political significance has almost
174. Cevat, 47; McCullagh, 67 ff.
175* McCullagh, 59. The ulema denounced the Muhammedan
League and its organ, the Volkan "which does not con­
tain good and sincere Mussulmans, but alas! but in­
triguers who seem bent on exploiting religion". Ibid. 
6l. Hikmet Bayur, 297» note 1, found it strange that 
an Islamic paper should have a French name.
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completely been lost. It is doubtful if the rebellion
could have been so restrained and well controlled had
its inspiration been only religious fanaticism. The
rebels searched out only members of the Committee and
with the same care sacked only the offices of the
Committee press. The Liberal Unionists, as much open
to attack from religious fanaticism, were not harmed,
let alone the Christian deputies and foreigners. A
religious outbreak, which would normally have struck
terror in the hearts of Christians, was praised in the
Greek press. The Neologos wrote:
"The Army has gained the great prize for 
patriotism, and April 13, 1909 ought to 
be henceforth marked with no less splendour 
than July 24, 1908. The Array was inspired 
yesterday by its love for the country and 
by no other sentiment." 176
Religion was the vehicle for the political 
struggle which had been continuing since July 1908.
Islam had played a vital role in Ottoman society and 
continued to do so, and used as a weapon against the 
Committee, it provided the opposition with the largest 
audience. The religious aspect of the counter-revolution 
ended with the meaningless demand for the ijeriat; here­
after the politicians took over. The Committee regime 
floundered and the Liberals took its place. Ismail Kemal
176. McCullagh, 59.
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was elected the President of the Chamber, Mizanci 
Murad, who Kamil Pa^a had exiled in October 1908,
17 7offered to support Tevfik establish himself in power.
Even the new ministry was regarded as a stop-gap until 
the situation became calm, and Kamil Pasa could be 
appointed Grand Vezir once again. Then the triumph
of the Liberals would be complete.
The Committee was totally defeated; it only 
remained for the Liberals to convince the Third Army 
in Macedonia that the rebellion had been spontaneous 
and in no way unconstitutional. But this was far from 
easy. The Committee was still all-powerful in Macedonia 
and the Third Army was loyal to the constitution. The 
Palace was bombarded with telegrams from the Macedonian 
provinces, accusing Abdulhamid of destroying the con­
stitutional Government and the constitution, and 
threatening retaliation.^ -79 Macedonia refused to 
recognise Tevfik Pasa's Cabinet and the Committee de­
manded the arrest of certain members of the Liberal Union,
177- See above,
178* Lowther to Hardinge, pr.,no.25» Constantinople, 
l^ t April, 1909, F . 0. 800/lQk, (Hardinge Papers).
179. Cevat, 62.
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namely Ismail Kemal, Mizanci Murad, Kamil’s son Said
Pa^a, the Sultan’s Second Chamberlain, Emin Bey, and
180
some prominent newspapermen. On 17 April, the
Committee passed on from words to action. The ’Action
Army’ (Hareket Ordusu) left Salonika, ostensibly to
restore discipline among the rebellious troops, and
to restore order in the capital. The Sultan welcomed
this, and thought it was a good idea so long as force
idlwas not used. But in the Cabinet the news caused
panic. Some members thought it would be wise to send
a deputation to meet the ’Action Army* before it
reached the capital and to reassure the troops that the
182Constitution had not been harmed.
Deputations were sent to negotiate with the
Array from Salonika, but they met no favourable response;
one of the deputations was not even allowed to return to 
183the capital. The British Ambassador, at the request
t
of Ismail Kemal, instructed his consuls in Macedonia 
,fto assure the population that the Constitution was not
180.. Tiirkgeldi, 29-30.
18L. Cevat, 65-6 .
182. Turkgeldi, 30.
183.. Ismail Kemal, 3^3; Lowther to Grey, no. 287, Con., 
Constantinople, 20 April,1909, F .0.371/771/15783•
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compromised”, thereby hoping to prevent intervention
184from Macedonia. But the Committeefs influence was
too pervasive, and such propaganda was either suppressed
185or countered with propaganda of their own. As a
final bid to prevent the occupation of the capital by 
the 1 Action Army1, the Porte asked Sir Gerard to permit 
Mr. Fitzmaurice to join the delegation which was going 
to negotiate with the Salonika force. The Porte cal­
culated that English support would strengthen their
186
bargaining position and undermine the opposition.
Mr. Fitzmaurice went with the delegation, but when he
reached Stamboul he found that other counsels prevailed
and that it was decided that the deputation should go 
187
alone.
This deputation proved to be a failure too, and 
the troops from Salonika continued to surround the 
capital. Finally, on the night of 23/24 April, the 
’Action Army* began operations, and after some skirmishing
18^. Ismail Kemal, 343; Lowther, ibid.
185. Lowther, ibid,
186. Lowther to Grey, no.129, tel.pr., Constantinople,
17 April, 1909, F.0.371/770/14474^
187. Same to same, no.287, con.,Constantinople, 20 April,
1909, F.0.371/771/15582.
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18 8the capital was occupied. On 22 April, the two
Chambers sat together at Ye^ilkoy as a National 
Assembly. They ratified the proclamation of the in­
vesting army, guaranteed the Constitution and security 
in the country, and declared that the actions of the
army were in conformity with the aspirations of the 
189nation. Five days later, the National Assembly pro­
claimed its decision to depose Abdiilhamid and replace
190
him with his brother Mehmed Re$ad. The National
Assembly’s decision was ratified by a fetva extracted
»• ’191
from an unwilling Jjeyhulislam, * and this marked the end
180. Colonel Surtees...no.307, op.cit.,also a more detailed 
account in Lowther to Grey,n o .303,con.,Pera,28 April, 
1909, F.0.371/771/16537.
189. The proclamation of the Action Army; Ikdam, 21 April, 
1909. Proclamation of the National Assembly, Takvim-i 
Vekayi, 24 April, 1909.
190* The charter announcing the decision to depose
Abdiilhamid in Takvim-i Vekayi, 28 April, 1909; Cevat, 
153-4. Abdurrahman $erif, Minister of Education in 
Hilmi Papa’s Cabinet relates how this decision was 
taken in a secret sitting of the National Assembly. 
’Abdurrahman geref Beyin Eseri’, 19-25; cited in 
Cevat, 145-6; Mente^e, Curahuriyet, 22 Oct.,1946;
Ahmed Riza, Cumhuriyet, 3 Feb.,1960.
191. B.Lewis, Emergence. 213; Turkgeldi, 3 6 . Text of 
the fetva in Cevat, 148.
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of* the counter-revolution, though mopping-up operations 
continued.
The suppression of the counter-revolution 
proved to be a mixed blessing for the CUP. The Liberal 
Union was destroyed as a party though not in spirit; 
but the Committee did not emerge unchallenged. The 
events of 13 April had shown the Committee’s inability 
to control the situation and to maintain law and order.
The chaos that followed forced the army to intervene 
as the instrument of law and order, and not as the 
instrument of the CUP.^^^ Until April 1909, the soldier 
had played the subordinate role to the politician, and 
only junior officers had been members of the Committee.
The revolt brought in the senior officers. Mahmud 
JJevket Pa^a took care to point out that he and his army 
were not acting as agents of the Committee, and that his 
only aim was to see law and order maintained and dis­
cipline in the army r e s t o r e d . ^  Significantly his
1 9 2 . §evket Papa’s proclamation, Takvim-i Vekayi, 26 April 
1909* Also Colonel Surtee’s interview with ^evket 
Pa^a in Surtees to Lowther, no.307, op.cit., and
n o .38 M.A. Constantinople, 12 May,1909, F.0.195/2323 and 
no.39 M.A. Constantinople, 14 May,1909, F .0.195/2323• 
Also Consul Lamb to Lowther, n o •135,sal.tel.,Salonica,
21 April,1909, F.0 .195/ 2328,
19 3 . Proclamation and Surtees, ibid.
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Chief of Staff was no other than Mustafa Kemal, a 
junior officer unconnected with the CUP, and para­
doxically a firm believer in the principle that the
194army should stay out of politics. * But the failure 
of the politicians to maintain law and order brought 
in the soldier, and the establishment of martial law
19*5
made a military dictatorship seem inevitable. ^  
Though this did not take place, the effer.ts of the 
soldier*s growing role in the politics of the Empire 
became apparent in the period that followed.
194. For Mustafa Kemal's role in the Action Army see 
Bayur, i, 299; and Abidin Daver *Hareket Ordusu 
Istanbula Nasxl Girmi^ti*, Cumhuriyet, 24 April,1951*
195. Mandelstam, Sort, 25*
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CHAPTER III
(i) THE MILITARY AND THE CUP
It was pointed out at the end of Chapter II
that the failure of the politicians to maintain law
and order in April 1909 had brought the professional
soldier into the area of politics,.'*’ But the army,
not knowing how to runthe Empire, left the civilians
to govern. It retained, however, the power to veto
any measures it did not approve of. Though the CUP
was the only political association existing at the
time, the army's power of restraint was so effective,
that the government was still far from being a "one
party dictatorship", as it has sometimes been des- 
2
cribed. Nor did the fact that all opposition parties 
were banned bring to an end all opposition to the 
Committee’s policies. There may have been no Liberal 
Union Party (Ahrar Firkasi) in May 1909, but there were 
many Liberal Unionists.
1. See above, .
2. Recai G.Okandan, Amme Hukukumuzun Ana Hatlari, (1959)
345, writes: "The Unionists took advantage of the April
revolt (31 Mart Vak'asl!) and disbanded rival political 
parties, proclaiming a one party dictatorship", and 
Bayur, i,301, wrote: "In short, having saved the nation
from a grave danger, the CUP emerged even stronger than 
before." See also Dani^mend, IV, 3^1.
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The political situation of May 1909 was neatly
summed up by Lieutenant-General Pertev Pa^a, Chief of
Staff to Mahmud {Jevket Pa^a. On being asked what the
intentions of the military authorities were with regard
to the existing political situation, Pertev Pa^a replied:
"I will tell you, my dear friend, there is no 
secret; it is intended that Mahmoud Shevket 
Pasha, who, as you know, is now practically 
Military Dictator, shall become Inspector- 
General of the first three Ordus. There is 
no intention of interfering with the Committee 
of Union and Progress, to which we all belong - 
myself included - but we only acknowledge 
loyalty to its principles in so far that we
have sworn to protect the Constitution ......
♦ *•.♦ and no more officers will join the 
Committee." 3
The army was certainly the most important 
single factor in the politics of the Ottoman Empire.
But it was not politically monolithic. In political 
terms it was divided into three quite distinct groups.
The largest and least important was the rank and file. 
This group, like the civilian populace, could be 
influenced at any moment by the propaganda of the 
popular demagogue. Therefore it had to be kept iso­
lated from political influence. The second group, 
that of the junior officers had been educated in the
3* Pertev Papa's conversation with Conyers Surtees, (Military 
Attache) in C.Surtees to Lowther, no.39, Pera, 14 May, 
1909, F.0.371/776/19410.
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Hamidian military colleges, where politics had un-
4
officially and illegally dominated the curriculum.
They were therefore, at least in 1909, supporters of 
constitutional government and the CUP, and what it 
stood for, namely union and progress. The third group 
was that of the senior officers, men like JJevket,
Mahmud Muhtar and Pertev Pa^as, to mention only a few.
They were professional soldiers who symbolised dis­
cipline. They were determined to create an army free 
from the influence of politics so that the events qf 
13 April could never happen again. In accordance 
with this principle ^evket Pa^a had led the 'Action
Array’ in order to restore order in the capital and
5
discipline in the army.
All power was virtually in the hands of Mahmud
^evket Pa^a.^ Though he did not exercise this power
directly, at first it was always exercised under his
7
personal supervision. The Committee of Union and
4. Ahmet Bedevl Kuran, 'Harbjye Mektebinde Hurriyet Mucadelesi*, 
(n.d.), passim.
5. Cevat, 65-6 .
6 . Halid Ziya U^akligil, Saray ve Otesi, i,(1940),42 and 45*
7* Mahmud Kemal Inal, Osmanlj. Devrinde Son Sadriazamlar, 14 
pts.,(1940-53), 1887TJ where he cites Mahmud Muhtar Pasa's 
work, 'Maziye bir Nazar1, n.Id,and the Political Memoirs 
of an Old Minister(Unnamed), which appeared in Tan on 
21 December, 1937*
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Progress was at this stage almost powerless. Its entire 
organisation in the capital had been completely smashed 
during the counter-revolution. Rather than compete for 
power, the CUP was occupied with trying to regain some
g
of its old power and influence. It could do no other
than to play second fiddle to §evket Pa^a, and it was
in his shadow that it later made its comeback.
Though Sevket Pa^a came from Salonika to uphold
the constitution, he soon made it abundantly clear that
he himself intended to be free of all constitutional
checks. The first manifestation of this came on 18 May
when §evket Pa^a became the Inspector-General of the
9
first three army corps. There was no precedent for 
this post and it seems to have been specially created 
for the prevailing political situation. Being purely 
military in function, it placed §evket Pa^a outside 
the authority of the Minister of War and the Cabinet, 
especially while martial law was in operation, and 
martial law was prolonged until March 1 9 1 1 * ^  In the
8 . U^akligil, 44. For the destruction of the CUP organ­
isation in the capital, see above, f f *
9. Lowther to Grey, no.360, con.,l8 May,1909? F.0.371/ 
776/19411.
#
10. Imperial Irade of 11 August, 1909? prolonging martial
law until March, 1911, in Lowther to Grey, no.6^4, con., 
Therapia, 11 August, 1909, F .0.371/779/30767.
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following year when the Committee Hried to rationalise 
the finances of the Empire by means of a budget, Jj>evket 
Pa^a refused to allow the Ministry of Finance to inspect 
military expenditure.^
Mahmud §evket Papa's desire to be independent of 
the Cabinet probably sprang from the soldier’s innate 
suspicion of the civilian, especially with regard to 
military affairs. The Porte also resehted the army's 
independence and its interference in government, since 
this violated the principles of modern centralised 
government which the Committee had set out to intro­
duce in July 1908. But in spite of such major dif­
ferences, the army and the Committee had something in
common which enabled them to work together. They both 
shared the patriotic ideal of territorial integrity, or
i
as Halide Edib has so aptly described the CUP, they j ;
12 ^were both "Empire men".
It was in this political atmosphere that Huseyin Hilmi Pa$a
13was appointed Grand Vezir for the second time. Tevfik
11. See below, <3? ff’
12. Halide Edib, M e m o i r s 266.
13• Hatt-x Humayun,dated 15 Rebiulahir, 1327,(5 May,1909) 
appointing Hilmi Fa$a Grand Vezir in Inal, xi,l671.
Five days earlier, Tevfik Pa^a had been confirmed in 
his office of Grand Vezir by a Hatt-x Huoaynn dated 
1 May,1909. See Stamboul, 2 May 1909•
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Pa§a, hovrever acceptable he may have been, had to go
simply because he had come to power during the April
revolution. Hilmi Pa^a was restored to his old position
because he had been overthrown by the counter-revolution- 
14aries. His reappointment was not popular with all
sections of the Committee. They made this quite clear
on 24 May when Hilmi Pa^a came before the Chamber to
present his programme and to ask the House for a vote
15of confidence. He came under heavy attacks, but 
finally the Chamber gave him the vote 191 to 5* The 
Committee probably thought it expedient to do so because 
a Cabinet crisis at such a critical stage would have 
proved fatal to parliamentary government. There seems 
to be some truth in what a Cabinet minister is re­
ported to have told the British Ambassador: "that had
the Committee not arranged to give a vote, Mahmoud Shevket
14. U^aklxgil, 80-1, suggests that Hilmi Pa$a was brought back 
as a symbol of the Committee’s influence and strength. 
Talat Bey cited by Turkgeldi, 40, said that the re­
signation of Tevfik Papa's Cabinet was regarded as being 
essential on account of the great excitement in the 
provinces. - It is not likely that the Committee had 
much to say in Hilmi Papa’s appointment. The Cabinet 
did not include a single Unionist, while it had Ferid Pa$a 
as Minister of the Interior, and he was definitely 
hostile towards the Committee.
c t
15« Heyet-i Vukelanin Programi in Tanin, 25 May, 1909, 2.
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Pasha might have felt obliged to suad the House about
l6its business". It was much too early to challenge 
the army. Before it could take on such a task, the 
Committee had to re-establish itself in the capital.
In July 1908, the Committee of Union and Progress 
had been faced with the problem of what to do with the 
power they had so suddenly acquired. The Unionists were 
essentially conservative and had no intentions of des­
troying the existing governmental machinery. Therefore 
they left the elder statesmen in power, and set them­
selves up as guardians of the constitution. But in 
April 1909 the ease with which the non-Unionist Cabinet 
of Hilmi Pasa succumbed to the rebels, made the Committee 
realise the need to strengthen their position by direct 
participation in government. They did not intend to 
take over the Cabinet overtly. They thought they could
solve the problem by introducing Unionist deputies into
17the different ministries as under-secretaries. In 
this way, the Committee would be able to influence the 
minister without offending traditional prejudice, and 
also acquire the necessary experience to be able to take
16. Lowther to Grey, no.378, con.,Pera, 25 May,1909, F.0.371/ 
761/20293.
17. H.C.Tallin, Talat Pasa, 37.
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over the ministries at a later date. The Gommittee had
already secured its position in the Palace, by having
Halid Ziya appointed as the Sultan’s First Secretary and
l8Tevfik Bey as his Second Chamberlain. The under­
secretaries were expected to serve a similar though 
more important function in the cabinet.
Some members of the Committee discussed this
19idea for the first time during the counter-revolution.
But nothing was done until the revolution had been
crushed. On 6 May (23 Nisan, 1325)» Cavit and Talat
went to see Mahmud J=>evket Pa^a in order to win him over
to their side. But the latter dismissed them with a
20few patronising words. They then went to see the 
Grand Vezir, but Hilrai Pa^a was no less discouraging.
He told them that in no country were under-secretaries
18. U^akligil, i, 20-4; also Mehmed Kaplan, 'Halid Ziya' 
in IA, V/i, Istanbul, 1948, 146.
19. Mehmed Cavitf'Me^rutiyet Devrine ait Cavit Beyin 
Hatiralarl', Tanin, 8 Sept.,1943.
20. Ibid., Cavit wrote of the interview with §evket Pa^a: 
"He became patronising; he considered us rather young 
and thought that we were trying to attain position.
'You will become under-secretaries, do not be in a 
hurry; when you gain experience you will even become 
ministers', he said". See also Yal^in, Talat Paga, 37*
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21to be found in the Cabinet. Discouraged but undaunted,
the Committee decided to take the matter before the 
Chamber•
If deputies were to be allowed to hold the
office of under-secretary, Article 67 of the Constitution
would have to be modified. This article laid down that
a deputy could not hold, at the same time, any other
government appointment. Though a minister could be
elected a deputy, other officials elected as deputies
were obliged to resign their office if they accepted
22their ipandate as deputy. A motion of amendment had 
first to be passed by the Chamber of Deputies by a 
two-thirds majority of its members, then approved by
the Senate by a similar majority, and finally sanctioned
» 23by Imperial Irade, before it came into force. In theory,
21. Cavit, ibid.,wrote; "Hilmi Pa?a claimed that in no 
country were under-secretaries to be found in the cabinet." 
Yal9in thought that the old generation did not wish to
dig its own grave by preparing younger men to take over.
See Yalpm, Talat Pa^a, 37; Turkgeldi, 43 and Hilseyin 
Cahit, 'Muste^arlar meselesi’, Tanin, 19 May, 1909*
22. Gozubuyuk and Kili, 32. The official text of the con­
stitution in French is in G ,Aristarchi, Legislation 
ottomane, V, (1878  ^ 17.
23. Ibid., Article 116, 3&; Aristarchi, 24-5.
- 102 -
a vote in the Chamber should have been easy to 
obtain. There was no opposition in June 1909 and 
the House was packed with Unionists. But the Comm­
ittee itself was divided over the issue of under­
secretaries. In the Party and the Society there
were those who did not approve of the idea of choosing
24under-secretaries from among their members.
The problem was brought before the Chamber 
25on 1 June, 1909* Hilmi Pa^a read the modified
version of the article and then submitted the text
to the Committee for the revision of the constitution.
There was a debate in the Chamber on 12 June which
was so long and heated, that finally a closure had 
26to be voted. The issue was then put to the vote
by a show of hands. (This seems to have been Ahmed 
Riza1s device to steam-roll the issue in favour of 
the Committee•) But when Ahmed Riza announced that
24. h .C .Yal9in, Talat Paga, 37.
25. 84th Session, 1 June,1909 in Takvim-i Vekayi, 3 June, 
1909, 8 . and *Chronique Parlementaire*, Stamboul,
2 June,1909, 2 ; 'A La Chambre Ottomane', The Levant 
Herald, 2 June,1909, 2 .
26. 91st Session, 12 June,1909 in Takvim-i Vekayi, 22,. 
June, 1909; Report of the Proceedings of the Turkish 
Parliament during the month of June,1909, enclosure 
in Lowther to Grey, no.624, con.,Therapia, 4 Aug., 
1909, F.0.371/761/29787, 9-10.
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it had been accepted by a majority, there was an up-
27roar in the House. Several deputies demanded a vote 
by ballot on the whole question. It was decided, at 
last, to vote by ballot on the question whether the 
post of under-secretary was compatible with the man­
date of a deputy. The result of the vote was 113 for 
and 74 against, and since this did not constitute a
28two-thirds majority the question was left undecided.
On Thursday, 17 June, discussion was again revived.
But the opposition was still too great and Talat
29withdrew the motion on behalf of the Committee.
In view of this failure to have Article 67 
modified, the Unionists revised their entire policy.
They decided to place some of their more prominent 
and talented members directly into the Cabinet. The 
policy of moderation and co-existence vis-a-vis the 
Hilmi Pa^a Cabinet was brought to an end. And an
27. Ibid., all references.
28. Ibid.; both Stamboul and the Levant Herald of 18 
June,1909 give the result as 108-75•
29* 95th Session, 17 June,1909 in Takvim-i Vekayi,27,28 
June 1909, 12 ff and 3 ff, respectively. See also 
'Chronique Parlementaire1, Stamboul, 18 June,1909, 2.
This time the debate was on another issue and not the 
under-secretaries at all. The opponents of the scheme 
argued that the measure had been defeated in the Chamber, 
or at least had not obtained the two-thirds majority 
needed to change the constitution. Therefore it was 
now unconstitutional to re-open the issue.
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attempt was made to introduce unity and discipline
into the society, since experience had shown that
measures in the Chamber were defeated because the
Committee deputies failed to support them.
Manyasizade Refik was the first Unionist to 
30become a minister. But on account of his untimely
death he had not been able to play a role of any 
31significance. It was not he but Cavit Bey, deputy 
for Salonika and a prominent member of the CUP, who 
was the first real Unionist in the Cabinet. He 
joined the Cabinet in June 1909 as Minister of Finance, 
and in the years that followed played a role of great 
importance.^
In July 1909, the Committee seem to have con­
sidered the possibility of bringing down the Hilmi 
Pa^a Cabinet, and in its place setting up a new Cabinet 
much more unionist in complexion. Unable to have a
3 0 o Tunaya, Siyasl Partiler, 177-
31. See above, Chap• II, -S'S*
32. Lowther to Grey, no.497, con.,Therapia, 28 June,1909,
F.0.371/777/25107. Hiiseyin Cahit wrote: "Cavit Bey 
may be counted as the first Minister of Finance since 
the Revolution of July 10." "Riitbesiz Nazir", Tanin,
27 June,1909. For a brief account of Cavit!s activities 
during this period see D.A.Rustow, Article Djawid Bey 
in El2 .
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Grand Vezir from amongst their number, they secretly
approached Kamil Pa$a and offered him his old office
on condition that he include some Unionists in his
Cabinet, especially Talat Bey as Minister of the 
33 aInterior. Kamil did not reject this proposal but 
pointed out the shortcomings of the Committee can-
34didates, and at this point the matter seems to have 
been dropped.
Meanwhile attacks on the Cabinet continued.
The Tanin of 20 July accused the Cabinet of containing 
members attached to the old regime, and demanded that 
the government be handed over to active, honourable, and
33* Lowther to Grey, pr .,Constantinople, 20 July,1909, 
F.0.800/76. Sir Gerard*s informant was Kamil Pa^a 
himself. On its intention to replace Hilmi Pa§a 
with a candidate of its own, the Committee wrote to 
the Eastern Question Association in Putney:
’’Hilmi has upset our projected Bulgarian alliance 
and will not hold long as Grand Vizir if he does 
not give way. Talaat would not consent to be nom­
inated Grand Vizir and he is right to keep out of 
it for a time. Kiamil Pasha is friendly to us now, 
but his chances are not improved for re-appointment 
as Grand Vizir in consequence of his name having 
been pushed forward by your Embassy which ought 
to desist if it really wishes to help him.” (N) 
Committee of Union and Progress to Mr.Atkin, 
(Secretary of the Eastern Question Association), 
Salonica, 2 Sept.,1909, in F .C .371/ 780/33878.
34. Lowther..., ibid. , Kamil’s objection to Talett be­
coming a minister was that he had been an employee 
in the telegraph office on £3 a month.
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35trustworthy men, men of the new regime. Three days
later on the anniversary of the revolution, the Central
3 6Committee in Salonika issued a proclamation. As
Ottomans, all the different elements in the country
were called upon to sink their differences in the
interests of the nation as a whole. They were urged
to replace the Cabinet, which was full of men imbued
with the traditions of the old regime, by a younger
Cabinet whose youth and enterprise alone could save 
37the country. As a consequence of these attacks,
Ferid Pasa, whose name was intimately connected with
the old regime, resigned as Minister of the Interior,
3 ft
and his place was taken by Talat.
With Cavit and Talat in the Cabinet the 
Committee*s position was more secure. The Committee 
now set out to remedy the factionalism and lack of 
unity amongst its members in the Chamber. As early 
as December 1908, even before Parliament had met, Sir 
35« Tanin, 20 July,1909* 1.
3 6 . Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyetinin Osmanlilara Beyannamesi, 
Text in Tanin, 2k July, 1909.
37. Ibid.
38* Lowther to Grey, no.263, conC o n s t a n t i n o p l e ,
7 August, 1909, F.0.371/761/29709.
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Gerard Lowther had predicted that deputies elected
on the Committeefs ticket would not always vote with
39it in the Chamber. This prediction was vindicated 
when the Committee was forced to disown its dissident 
members who insisted on voting against Kamil Pasa 
on 13 January, 1 909*^
The Committee, realising its weak position 
in the Chamber, tried a political manoeuvre. At an 
official dinner of the CUF at the Pera Palas Hotel 
on 12 March, Hilmi Pa$a announced that the Committee 
had renounced its old role since the opening of
4lparliament in order to form a political party.
The purpose of this announcement was to appease the 
dissidents in the Chamber who wanted independence of 
action, and the opposition who challenged the Committee 
to come out into the open. Having made this concession 
to its deputies, the Committee hoped they would vote
39* Lowther to Grey, no.855T con.,Pera, 13 December,
1908, F.0.371/5^6/43987.
40. See above, Chap.II, '
41. The Levant Herald, 15 March,1909- - This was the first 
official announcement of a parliamentary party within 
the CUP. A few hours before the outbreak of 13 April, 
it was repeated with a view* to calming down the 
opposition and avoiding the fast approaching calamity. 
See Tunaya, Siyasj Partiler, 183; and McCullagh, 
Abd-ul-Haraid, 74.
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In accordance with its wishes. On 12 June, the same 
day as Article 67 was to be discussed in the Chamber, 
the press published the official charter of the
4 2
Parliamentary Party of Union and Progress. The 
concession did not have the desired result and 
Article 67 was not modified. Unity seemed to be as 
far away as ever. Just before the Second Congress of 
the CUP, Huseyin Cahit wrote an article on the pos-
43
ition of the Society and the Party. He called for
unity and discipline and pointed out that those
deputies who had been elected under the auspices of
the Committee, had a duty to obey its orders. But
to those deputies and members of the Committee who
did not like its programme, he offered the alternative
of making their own programme and forming a separate 
44party. In February 1910 some Unionist deputies,
as if acting on Cahit Bey's advice, formed the Ahali
Firkasx (People's Party) and ended the myth of a
45monolithic Committee.
42. Meclisi Meb u s a m  OsmanidenMute^ekkil Ittihad ve 
Terakki Firkasxmn Niaamnamei Dahilisi, text in 
Tunaya, Siyasi Partiler, 210-11.
43.*Cemiyet ve Fxrka, Tanin, 7 Sept.,1909*
44. Ibid.
45. Tunaya, Siyasi Partiler, 294-3*
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The conflict between the civilians and the 
military was much more complex, and is therefore more 
difficult to put ones finger on. In theory both 
elements were allied against reaction and committed 
to the Constitution. In practice they differed on 
the question of power. The military, having restored 
a constitutional regime, recognised the civilians' 
legal right to power. The civilians, in their turn, 
conceded to the military the right to interfere in 
politics by consenting to the establishment of martial 
law, which in practice placed the military above the 
civilian adnmistratfon. The result was an ambiguous sit­
uation with two legal authorities enjoying undefined 
powers.
Huseyin Cahit*s article of 26 October was an 
attempt to find a solution to this situation favour-
46able to the Committee. He appreciated the army's
role in defending the constitution, but pointed out 
that further interference was unnecessary now that 
a constitutional regime was firmly established. He 
warned that continued interference would be harmful
46. Htiseyin Cahit, *Askerler ve Cemiyet;, Tanin, 
26 Oct.,1909.
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both to the state and to military discipline.
Because of the changed situation, the Committee had 
decided that in future soldiers would not be members 
of the Committee, its clubs, or in any way be con­
nected with it. But at the same time they would
hbnot leave the Committee. This double talk can only 
be taken to mean that while the Committee expected 
the senior officers to opt out of politics, it ex­
pected junior officers to continue supporting it.
Mahmud §evket Pa^a was of the opposite view.
He expected all (junior) officers to terminate their 
affiliations with political parties and societies, 
since political involvement undermined the unity 
and discipline of the army. The Imperial pro­
clamation of 29 May, appealing to officers in the 
armed forces to stay out of politics, made this quite 
plainl^ In a speech at Second Army headquarters at
hi. Ibid.
hb. Ibid. , also see Tunaya, Siyasi. Partiler, 183-^.
k 9 . Consul Lamb to Lowther, tel.,no*135 sal., Salonica, 
21 April,1909, F.O.195/2328o
30. Hatt-i Humayun dated 16 May,1325 in Tanin, 30 May* 
1909, 2 .
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Edirne in November, Jgevket Pa^a personally urged 
his officers to abstain from politics. As an ex­
ample of exploiting the army for political ends, he 
pointed to Colonel Sadik*s election as the Committee*s 
delegate in negotiations between the Committee and 
the P orte.^
The differences between the military and the 
Committee were not always expressed in such open terms. 
More often they were shrouded in the Anglo-German 
rivalry then taking place in the Ottoman Empire.
The Committee looked to Britain and the military to 
Germany, and any criticism of Germany in the Committee 
press could be taken to mean criticism of the military. 
This also partially explains the Committee’s
A eg
feelers to Kamil Pa^a in July 1909* Kclmil was a 
notorious Anglophile and was known to have the support 
and goodwill of the British Embassy at Istanbul. He 
also had the prestige and experience necessary to 
become independent of Ifevket Pa^a, something which 
Huseyin Hilmi did not seem to be anxious to do.
51» Mr.Marling to Grey, no.896, con., Constantinople,
10 Nov.,1909, F.0.371/761/41733.
52. See above, 105.
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July 1909 seemed a good time for the Committee to
attempt to bring about a rapprochraent with Britain,
An Ottoman Parliamentary Delegation was visiting
53Paris and London, and General Van der Goltz was in
54
Istanbul to reorganise the army.
In December, a project to amalgamate the
Hamidieh, an Ottoman navigation company on the River
Euphrates, and the Lynch Company, a British concern,
became another occasion to air the conflict between
55the Committee and Sevket Pasa. The Committee press 
ascribed the opposition to the fusion scheme to German 
instigation. Ijevket Pa^a and Vo.n der Goltz were 
accused of planning to overthrow the CUP in order to
56set up a military regime devoted to German interests.
53. Lowther to Grey, n o .510,con.,Therapia, 1 July,1909*
F . 0.371/778/25*t36 » and The Times, 16 July,1909*
54. Lowther to Grey, no.552, con.,Therapia, 1^ July,1909, 
F.0.371/775/27099.
55• There is a very detailed documentary account of the 
•Lynch Affair* in F .0.371/759°
56. Jeune Turc, 12 Decembre,1909 , enclosure in Marling to 
Grey, no.967, v.con.,Constantinople, 14 Dec.,1909,
F .0 .37l/78l/46o6l. The main opponent of the fusion 
scheme was Babanzade Ismail Hakki, deputy for Baghdad. 
He was a very prominent Unionist and opposed to fusion 
on the grounds that Britain was already powerful in • 
Iraq, and control of the river system would make her 
even more powerful. As a good Unionist he wanted the 
Porte to strengthen its hold in Iraq, rather than make 
it weaker. - The whole problem was of course linked 
with the Baghdad Railway and German interests therein.
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There were further attacks on Germany in the Tanin,
57particularly in the issue of 17 December. These
attacks were so displeasing to the military that it
was thought that Cahit Bey would be summoned before
58the court-martial. Though Cahit Bey was not summoned,
59the court-martial suspended the Tanin on 22 December.
The military made it quite clear as to who had the 
real power.
In the Chamber, the Lynch Affair aroused much 
spirited debate.^ Finally Hilmi Pa^a, who favoured 
the fusion scheme, asked for a vote of confidence.
The vote he received was almost unanimous.^ Yet in 
spite of his mandate from the Chamber, Hilmi Pafa
57. Huseyin Cahid, *Almanlar ve Osmanlilar, Tanint 17 Dec., 
1909. See also Mr.Marling to Grey, n o •99^, con., 
Constantinople, 26 Dec.,1909, F .0 .371/ 992/178.
58. Mr.Marling, ibid.
59. Yeni Tanin, 23 Dec.,1909*
60 .*Chronique Parlementaire\ Stamboul, 30 Nov.,1909, 2 .
The interpellation of Hilmi Fasa on this subject was 
asked for by three deputies from Mesopotamia. See also 
Stamboul, 13 Dec.,1909, *Chronique Parlementaire1;
'L'Affaire Lynch a la Chambre1, - also The Levant Herald,
30 Dec.,1909*
61. Stamboul, 14 Dec.,1909; Levant Herald, 14 Dec.,1909°
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tendered his resignation on 23 3e cember. The 
resignation was accepted and the office offered to 
Hakki Pa^a, Ambassador to Rome, After some hesi­
tation and negotiations, Hakkf Pa^a accepted and the 
Hatt announcing his appointment was issued on
6>r
12 January, 1910.
(ii) THE PERIOD OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
The first session of the Ottoman Parliament
64ended on 27 August, 1909. It was a long and event­
ful session, and for the sake of convenience may be 
divided into three quite distinct periods. The first 
period lasted from the opening of parliament on 17
December, 1908 to the fall of Kamil Pa^a on 13 February, 
65
1909. During this period parliament was more con­
cerned about the crisis brought on by Austria-Hungary1s 
annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Bulgaria’s
6 2 . Yeni Tanin, 29 Dec.,1909; and also Sabah and Ikdam of 
the same date.
6 3 . A .A .A .(Adivar), Ibrahim Hakki Pa^a, _IA, V/ii, 892, 
Hatt-i Humayun in Yeni Tanin, 13 Jan.,1910.
64. Tanin. 28 Aug.,1909.
6 5 . See above, Chap. II, SH ff
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declaration of independence, than with legislation. 
Moreover, the Chamber was still too inexperienced 
and inarticulate and lacked the unity necessary for 
legislating. The second period began with Kamil’s 
fall and ended with the deposition of Abdulhamid II 
and the accession of Mehmed V in May 1909* The 
failure of the revolt of 13 April temporarily dis­
credited the conservative, anti-reformist element in 
the Empire, and gave an impetus to the radical, 
reformist group in the Chamber. It was, therefore 
during the third period, lasting from the beginning 
of May to 27 August, that most of the legislative work 
was done.
In his closing address to the Chamber Ahmed
Riza, President of the Chamber, summed up the legis-
66lative work of the first session. The Government
had submitted 73 Bills to the Chamber. The Chamber
had passed 53 of these after discussion, and the
remainder had gone to various committees. Deputies
had submitted 668 motions to the House, of which 158
were accepted and passed on to the competent ministries
8 7by special committees appointed for the purpose. Ahmed
66. Ahmed Riza’s speech in Tanin, op.cit, n.64.
67. Ibid,
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Riza was simply pointing out that the Chamber had
legislated on almost every kind of problem, from the
vital to the trivial. The Chamber had passed such an
important law as the 'Law of the Provisional Budget 
68of 19091, as well as laws of minor importance, such
as the 'Law Prohibiting the Use of Spirits of Wine
69in Beverages'. Essentially the purpose of the 
legislation enacted in this period was three-fold. 
Firstly, to write into the constitution the political 
changes which had taken place since July 1908.
Secondly, to modernise and give unity to the Ottoman 
Empire and its administrative machinery. Finally, 
and closely bound up with the second aim, to enact 
such legislation as to make the capitulations un­
necessary, and thus bring about their abolition.
The question as to who was the supreme authority 
in the Empire had already been decided in favour of 
the Chamber of Deputies. The amendments legalised 
the fait accompli. Of the 119 articles of the 1876 
Constitution, 21 were modified, one annulled and three
68. Takvim-i Vekayi, l6 March, 1909•
69 . Takvira-i Vekayi, 30 Aug.,1909.
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70new ones were added on. Not all the modifications 
recorded a change in the power structure; some,
71Article 28 for example, were changed only verbally*
But the amendment of Articles, 3, 7* 27, 77 and 113 
virtually mark the end of the Sultan’s power and 
prerogatives. The modified version of Ai'ticles 29,
30, 33, 38, 44, 33 and 54 show how completely the 
Porte had fallen into the shadow of Parliament.
Article 3 which had vested unconditional 
sovereignty in the House of Osman was revised. Sov­
ereignty was made conditional on the Sultan’s oath 
before the General Assembly to respect the ijjeriat
and the Constitution, and to remain faithful to the
72country and to the nation. The Sultan’s prerogative 
to nominate and revoke ministers was omitted from 
Article 7* Though he was permitted to nominate persons 
to high office, he had to do so in conformity with 
special laws* He retained most of his old prerogatives,
though the right to make a treaty of almost any kind
70. H.N.Kubalx, Kanun-i Esasi, in IA,vi,170.
71. The 1909 amendments of the 1876 Constitution are pub­
lished in Takvim-i Vekayi,4 Sept.,1909* The modern( 
Turkish text of these amendments is found in Gozubuyuk 
and Kili, op.cit.,70-3 and the complete text of the 1876 
Constitution on 25-38. For convenience all future 
references to the Constitution will be made to 
Gozubuyuk and Kili and Aristarchi, op.cit# n.22.
72. Gozubuyuk and Kili, old article on 25, modified version 
70 (article 3); Aristarchi, 7»
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which had been his in the past, was now made subject
73to the approval of Parliament.
The appointment of ministers was taken out
of the hands of the Sultan. He still retained his
prerogative to appoint the Grand Vezir and the
Seyhulislam. But the duty of choosing the rest of
the Cabinet was vested in the Grand Vezir, who was
expected to submit his list to the Sultan for his
sanction. In the same way, the President and the
two Vice-Presidents of the Chamber of Deputies were
no longer appointed by the Sultan. They were elected
by the deputies and the result of the election was
75submitted to the Sultan for his sanction. Finally, 
Article 113* that notorious article which had given 
the Sultan the right to banish anyone who was regarded
as a danger to the security of the State, and which
had been used to exile Midhat Pa^a, the architect of 
the 1876 Constitution, was so completely modified that 
the Sultan was not even mentioned in it.
73* Ibid.,(Article 7)* 25 and 70; Aristarchi, 7-8.
7^fc. Ibid.,(Article 27), 27 and 70; Aristarchi, 10.
75. Ibid,,(Article 77), 33 and 72; Aristarchi, 18.
76. Ibid.,(Article 113), 37 and 73; Aristarchi, 2A.
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The result of the modification of these five
articles was that the Sultan "reigned but no longer
ruled". His function in the government of the Ottoman
Empire was restricted to confirming decisions already
taken by the Cabinet or Parliament.
The Unionists were as determined to curb the
powers of the Porte as those of the Palace. That is
why they had taken such a firm stand against Kamil
Pa^a, bringing about his fall in 1909* The amendments
were a manifestation of the weakened position of the
Porte. Article 29 limited the discretionary power
77which had been the Grand Vezir's in the past.
Ministers were made responsible to the Chamber of 
Deputies, jointly for the overall policy of the gov­
ernment, and individually for the policy of their 
departments•^
In case of any disagreement between the 
Cabinet and the Chamber, the Cabinet had either to 
submit to the ruling of the Chamber or resign. If 
the Cabinet resigned and a new ministry was formed which
77* Ibid.,(Article 29), 27 and 71? Aristarchi, 10.
78. Ibid.,(Article 30), 28 and 71? Aristarchi, 10.
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adopted its predecessor’s posture, and if the Chamber
rejected it with a vote of no-confidence, the Sultan
was bound to dissolve the Chamber and order new elections
in accordance with the Constitution. But if the new
Chamber maintained the decision of its predecessor, then
the ministry was obliged to abide by the ruling. In
79short, the last word was always with the Chamber.
The Cabinet became almost totally dependent on the
goodwill of the Chamber. The Chamber could summon,
by a majority vote, a minister and interpellate him
on any matter. If after the interpellation a vote of
no-confidence was passed, the minister would fall.
If the minister happened to be the Grand Vezir, his
80Cabinet would fall with him.
In the past, all proposals for new legislation
had gone through the Cabinet, which had drawn up the
Bill. But Article 53 was revised in 1909* Initiative
for legislation could now come directly from both
Chambers, and legislation could be carried out without
the Cabinet’s intervention, though it had to be sanc-
81tioned by the Sultan before it became law. Article 
5k strengthened Parliament's hold over the legislative 
process further.^
79. Ibid.,(Article 35), 28 and 71; Aristarchi, II.
80. Ibid..(Article 38), 29 and 71; Aristarchi, 12.
81. Ibid.,(Article 53), 30-1 and 72; Aristarchi, 14-15.
82. Ibid.,(Article 54), 31 and 72; Aristarchi, 15,
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If one of the aims of amending the constit­
ution was to weaken the executive and strengthen the 
legislature, it was fulfilled beyond all expectations. 
Ever since July 1908 the Unionists had placed the 
hopes of their reform movement in a strong parliament, 
which they expected to act as a counter-balance to the 
more conservative forces in the Palace and the Porte. 
How powerful they had succeeded in making Parliament 
only became clear in 1912, when the Committee found 
the Chamber of its own creation unmanageable. But in 
1909, for better or for worse, the centre of gravity 
had definitely shifted in favour of the legislature.
Apart from the constitutional amendments, the 
Chamber passed other legislation whose aim seems to 
have been to curb some of the freedom released by the 
Revolution of 1908, and to prevent the recurrence of 
a counter-revolution of the type that had just been 
suppressed. With these legislative measures the 
Unionists also tried to centralise the government and 
to bring unity to the Empire by "ott organizing" all 
the diverse elements therein. Thus within the span of 
a few months the Chamber passed the "Law on Vagabondage
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83 84and Suspected Persons', the 'Law on Public Meetings',
8 3
the 'Laws on the Press and Printing Establishments',
86the 'Law on Strikes', the ’Law concerning the Con-
87 88scription of non-Muslims', the 'Law on Associations',
and the 'Law for the Prevention of Brigandage and
Sedition'»^
The purpose of these laws was to place in the
government's hands the power to curb any movement
expressing dissatisfaction against its policies. The
'Law on Vagabondage and Suspected Persons' curbed
any kind of individual action, while the 'Law on
Public Meetings' made any public protest impossible.
Before any meeting, the organiser was expected to
present a written declaration stating his name and
8 3 o Takvim-i Vekayi, 14 May,1909* Text (French) in Lowther 
to Grey, no.5o3, con.,Therapia, 26 July,1909, F.0.371/ 
779/28919.
84. Takvim-i Vekayi, 17 June,1909* Translation of law in 
Lowther to Grey, no.466, con.,Therapia, 22 June,1909 
F.0.371/777/23981.
8 5 . Printed as two separate laws in Takvim-i Vekayi,
31 July,1909. Texts of both laws in Lowther to Grey, 
no.655t con.,Therapia, Aug.11, 1909, F .0.371/779/30768•
86 . Takvim-i Vekayi. 15 Aug.,1909*
87 . Takvim-i Vekayi, 11 Aug.,1909*
88 . Takvim-i Vekayi, 23 Aug.,1909* French text in Stamboul,
24 Aug.,1909.
89 . Y.H.Bayur, i, 306.
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profession, and indicating the place, date and time 
of the meeting. The 'Laws on the Press and Printing 
Establishments', while not actually censoring the news­
papers, acted as a great restraint on the freedom of 
the press. The anti-strike law checkmated any action 
that might have been taken by the growing labour move­
ment. And the 'Law of Association', the 'Law for the 
Prevention of Brigandage and Sedition', and the 'Law 
on the Conscription of non-Muslims' were a belated 
attempt to end the difference existing among the various 
ethnic groups in the Empire and to bring about unity.
The first law forbade the formation of political
clubs or associations which had an ethnic basis or
90a national name. The second law authorised the 
formation of special military units to be used for 
disarming and repressing Greek and Bulgarian bands 
in Rumelie and Armenian bands in Eastern Turkey.
Those measures which had aimed at centralisation 
met with a certain amount of success. 3ut the growth 
of nationalism among the subject peoples of the Empire
90. Article 120, one of the new articles added to the 
constitution laid down this principle in the con­
stitution itself. See GSzubuyuk and Kili, 73*
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made it too late in the day to realise ’’the 'ottomanist' 
dream of the free, equal, and peaceful association 
of peoples in a common loyalty to the dynastic sov­
ereign of a multi-national, multi-denominational 
91empire.” Even while the association law was being 
discussed in the Chamber, Dalcheff Efendi, a Bulgarian 
deputy had pointed out ’’that union of different ele­
ments would not be brought about by the passing of
92laws, but by community of interests". This is 
exactly what was lacking in the Ottoman Empire.
The Unionists were concerned with one other 
problem; the creation of a modern state. For this it 
was essential to abolish the capitulation, "long
93resented as a symbol of inferiority and subservience", 
and absolutely incompatible with the status of a modern 
state since they violated its sovereignty. Knowing that 
they were not powerful enough to abrogate the capitulary 
rights of foreigners by force, the Unionists tried to
91. B.Lewis, Emergence, 214.
92. 'Report of the Proceedings in the Ottoman Parliament 
during July and August 19091, 6 , enclosure in Lowther 
to Grey, no.799» con., Therapia, 29 Sept.,1909i
F.0.371/761/36622.
93. B.Lewis, Emergency, 249*
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overcome this weakness by legislation. By intro­
ducing sound legislation, they hoped to make the 
administration of the Empire efficient so that for­
eigners would no longer need to claim their special 
privileges. At the same time, the new laws would 
violate the capitulations in such a discreet way that 
the Great Powers would either be forced to ignore 
the violation or they would not be able to intervene 
effectively. In a short time, it was hoped, a pre­
cedent would be set, and the capitulations would
either wither away or would be renounced by the
9 4
Powers voluntarily.
But the Unionists, far from being anti-foreign, 
had sought foreign assistance in reforming and modern­
ising the administration of the Empire. A few months
9k. Even in the 19th century "one of the main purposes 
of these changes was to meet foreign criticisms of 
Ottoman justice, and thus prepare the way for the 
abrogation or limitation of foreign judicial privi­
leges recognized by the capitulations". B Lewis, 
Emergence, 179. During this period there was con­
siderable optimism that the capitulations would 
soon be abolished. Thus while discussing the 
privileges that various elements enjoyed in the 
field of education, Talat Bey said in the Chamber 
that he "failed to understand how, at a time when 
the Capitulations were about to be abolished, school 
privileges could be retained". - Debate, 3 June,1909i 
Report of the Proceedings of the Turkish Parliament 
during the morth of June, 1909» in Lowther to Grey, 
no.624, con., Therapia, 4 Aug.,1909, F.0 .371/?6l/ 
297^7; and Tanin, 9 June, 1909.
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after the revolution, the Porte obtained the services 
of Mr. Crawford, a British customs official, to re­
organise the Ottoman Customs. His work was appreciated
so much that the Porte asked for his term to be ex-
95tended for a further two years. In the same way
the Porte wanted its Post and Telegraphic services
modernised so that foreign post offices could be
abolished. The Ministry of Post and Telegraph was
opened on 23 July, 1909, and in his speech, Nail Bey,
significantly, spoke of the foreign post offices as
an infringement of Turkish sovereignty, and asked
96for efficiency so that they could be removed. A
few weeks later, M.Sterpin was engaged as director-
97general of the new ministry, and a new article was 
attached to the constitution guaranteeing the privacy
98of letters in the Ottoman post. In August, Count
95* Grey to Lloyd George, (Chancellor of the Exchequer), 
London, 29 July,1909, F .0 .371/763/34737.
96. Lowther to Grey, no.594, con.,Therapia, 26 July,1909,
F .0,371/779/28925•
97. Kr.Sterpin, a Belgian, was engaged because Belgium 
had no post office in the Ottoman Empire, and he was 
therefore acceptable to everyone. Lowther to Grey,
no.656, con., Therapia, 10 Aug.,1909, F .0 .371/779/30769•
9 8 . Article 119, Gozubiiyiik and Kili, 73 •
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Ostrorog was appointed 'Conseiller de Justice1. His 
dut ies were mainly those of drafting laws for pre­
sentation to the Chamber, and bringing the Ottoman
99code of law in line with that of Europe.
The Porte1s attempt to violate the capitulations 
did not go unnoticed. The British Ambassador pointed 
out to his government that each law often infringed 
upon the treaty rights of foreigners. To overcome 
this he suggested that each law as passed be examined 
and action taken as required. It was the result of 
such diplomatic surveillance that the Porte withdrew 
Article 13 of the ’Law Concerning Vagabonds..1 This 
article sanctioned flogging as a punishment for 
vagabondage, and the foreign missions refused to allow 
their subjects to be flogged by the Ottoman authorities.
The foreign embassies maintained their surveillance 
over all new legislation passed by the Chamber, and 
frustrated the Porte's attempt to abrogate the
99 o Lowther to Grey, no.632, con., Therapia, 6 Aug.,1909, 
F.0.371/779/30745.
100. Lowther to Grey, 110.665, con., Therapia, 14 Aug.,1909,
F.0.371/779/31623.
101. Ibid.
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capitulations. The capitulations continued to haunt
the Turks until 24 July, 1924 when they were abolished
102by the Treaty of* Lausanne. While they remained
in force, the Ottoman Empire retained its status of 
a 'semi-colony1.
102. B.Lewis, Emergence, 249-
103- Huseyin Avni, Biryari Mustemleke Plus Tarihi, 
(1932), Istanbul, passim.
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CHAPTER IV
THE GROWTH OP OPPOSITION
The role of the Committee of Union and Progress
in the politics of the pdriod under review has been
exaggerated to an extent that discourages any attempt
to look beyond the obvious. Almost all political
happenings have been reduced to the machinations of
the Committee. In conformity with this convenient
pattern, Hilmi Papa’s resignation on 28 December,1909
- a fortnight after receiving an overwhelming vote of
confidence - has also been put down to Unionist pressure
1
and intrigue. It is true that the Unionists had not 
been happy with Hilmi during both his terms of office.
He had succumbed to the counter-revolutionaries on 
13 April without offering any resistance. After the 
counter-revolution had been crushed he was restored 
to power by ^evket Pa$a, and throughout the rest of 
the year he remained virtually neutral in the masked
1. Bayur, i, 318; Danismend, iv, 381; Okandan, 343;
Inal, 1572 ff.; Tunaya, 178, n.l6 , cites an article 
by Eabanzade Ismail^Hakki as evidence of Unionist 
collusion; Sabah, Ikdam and Stamboul of 29 Dec.,1909 
and Lowther to Grey, no.8 , con., Constantinople,
1 Jan.,1910, F .0 .371/ 1000/ 928; U^akligil, ii, 24.
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struggle between the Committee and the military.
All this may have provided sufficient motive for some 
Unionists to seek his resignation. But it is doubt­
ful if they were in a position to bring it about.
Besides there is no reason why we should not
believe Hilmi Papa’s own testimony regarding his
resignation. To the press he declared that he had
resigned purely on personal grounds, that the Committee
had put no pressure on him as was being suggested, and
that there was no disagreement between him and the
Committee. Hilrai's declaration was confirmed by
Halil Bey, President of the Parliamentary Party of 
2
the CUP. But the truth probably lies somewhere in 
the middle. While not discounting completely the 
Committee's role, especially its harassment of the 
government in the Chamber, it is necessary to look 
for more convincing reasons for Hilmi Papa's resignation.
2. Yeni Tanin, nos.l4 and 15, 7,8 Jan.,1910 respectively; 
Stamboul, 8 Jan.,1910; Times, 29,30 Dec.,1909; in the 
issue of the 30th the Times correspondent cited Hilmi 
Pasa's interview with the Reuter1s correspondent. Inal, 
1672-3. - It is worth noting that in August 1912, 
because Ahmed Muhtar Papa's Cabinet was persecuting 
Unionists, Hilmi Pa^a resigned his portfolio as 
Minister of Justice; see Abdurrahman Bey cited in 
Inal, 1674.
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One- factor was Hilmi Papa's own reluctance for 
office during such troubled and uncertain times. He 
had had most of his experience in provincial admin­
istration and had made his reputation as Inspector-
3
General of Macedonia. After the revolution he was
Minister of the Interior in Kamil Fasa's Cabinet, and\ *
when Kamil fell in February 1909, be succeeded him as 
4
Grand Vezir. Hilmi's first term in office was a 
period of great political unrest culminating in the 
mutiny of April 1909* It was during this period that 
he expressed his regret at not having gained more ex­
perience under tfuch well-tried Grand Vezirs as Said 
and K&mil Pa^as, before himself assuming that post.
Hilmi's second term as Grand Vezir passed under 
the shadow of Mahmud ^evket Pa^a and martial law, and 
he was deprived of virtually all independence of action.^
The debate in the Chamber on the 'Lynch Affair' was the 
straw that broke the camel's back. Hilmi (and Cavit),
3* Inal, 1654-64; U^akligil, ii, 23-4.
4. Inal, 1655; see above, Chap II,
5. Turkgeldi, 23.
6 . Abdurrahman Efendi, quoted in Inal, 1673; A Minister's 
Political Memoirs, Tan, 21 Jan.,1937, quoted in inal,l844.
7. See above, 112-14.
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finding the behaviour of the Chamber unreasonable 
and unpredictable, decided to settle the matter once 
and for all. In this situation and mood Hilmi went 
to submit his resignation to the Sultan. To Halid 
Ziya, the Sultan's First Secretary, he exclaimed:
"It is not possible to have an understanding with the 
Party. No Grand Vezir can remain in office without
g
relying on the majority...." But Hilmi was not
simply throwing in his hand and admitting defeat.
Through Halid Ziya he placed before the Sultan a
number of alternatives. The Sultan could reject his
resignation. If he accepted it, however, he could
reappoint Hilmi. If the new Cabinet did not have the
confidence of Parliament, the Sultan could dissolve
the Chamber and order fresh elections. Or finally,
if he accepted the resignation, he should summon the
Presidents of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies
9
and appoint the new Grand Vezir on their advice.
But the Sultan thought it more expedient to accept his 
resignation.
8 . U^akligil, ii, 24.
9. Ibid., 29-30.
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There was another factor which might con­
ceivably have had something to do with the resignation: 
the Lynch Concession. Hilmi Papa's overwhelming vote 
of confidence over the Lynch Affair created a new 
problem. Technically it left Hilmi free to grant the 
concession to the English firm. But 'national1 interest 
prevented him from doing so. Talking about the pol­
itical implications of granting a concession for a 
railway from Baghdad to the Persian Gulf, Hilmi had 
said: "This question puts us between the hammer and
the anvil. For political reasons I cannot grant this 
concession to the British.• • • The same political 
reasons applied to the granting of the 'Lynch Con­
cession' . The fear of British expansion in Iraq was 
strong among Arab deputies and within Iraq itself. 
Politically it was too potent a factor for the Porte to 
ignore. Even while the question was being discussed 
in the Chamber, there had been protest meetings in 
Baghdad against the concession being granted to an
10. E .T .S .Dugdale (ed.and trans.), German Diplomatic 
Documents, 1871-1914, iii, London, 1930, 367;
Baron von Marschall to the German Foreign Office, 
Constantinople, 25 Oct.,1909* (Hereafter cited as
G.D.D.)
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English concern,^ The situation in Baghdad and Basra
became so serious that the Porte considered proclaiming 
12martial law. It would be dangerous to grant the con­
cession to the Lynch Company, but also "very difficult
for us to reject the British . whose help we depend
13on in various questions". Under such conditions 
Hilmi*s resignation offered the best way out of this 
impasse; it would free his successors from established 
policy and decisions.^ Thus Hakki Pa^a was able to 
reverse Hilmi*s ’decision* concerning the Lynch Con­
cession, and even cancelled some other concessions
15ear-marked for British enterprise in and around Iraq.
11. Bayur, i, 313; Stamboul, 22 Dec.,1909; Times, 11 Dec.
1909* The Times correspondent wrote: "...Ismail 
Hakki Babanzadeh and Deputies from the Arab districts, 
who cherished a sincere, if unfounded, belief that 
the scheme of amalgamation covered an ingenious design 
on the part of Great Britain to effect the economic 
conquest of Irak...."; and same to same, Constantinople,
26 Oct.,1909, and 6 Nov.,1909* G . D . D .,iii, 368 and 385 
respectively.
12. The Levant Herald, 29 Dec.,1909*
13. Hilmi Papa's conversation with von Marschall, D .D .F ., 
op.cit, n . 10 .
14. Levant Herald, op.cit.
15* Lowther to Grey, no.25» con.,Constantinople, 15 Jan.,1910, 
F .0.371/1000/1348; Grey to Lowther, no.37, tel.con., 
Foreign Office, 17 Feb.,1910, F .0.371/1004/5693; 
Memorandum: Sir H.B.Smith's interview with Hakki Pa^a, 
enclosure in Smith to Nicolson, Constantinople, 30 Dec., 
1910, F.0.371/1240/636.
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There was considerable speculation about 
Hilmi Papa's successor. Hakki, Kamil, Said and Ferid 
Pa^as are said to have been considered, but Hakki was 
chosen because he was the least controversial and most 
acceptable candidate. The fact that he had been 
legal adviser to the Porte and ambassador to Italy 
gave him roots in traditional institutions and made 
him acceptable to the conservative element. His 
liberal education in political science and law and 
his early career as a lecturer brought him "closer 
to youth, to innovation and Europeanisation than the 
earlier vezirs".^^ Not being a partisan of any faction 
he was able to bargain with all sides. He demanded 
absolute freedom in forming his Cabinet and once this 
condition was met he accepted office. One of his first 
acts as Grand Vezir was to appoint Jevket Pa§a Minister 
of War, thereby hoping to end the anomoly of having 
the administrator of martial law and the Inspector- 
General of the first three army corps outside Cabinet
l6, Yalpin, Talat Pasa, 36 ; Inal, 1763 and 1783-4; 
U^akligiTJ ii, 44 f f . ; fSadrazara Kim Olacak?’ 
ikdam, and Tanin of 29 Dec.,1909; Lowther to 
Grey, op.cit., a.i.
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17control. But £>evket P a p ’s inclusion in the Cabinet
created problems of its own.
Yusuf Hikmet Bayur has noted that the year 1910
was the first and last year when the Ottoman Empire
was free of irksome external problems (excepting Crete)
idand the pressure of foreign governments. But this
favourable external situation did not make for internal
political stability; if anything it aggravated it.
M.Milanovitch, the Servian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
who visited Istanbul early in 1910 observed that ’’the
position of Hakki Pasha was not paramount; there
was the Committee, and there was, above all, the army,
not to speak of the various elements which were not
19friendly to the new order of things”. This, briefly, 
was the political situation prevailing in the capital.
The discord between the military and the politicians 
continued unabated. But a development of greater
17. A . A . A. (Adivar ) , Ibrahim Hakki P a p ,  I . A . , 892. Inal, 
1871 and 1884; Political Memoirs, op.cit.,n.6 ; Mahmud 
Muhtar P a p ,  Maziye bir Nazar, cited in Inal, 1884; 
Yeni Gazete, 3 Jan.,1910, quoted in Stamboul of
3 Jan.,1910, Lowther to Grey, ibid., and also no.27, 
con.,Constantinople, 16 Jan.,1010, F .0.371/1000/3550.
18. Bayur, i, 316.
19. Nicolson to Grey, no.158, con.,St .Petersburg,
26 March, 1910, F .0.371/1008/11717.
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political significance was the re-appearance of 
conservative groups, both within the CUP and without; 
groups which had lain dormant since Hay 1909* The 
formation of the People's Party (Ahali Firkasi) on j
i
2021 February 1910 was the first manifestation of this.
At the time it aroused little comment because everyone
was preoccupied with martial law. But it was not long
before people realised the long-term consequences of
the growth of a conservative opposition.
20 .ikdam, 22 Feb.,1910; Tunaya, 294-303; A.B.Kuran,
322-3* During this period 1909-11 other conservative 
groups were also formed. There was the Mutedil 
Hurriyetperveran Firkasi also known as Mutedil 
Liberaller or Moderate Liberals, Tunaya, 254-61, and 
the Osmanlx Demokrat Firkasi (Firkai Ibad) or the 
Ottoman Democratic Party, ibid. There was also the 
New Party or Hizb-i Cedid. All these liberal- 
conservative groups acted together against the 
Committee and therefore hardly functioned as sep­
arate groups. Finally in November 1911 all op-, 
position groups united to form the Hurriyet ve Itilaf 
Firkasi or the Freedom and Association Party, see below. 
There were also some left-wing.groups• In Sept.1910 
the Osmanli Sosyalist Firkasi (Ottoman Socialist Party) 
was formed. See Tunaya, 303-14; G.Haupt, Le Debut 
du Mouvement Socialiste en Turqiue, Mouvement Social, 
no.45, 1963, 121-37; Joshua Starr, The Socialist 
Federation of Salonika, Jewish Social Studies, vii,
1945, 323-3 6 ; on the activities of one of the founders 
and president of the Socialist Party, Huseyin Hilmi, 
see M. S . (papanoglu, Turkiye'de Sosyalizn Hareketleri 
ve Sosyalist Hilmi, Istanbul, 1964. - The socialist
movement had very little success; its leaders were 
persecuted and exiled and the party soon disappeared. 
Kemal H.Karpat, Turkey's Politics, The Transition to 
a Multi-Party System, Princeton. 1959, 353-4, n.16, 
writes, "This persecution was explained as stemming 
from the fact that since the country had no industry, 
socialism was an artifically planted movement in Turkey". 
Another rather smugly held idea emerges in parliamentary 
debates that Ottoman (Muslim) society was essentially 
egalitarian and classless and therefore socialism had no 
relevance in the Ottoman Empire.
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The continued existence of* martial law made
a mockery of* constitutional government. Hakki Pa^a
tried to modify this situation by bringing §evket Pa^a
into the Cabinet, and in his programme read before the
Chamber on 25 January, he promised to end martial law
21"now that the situation was normal once more". Not 
only did he fail to carry out this promise, but his 
idea of using Sevket Pa^a to strengthen the position of 
his: Cabinet also boomeranged. ijievket's presence in 
the Cabinet weakened the reformist group, especially 
with regard to financial reform.
The Committee had set itself the task of re­
forming the administration of the Empire, and naturally 
financial reform came very high in the order of 
priorities. Mehmed Cavit, Minister of Finance in 
Hakki Papa’s Cabinet, had set out to educate the 'public*
on the importance of financial reform even during the
22first days of the constitution. V/hen he became Hilmi 
Papa's Finance Minister in June 1909, he set up a
21. Hakki Papa's programme in Yeni Tanin, 26 Jan.,1910; 
French translation in Stamboul of same date.
22. Mehmed Cavid,*But£e Nedir1/, in Sabah, 10 Aug., 1908.
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a special committee to prepare the budget for the
following year. The estimated budget was presented in
23
December and soon after Hilmi Pa^a resigned. Hakki 
Pa^a, however, promised to apply scrupulously his pre­
decessor’s budget, and at the same time promised to 
increase revenue by reforming the system of taxation, 
and by reaching an agreement with the Powers which 
would permit the Porte to raise certain tariffs on 
imports. He said his Cabinet would try to cut down 
expenditure, but never at the expense of the dignity 
and prestige of the Empire, nor at the expense of good 
administration. He added that he realised that the 
Ottoman Empire was a Great Power with a vast coast 
line and extensive borders. Therefore he would always
give the utmost attention to the needs of the army and 
24the navy.
The partial reform of the system of taxation in
23* Estimated budget is given in Marling to Grey, no.999* 
con.,Constantinople, 28 Dec.,1909* F .0.371/993/183• 
Actual budget given in ¥.W .Cumberland, The Public 
Treasury, E.M.Mears, Modern Turkey, New York, (19241390.
24. Hakki Papa’s programme, Yeni Tanin, op.cit» n.21.
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25
1909 had produced encouraging results. At the end 
of* 1910, in spite of all the difficulties, the achieve­
ments of Cavitfs financial administration were gener­
ously praised by Sir Adam Block, President of the 
26Public Debt. But despite this substantial increase 
in revenues, it was still not possible to meet the 
deficit in the budget or to carry out any real and 
lasting reforms because the military dominated the 
political scene. Their heavy demands on the budget 
and their interference in the administration would not 
permit this. General Von der Goltz, addressing the 
German Asiatic Society on his return from Turkey,
25. Improvement in revenues in 1909; extract from the
Tanin,10 March,1910, in Lowther to Grey, no.l86,con., 
29 March,1910, F .0.371/1007/11227.
1910 1909 Increase Decrease
Real Property
Tax 26,625,980 15,780,892 10,872,088
Tax on Pro­
fits (Temettu) 2,052,256 1,717,755 334,501
Tithes 85,718,059 76,568,397 9 ,149,662
Sheep Tax 1,093,004 525,435 567,569
Military Ser
vice Exemption
Tax 837,626 7,190,565 6 ,352,939
Other Sources3S,050,110 18,484,901 19,565,209
Total 154,404,035 120,267,945 40,489,029 6,352* 939
Customs 24,249,854 21,734,4o4 2,515,450
Posts and
Telegraphs 6 ,291,014 6 ,312,270 21*256
Total 184,944,903 148,314,619 43,004,479 6,374, 195
26. Achievements of the new regime: Sir Adam Block*s view. 
Times, 15 Dec.,1910; see also Tanin, Z k  Dec.1910.
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observed that internal reform in the Ottoman Empire
was not possible while the Porte faced the possibility
of external aggression. In the prevailing situation
the only real desire of the Young Turks was to in-
27crease their military strength. While this idea was 
endorsed by the Committee, it was dogma to the military. 
Men like Cavit, however, criticised on rational grounds 
the policy of sacrificing other much needed reforms to 
the exigencies of a renovated army and navy. They 
asked why the military expenditure could not be cur­
tailed and more money devoted to productive ends.
The debate on the military budget commenced on 
16 June. Mahmud ^evket Pa^a spoke in support of his 
estimate. Security, he declared, was the first need of 
the Empire; without security, public works and the re­
organisation of finances would prove futile. He pointed 
out that as defence was not a party issue, deputies 
ought to forget party affiliations when voting. He 
requested that the military budget be voted unanimously, 
so that everyone might see that the Ottoman nation had 
resolved to maintain its power. He concluded by asking 
the Chamber to vote an extra-ordinary credit amounting to
27* Goltz’s speech reported in the Times, 9 Dec.1910.
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five million liras, as well as the ordinary budget of
28nine and a half millions. Cavit Bey spoke against
the inflated military budget and appealed to the Chamber
to reject it in its present form. He pointed out
that the already large deficit would swell dangerously
if the budget were allowed through. But Jyevket Pa^a
dismissed Cavit*s arguments about a lack of money by
29concluding: "we will spare nothing for the army".
Cavit1s arguments made no impression on the Chamber 
either. Three days later the ordinary and extra­
ordinary military budget was voted by the Chamber, and
soon after Cavit left for Paris to raise a loan op the 
30Paris Bourse. On the budget Lowther commented:
28. 115th Session of the Chamber of Deputies, 16 June,1910,
Takvim-i Vekayi, viii, 2303 ff•; Tanin, Yeni Ikdam and
Stamboul of 17 June,1910; Annual Report,1910, in 
Lowther to Grey, n o .103» con.,Constantinople, 14 Feb.,
19X1, F.0.371/1245/6167; Annual Register. 1910. (London,191^ 
337-8.
29. Ibid.
30. Il6th Session of the Chamber of Deputies, 19 June,1910,
Takvim-i Vekayi, viii,2356 f f .; Tanin and Stamboul of
20 June,1910; Lowther to Grey, n o .434, very con.,
Therapia, 27 June, 1910, F . 0 ./371/993/23952*; Major 
Tyrrell, the Military Attache, wrote that there was
a rumour that the military budget had been voted 
under compulsion. See Major Tyrrell to Marling, 
Constantinople, 21 Nov.,1910 in Marling to Grey, no.858, 
con., Constantinople, 23 Nov.1910, F .0.371/1017/^3077•
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"The only object on which money and attention 
are lavished is the army,•. His budget /Sevket 
Pasa's7} by far the largest of all /a third of 
the entire budget7 , was the only one which was 
passed without discussion, and, in fact, he 
appears to plunge his hand into the public 
purse exactly as he likes, leaving it to Javid 
Bey, the Finance Minister, to arrange the 
account-books afterwards.,,. It is difficult 
to believe that a man of Javid Bey *s intelli­
gence should contemplate the heavy military 
expenditure without disquietude, but he seems 
quite powerless in the hands of the military....”
Such was the relationship between the military 
and the Committee.
The Committee’s concession to Sevket Pasa re­
garding the military budget may be explained away by 
arguing that the Committee had conceded no principle.
It may be argued that the Unionists in parliament, aware 
that the inflated military budget would increase the 
deficit, nevertheless voted for it because they shared 
the belief in the need of a powerful army. But such 
arguments cannot explain away Cavit1s capitulation to 
ipevket Pa^fa in a conflict which took place later in the 
year. This time the conflict was one of constitutional 
principles: whether the Ministry of War would submit 
its accounts to the scrutiny of the Ministry of Finance.
As a part of the programme to reorganise the 
financial administration, Cavit created an audit department.
31. Lowther,.., ibid.
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The function of this department was to examine the
accounts of all other ministries, and to make sure
that money was being spent as specified in the budget.
32The aim of this measure was to check corruption.
There was already some tension between the
military and certain Unionists, caused by the latterfs
demand for an investigation regarding the Yxldlz
treasure. In this demand there was a strong suggestion
of embezzlement by the martial law authorities while
they had been occupying the Palace after April 19092
But the matter had aroused great controversy and had
33been dropped at the insistence of ^evket Pa^a. The 
Finance Ministry's claim to inspect military accounts
34brought the conflict into the open. This conflict 
came to a head when ijevket Pa^a, who had ordered cer­
tain war materials not provided for in his budget, 
asked the Finance Ministry to pay. The ministry re­
fused on the grounds that such expenditure was provided 
for in the extra-ordinary military budget. The question
32. Halil Mente^e, Cumhuriyet, 18 Oct.,19^6* - Halil Bey, 
deputy for Mente^e, was elected President of the 
Parliamentary Party of the CUP on 27 Feb.,1910, see 
Tanin, 28 Feb.,1910 - Annual Report,1910 and Annual 
Register, 1910, op.cit, n . 28.
33 . Mentejgse, ibid.
3^. Ibido
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came before Cavit who upheld his department’s decision.
But rather than abide by this decision, the Minister
35of War sent in his resignation.
While the Yeni Ikdam described this confront­
ation between ^evket Pa^a and Cavit as a ’’ministerial
crisis”, the Tanin dismissed it as /differences within 
36the cabinet”. Huseyin Cahit’s editorial gave the 
first hint of the Committee *s desire to reach a com­
promise with the Minister of War, rather than make 
this issue into a first-class crisis. He wrote that it 
had been obvious since the beginning of September that 
the subject of public accounts would lead to differences 
between the Ministers of War and Finance. But since 
such differences were not of an important character 
there was no need for anxiety. The Committee had 
summoned a special meeting to discuss this question 
and decided to follow a reasonable policy. Huseyin 
Cahit concluded:
35• Ibid., and Tanin, 18 Oct.,1910; Yeni Ikdam, 17, l8 
Oct.,1910 respectively; Lowther to Grey, n o .211, 
tel.con.,Pera, 30 Sept.,1910, F .0.371/993/35428 and 
no.224 tel,pr., Constantinople, 17 Oct.,1910,
F.0.371/994/37832.
3 6 .'Buhran-i Vukela, Yeni ikdam, ibid., and Heyet-i 
Vukelcida Ihtilaf, Tanin, ibid.
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"Knowing all this, we refuse to believe that 
we are faced with a ministerial crisis today 
• . . • Looking at the internal and external 
situation, we have smiled sceptically at the 
words '’a ministerial crisis may take place 
any time1. No ministry can remain in power 
for ever. But is the application of the 
above-mentioned law so urgent that ministers 
should disagree about it twenty or twenty- 
five days before the opening of Parliament?
No one who trusts the judgement of our ministers 
can think so." 37
In accordance with Huseyin Cahit's prophecy a 
deputation consisting of Halil, Rahmi, and Dr. Nazxra 
visited ^evket Pasa at his residence, only to receive
7 Q
a rude welcome. In spite of a cool beginning they 
soon got down to discussion. Halil Bey reminded the 
generalissimo that though he had accomplished great 
deeds for the country, he had done so in collaboration 
with the Committee. It was still in the interests of 
the country that this collaboration continue and there­
fore the two sides should come to an understanding.
An understanding was finally reached on the basis that 
Cavit Bey should agree not to apply the audit law to 
the Ministry of War, since that ministry needed absolute
37. Tanin, ibid.
38. Mente^e, op.cit., gives an account of the reception: 
Jevket Pa^a: "Why have you come in this manner, so
early in the morning?"
Halil Bey: "To drink a cup of your morning coffee,
Pa^a",
§evket Pa^a: "Halil Bey, I can no longer work with
those who want to stab me in the back."
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secrecy and security. This decision, however, was to
39be referred to the Chamber for its sanction.
No matter how hard the Committee tried to 
disguise the fact, there had been a ministerial crisis
4cand it had been resolved on Mahmud ^evket Paga’s terms. 
The Committee’s prestige suffered a setback while Jfevket 
Papa’s prestige increased. On 2k December, going from 
strength to strength, the War Minister asked Parliament 
for authority to divert at his discretion three million 
liras out of a total of nine millions assigned to his 
ministry. Though there was some opposition in the 
Chamber to this request, ^evket Pa^a once again carried 
the d a y . ^
The epilogue of this conflict between the 
Ministers of War and Finance occurred in August 1911. 
Cavit Bey had resigned meanwhile, but his successor,
Nail Bey, though not a Unionist, also objected to 
J^evket Papa's capricious handling of finances. Again
39. Ibid.
40. H.Cahit, 'Buhran-i Vukela, Jfayiasi ve Tefsirati’, 
Tanin, 2k Oct,,1910.
kl. ’L'Armee a la Chambre* and ’Chronique Parlementaire*
Stamboul, 26 Dec.,1910, 1-2; Marling to Grey, no.937, 
con.,Pera, 28 Dec.,1910, F .0.371/1235/27; Tyrrell to 
Marling, Constantinople,. 2 Jan.,1911? enclosure in 
Marling to Grey, no.*t, con., Constantinople, 3 Jan., 
1911, F.0.371/12^2/838.
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£>evket Pa?a refused to reduce his estimated budget or
to subject his accounts to examination by the audit
department. The events of the previous year were re-
42enacted and a ministerial crisis was in the air.
But on 29 August, Grand Vezir Hakki Pa^a assured
Lowther "that an arrangement would easily be found ..•
and that the rumours of his (Hakki*s) resignation
43were quite unfounded". However, no solution seemed 
to be forthcoming. Nail Bey threatened to resign,
Sevket Pasa took to his bed, and the cabinet was forced> ♦ 1
44to await his return before it could discuss the question.
In this situation the Cabinet decided to postpone dis-
45cussion until the re-opening of Parliament. But in 
the meantime events took a turn of their own and made 
all such discussion academic. Italy declared war on 
the Ottoman Empire, and in time of war it became im­
possible to question the position of the Minister of V7ar.
42. Tanin, 29 Aug.,1911; Stamboul, 'Le Cabinet - L'Armee et 
le Defecit*, 28 Aug.,1911 and also 29 Aug.,1911. Lowther 
to Grey, no.6l4, con., Constantinople, 30 Aug.,1911,
F.0.371/1244/34689.
43. Lowther..., ibid.
44. Tanin, 31 Aug.,1911.
45* Tanin and Stamboul, 4 Sept.,1911.
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Before passing on to the growth of an opposition 
during 1910 and 1911, it is necessary to discuss briefly 
the conclusion of the loan of 1910. The implications 
of this loan on the internal politics of Turkey are 
still far from clear.
The requirement of waging the Crimean War had 
forced the Porte to float its first foreign loan on 
the money markets of London and Paris. Hereafter the 
issue of foreign loans became the accepted practice of 
meeting the financial needs of the Empire. In 1875 
the Porte failed to pay the charges on a foreign debt 
of two hundred million pounds sterlirg. Six years 
later it was forced to permit its creditors to take 
charge of certain imperial revenues - salt, tobacco 
monopolies, silk and fisheries - in order to redeem 
their money. The body set up to carry out this task 
was known as the Administration of the Ottoman Public 
Debt.46
The Public Debt, technically a department of the 
Ottoman Ministry of Finance, functioned as an independent 
body. Its executive members were elected by the foreign
46, On the early loans see F.S.Rodkey, Ottoman Concern 
about Western Economic Penetration in the Levant, 
1849-1856, Journal of Modern History, xxx, 1956,348-53? 
Blaisdell, ...Financial Control.^,, passim; Bernard 
Lewis, Duyun-i Umumiye, E . I . ^  (*1963).
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bondholders in their respective countries, and it was
to them that the executive was responsible. In l88l
the Public Debt had at its disposal over 300 revenue
collectors; by 1911 its total staff numbered 8,931 -
47more than that of the Ottoman finance ministry.
Moreover, this body had become powerful enough to 
exercise great influence on the political, social and 
economic life of the Empire, Such was its influence 
that the Porte found it difficult to raise a foreign
48loan without the guarantee of the Public Debt.
The aspiration of the Young Turks to redeem 
their Empire from European control has already been 
noted. In order to achieve this aim they considered 
it essential to reorganise the administration and to 
make it a paying concern, so that foreign loans would 
no longer be necessary. But they were unwilling to 
risk reform for the sake of financial parsimony. In 
the beginning the cost of reform was high. Inefficient 
and corrupt officials who were entrenched in large 
in large numbers, had to be paid either a sum of money
47. B.Lewis, ibid.
48. Huseyin Cahit (Ottoman Representative on the Public 
Debt in 1910), ’Istikraz Etrafinda*, Tanin, 9 Sept.1909; 
B.Lewis, ibid; Blaisdell, 6-8 .
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or regular pensions. But the Unionists considered
this method less costly in the long run than the re-
49tention of useless functionaries. There was also 
the cost of a renovated army to be met, and this in­
creased year after year. Thus circumstances forced 
the Young Turks to continue the practice of borrowing 
abroad in order to make ends meet.
Huseyin Cahit expressed the hope3 and aspirations
of the Unionists concerning the raising of loans abroad
50by the new regime. He wrote of Turkey*s bad reputation
in European financial circles prior to the re-establishment
of the constitution, when ’’the Public Debt was our guarantee
and financiers would not trust anything to our Sultan, our
Grand Vezir or our Finance Minister, while they would
give millions to the Public Debt, an institution set up
51by foreigners”. He hoped that European financiers 
would show more confidence in the new regime, and allow 
it to float loans without imposing terms derogatory to 
the dignity of an independent country. He concluded that 
it would not be long, the Porte having settled its debts,
the Public Debt would be abolished and the Empire would
,  «  52be free.
49. Interview with Nazim Bey in Pester Lloyd, 12 May,1909, 
enclosure in Mr.C.Howard to Grey,n o .40, con.,Budapest,
14 May,1909, F.0.371/1010/19028.
50. H.Cahit, op.cit., n.48.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
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In the summer of* 1910 Cavit went to Paris to
negotiate a loan* It was natural for an Ottoman
Finance Minister to go first to Paris because the
53Ottoman economy was irrevocably tied to France.
Most of the earlier loans had been negotiated through
the Ottoman Bank, a French concern established in 1856.
These loans had been guaranteed by the Public Debt,
55% of whose bonds were held in France, while Germany
54
held 30% and Britain only 5%•
The French Government had been alarmed by what
it saw as a tendency amongst Unionists to attack foreign
financial and industrial institutions in the Ottoman
Empire. As a counter-measure against this tendency,
M. Pichon, the Foreign Minister suggested:
"Comme cette campagne •*. de compromettre tous 
les interets etrangers en Turquie, je verrais 
des avantages a ce que les Gouvernements 
occidentaux unissent leurs efforts pour 1 'arreter
53* On French interests in the Ottoman Empire see
Communication du Ministere des Finances, Paris, 8 Kevrier, 
1909 in Ministere des Affaires Etrangers, D . D . F . . 2e Serie, 
xi, no.645, 1067-9• On French cultural interests see 
Constans to Pichon, Pera, 1 Juin,1909, ibid.,206-7;
Also Times, 17 and 24 June,1910; Blaisdell, 5; Moukhtar 
Pacha, La Turquie, L'Allemagne et l fEurope, Paris,1924, 
102-4.
5^. Times, 17 June,1910; on the Ottoman Bank see M.Boppe to 
M.de Selves, Therapia, 27 Sept.,1911; D .D.F. 2e Serie, 
xiv, no.370, 531-6 ; it is interesting to note that the 
Ottoman Bank's correspondence with the Ottoman Finance 
Ministry was conducted in French, see H.C.Yal9in, 
Mesrutiyette ilk Istikraz*, Yakin Tarlhimiz, i, 366-7 .
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des ses debuts en faisant conprendre au Gouverneraent 
ottoman qu'an moment ou il cherche a reorganiser 
ses finances, il a interet a ne pas se raontrer 
hostile aux capitaux etrangers engages dans 
1 'Empire." 55
The French naturally did not share the Committee's
enthusiasm for setting up a new economic and political
structure independent of Europe and more particularly
France. In 1910, therefore, Pichon decided to settle
the issue by making it plain to the Porte that French
money would be available only if the Turks recognised
the continued preponderance of French finances in the
Empire. That this decision had been taken before Cavit's
departure, and what French strategy waff to be in the loan
negotiations, are revealed in Lowther's very confidential
despatch to Grey:
"... A suggestion had been made to me as to French 
policy, which seems not at all improbable. It is 
that the French financiers will put off Javid Bey 
in his negotiations with them and will leave him 
without money till the end of the year, by which 
time the financial pressure will be even more 
severe than now, and the amount required will be
55* Pichon to Ambassadors in Vienna and Berlin, (strangely 
not London and St.Petersburg), Paris, 9 April, 1909? 
D.D.F., 2e Serie, xii, no.l64, 203. The French were 
most alarmed at the Unionists' desire to nationalise 
'La Regie des Tabacs1 which was in French hands; 
for this purpose Cavit had set up a committee. See 
ibid. and Communication, D .D .F ., 2e Serie, xi, no.643,
1068-9.
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considerably increased. They will be able to 
impose such terms as they like, including the r
grant of those concessions which they most value."
Lowther's information proved to be correct. In
Paris the Ottoman Bank did indeed 'put off' Cavit by
offering terms which would place both Ottoman finances
57and the Ministry of Finance under French control.
Cavit offered to guarantee the loan with the customs 
recipts of Istanbul, but refused to have the loan under­
written by the Public Debt as was customary or to 
subordinate his ministry to the Ottoman Bank. Unable 
to accept such terms, Cavit went elsewhere and succeeded 
in concluding the loan on his own terms with another 
French syndicate.
56. Lowther to Grey, no.434, very con., Therapia, 27 June, 
1910, F .0.371/993/23945• - The French Ambassador,
M.Bompard claimed that Cavit went to Paris with the 
intention of fouling up the negotiations with the Otto­
man Bank, his purpose being to embarass M.Laurent, his 
French financial adviser. Bompard claimed that Cavit 
was being coaxed by English financiers, represented in 
Istanbul by Sir Adam Block, Sir H.B.Smith and Sir Ernest 
Cassels; Bompard to Pichon, Pera, 9 Nov.,1910, D .D .F .,
2e Serie, xiii, no.20, 33-6; Cambon to Pichon, Berlin,
7 Sept.,1910, ibid.884, n.2.; see also the French 
Finance Ministry's brief on Cavit Bey, on his visit to 
Paris to discuss outstanding financial matters between 
the two governments. D .D .F ..3e S6rie, vi, no.l44, 182-5. 
Rene Pinon, L 1 Europe et la Jeune Turquie, Paris ,(l91l)» 140, 
blames Baron Marschall, the German Ambassador at the Porte 
for the failure of the loan negotiations.
57* Bayur, i,323; Yal^n, op. cit. ; E.M.Earle, Turkey, the
Great Powers and the Baghdad Railway, London,ll923 , 2£5 f f ; 
Times, 17 Aug.,1910; Bertie to Tyrrell, pr.and con.,
Paris, 11 Aug.,1910, F. 0.800/172, {^Bertie Papers).
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Cavit revealed the terms of this loan at a meeting
he addressed in Salonika, on his way back to Istanbul.
He informed his constituents that the loan was for 11
million liras of which 6 millions would mature in 1910
and 5 million in 1911« A group of four French banks -
the Credit Mobilier, the Louis Dreyfus, the Bernard-
Janislowsky, and the Syndicate of Provincial Banks -
had taken up the loan. The price to the Government
was fixed at 86 and this would amount to about 92 to
the public, including commission. The interest was 4%
and the only guarantee he had given was the customs
receipts of the vilayet of Istanbul. On these terms, he
said, he was confident that the quotation of the loan
58on the Paris Bourse was now a mere formality.
But on 3 September, M.Pichon informed Hakki Pasa - 
who was then in Paris - that the loan could not be
59admitted on the Bourse under the present conditions.
58. Lowther to Grey, no.599* con.,Therapia, 23 Aug.,1910,
F.0.371/993/31382; Stamboul, 23 Aug.,1910, gives a 
part of Cavit1s speech. - Since this loan was ephemeral 
it does not find much space in most books.
59*Bertie to Grey, no.332, con.,Paris, 4 Sept.,1910,
F .0.371/993/32248; the Foreign Office was already 
aware of this and was actively collaborating with 
France. See Grey to Bertie, nos.225 and 380, con., 
Foreign Office, 30 April 1910 and l8 Aug.,1910,
F.0.371/993/11472 and 29828 respectively.
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Pichon declared that the loan could only be quoted if 
the guarantee given by the Porte appeared to rest on 
solid foundations, and justified the confidence of the
60French investor. Unable to accept any direct French
6jcontrol over its finances, the Porte broke off negotiations.*1
While negotiating with Paris, Cavit had sent out
feelers to London and Berlin about the possibility of
floating a loan there. He was optimistic about borrowing
in Britain from Sir Ernest Cassel's group* There was
even a rumour in Le Temps of 20 September that the Turks
had signed a contract with Sir Ernest's National Bank of 
62Turkey. But since Grey was co-operating with Pichon, 
the issue of a loan in London was out of the question. 
Therefore when Cassel was approached by the Turks he 
advised them to conclude the loan in Paris as they would
63
not get more favourable terms in London. In Istanbul
60. Bertie to Grey, no.334, con.,Paris, 4 Sept.1910,
F .0.371/993/32407 and Bertie to Tyrrell, op.cit. French 
terms also given in Bayur, i, 323; Blaisdell, 215.
61. Bertie to Nicolson, Paris, 20 Oct.,1910, F.0.371/994/ 
38330; Blaisdell, 215-6; Bayur, ibid.; Times, 23-27 
Sept.,1910; Tanin, 9 Sept.,1910.
62. Lowther to Grey, no.196, tel.con.,Constantinople,
20 Sept.,1910, F.0.371/993/34141; Bertie to Grey, 
no.359* con., Paris, 20 Sept.,1910, F . 0.371/993/3416*6 •,
63. Grey to Bertie, no.326, tel.pr.,Foreign Office, 22 Sept., 
1910, F.0.371/993/34385; Earle, 225-
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Sir H.B.Smith, director of the National Bank, "guided
by the desire to act in conformity with the views of
the British Government...", was also advising Cavit
64to be more conciliatory towards the French.
In the critical political situation prevailing 
in the capital during the autumn of 1910, Cavit could 
not concede anything which would compromise the sov­
ereignty of the Porte. Such an act would undermine
65the Committee’s already shaky position. In fact 
the Tanin saw this Anglo-French pressure as a means 
of bringing about Cavit1s fall, while Block had al­
ready observed that "by striking a blow at Djavid Bey 
the French are striking a blow at the party of Union 
and Progress and may bring about the fall of that 
party.
64. Sir H.B.Smith to Grey, London, 4 Oct.,1910, F.0.371/ 
993/36803; Block to Hardinge, Constantinople, 21 Sept., 
1910, F.Q.371/994/38775; Earle, ibid; Moukhtar Pacha, 
106; while Grey was supporting the French, the French, 
especially the Ottoman Bank, were trying to sabotage 
Britain’s position in the Ottoman Empire. See Lowther 
to Grey, no.631, con.,Therapia, 6 Sept.,1910, and 
Block to Hardinge, 10 Sept.,1910, F .0 .371/993/33040
and 33484 respectively.
65. See above, 140, ff.
6 6 . Tanin, 18 Oct.,1910; Block.. 2 1  Sept., op.c it, n.64.
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The Germans had meanwhile promised to provide
6 7the money if* no one else would. On 1 November,
representatives of the German banks arrived in
Istanbul. By 7 November an arrangement was arrived
at for a loan of 11 million liras, 7 million to be
drawn in 1910 with an option for a further 4 million
in 1911- The price was fixed at 86 with the interest
at Two days later the contract was officially
68signed. Later Cavit recalled how the "Germans
handled the business with great intelligence and tact.
They brought up no points which were not related
directly to the loan, and they made no conditions which
would have been inconsistent with the dignity of Turkey.
This attitude of Germany met with great approval on the
part of the Turkish Government which was then in a very
69difficult position".
German financial help came just in time to avert
Cavitfs fall. Though the Unionists were grateful to
Germany, this did not, as Earle suggests, enable "German
67* Seymour to Grey, no.263, secret, Berlin,28 Sept.1910,
F .0.371/993/35^73; Earle, 225-6; Moukhtar Pacha, 106.
68. Lowther to Grey, nos.2^3» 1 286, con.,Constantinople,
1, 7, 10, Nov. , 1910, F.0.371/99V39340,^0350,^1560, 
respectively; Earle, 225; Bayur, i, 323*
69. Cavit cited by Earle, 225-6, from a memo which Cavit 
wrote specially for Earle, see 236, n.*t.
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diplomacy and the Deutsche Bank to re-establish them­
selves thoroughly in the good graces of the Ottoman 
70Government”. jftiatever good-will Germany earned by
this act was lost in the following year, when her ally 
Italy declared war on Turkey. In fact there seems to 
have been no change in the Committee’s attitude towards 
Britain and France. Soon after concluding the loan 
with Germany, Cavit wrote to the then Turcophile,
Noel Buxton, expressing his disappointment at being 
let down in Britain, but adding: "Croyez neanmoins,
que cela n'a altere en rien les sentiments d'amiti^ 
que la Jeune Turquie a 1 ’egard de l ’Angleterre.
But in internal politics Cavit’s failure to float the 
loan in Paris or London became another weapon in the 
hands of the anti-Unionist opposition.
By the beginning of 1910, the political climate 
had thawed sufficiently to permit the opposition to come 
out into the open. This was manifested by the formation
72of an opposition group calling itself the People’s Party.
70. Earle, 224.
71- T .P .Conwell-Evans, Foreign Policy from a Back Bench 1904- 
1918, a study based on the private papers of Lord Noel 
Buxton,(London, 1932^ 30-1.
72. See above, 137, n.20.
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This party was formed by deputies - inside as well as
outside the CUP - who were dissatisfied with the Committee
on personal as well as ideological grounds. But in 1910
it was still too early for bold political activity,
since all activities - the Committee’s as well as the
opposition's - were inhibited by the prevalence of
martial law. Therefore in the beginning the People’s
Party confined itself to harassing the Cabinet and the
73Committee in the Chamber.
The People's Party, however, was much more 
powerful and influential than its membership suggested.
It had a large following in the Chamber and amongst 
Unionists who had not joined its ranks, but who sympathised 
with it and disrupted the Committee from within. The 
reappearance of a conservative opposition helped to bring 
the Committee and the military together, and it would 
seem that this saved the Committee from an early fall. 
Nevertheless the prestige and influence of the CUP 
declined in 1910, especially after J^evket Pasa1 s victory 
in the conflict between the Ministers of v/ar and Finance.
The debate on the budget on 30 April gave the 
opposition an opportunity to embarrass the Committee.
Cavit Bey, who was presenting his annual budget, proposed
73* Tunaya, 293-6.
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a small Increase In the allowances of the Sultan’s
sons-in-law. This proposal was rejected by the Chamber.
As a protest against the excessive interference by the
Chamber in the workings of the government, Cavit tendered
his resignation. Hakki Pasa supported his Finance
Minister and announced his intention to resign should
74the Chamber fail to revise its decision. The Committee
found itself in a crisis very similar to the one brought
about by the Lynch Affair in December 1909- Once again
Halil Bey, President of the Committee's Parliamentary
Party, rallied the Unionist parliamentary group, and on
4 May the Chamber, invoking Article 35, withdrew its
75decision, enabling Cavit to resume office.
Opposition in Istanbul was one thing, Opposition 
in Macedonia, which had been the Committee's stronghold, 
another. Macedonia had so far remained loyal to the 
Unionist cause. When some Unionists had seceded to form 
the People's Party, Committee clubs in Rumelie had been 
quick to shower the capital with telegrams of protest.
74. 8lst Session of the Chamber of Deputies, 30 April,1910 
Takvim-i Vekayi, viii, 1403 ff .;*3uhran-i Vukela?* Tanin,
1 May,1910; Stanboul, 2, 3 May, 1910, 'Chronique 
Parlementaire'.
75. 82nd Session..., 4 Kay,1910, Takvim-i Vekayi, viii, 
l46l ff ,; Tanin and Stamboul of 5 May,1910.
76. Tunaya, 301.
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Therefore the news that anti-Committee groups were 
being set up in Macedonia caused great alarm. The 
Committee was determined to crush this opposition 
before it took root. On 31 May, therefore, the premises 
of an opposition club at Manast^r were forcibly closed 
and some of its members arrested. The official pretext 
for this action was that the club was reactionary and
77had been supporting the Albanians in their recent revolt.
In the capital the murder of Ahmed Samim, editor
of the Sedayi Millet on 9 June, gave the government the
opportunity to stamp on the opposition. The similarity
between this crime and the murder of Hasan Fehrai was
78too striking to ho unnoticed. flThe crime of Balnpekapi”
wrote Huseyin Cahit, "strongly resembles the murder 
committed last year on the bridge. If one remembers 
how this inflamed public opinion against the Committee 
of Union and Progress and how the reactionaries exploited 
it to arouse the soldiery at Yllddz, the repetition of a
77* Vice-Consul Geary to Lowther, Monastir, 2 June,1910,
enclosure in Lowther to Grey, n o .366,con.,Constantinople, 
7 June,1910, F .0.371/1010/20903; also enclosure in nos. 
450 and 469 con.,Constantinople, 5,1$ July,1910, F.0, 
371/1010/24856 and 26779 respectively.
78. See above Chap.II; also Tanin, 10 June,1910 and
Constantinople press of the same date; Bayur, i,322; 
H.C.Yalpin, ’Siyasi bir CinayetgKurban Giden Gazeteci 
Ahmet Samim1, Yakin Tarihimiz, i,108; Lowther to Grey, 
no.379? con. , Therapia, l*t June , 1910, F . 0.371/1011/21934:.
- 163 -
similar deed cannot but arouse the suspicion that the
act was premeditated and aimed at arousing reaction
79against the same party." The Committee was accused
of the crime and a letter, alleged to have been written
by Ahmed Samim to a certain fevket Bey, was published
in a certain paper, revealing that the victim had in
8 0fact been threatened by the Committee.
The lesson of 13 April had been a hard one but
it had been well learned. This time the Government
took no risks. Opponents of the regime were quickly
arrested, and in July 1910 the authorities claimed they
were on the tracks of a reactionary conspiracy, leading
to the arrest of Dr.Rlza Nur, Deputy of Sinop, on 19 
81July. Next day the press published the story of the 
conspiracy, giving details of the organisation and aims 
of the secret association behind the plot. This assoc­
iation was said to be organised into cells of four: 
president, secretary and two members. The central 
committee consisted of a treasurer, a subscription
79» Tanin, 11 June,1910; Lowther, never partial to the
Committee, cleared the Committee of both this murder 
and that of Hasan Fehmi, see Lowther..., ibid.
80. Ahmet Samim's letter, enclosure in Lowther, op♦cit., 
n o .379; Bayur, i, 322.
81. Ismail Hakki, 1Bir Mebusun Tevkifi1, Tanin, 20 July,1910; 
Lowther to Grey, n o .48l,con.,Therapia, 13 July,1910,
F.0.371/1010/258^0; Tunaya, 295-6; B.Lewis, 215.
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collector, an assassin (fedayi), and two members.
The aim of this group was to provoke an uprising by
assassinating certain members of the Cabinet and some
deputies. Once in power it would dissolve parliament,
hold fresh elections, end martial law and re-employ
dismissed officials. The headquarters of the movement
were in Paris where it functioned under the name of
1Osmanliisl&hati EsasiyeiFirkasif or 'Le Parti Radical
Ottoman1. ^erif Pasa, ex-Ottoman Ambassador to Stockholm
82was its president. When Major Tyrrell asked Mahmud 
l^evket Pa^a whether he attached any importance to the 
reported reactionary conspiracy, the generalissimo replied: 
"No; but if I did not crush these people now they
83would become important."
Jevket Papa’s remark sums up the nature of the 
conspiracy: it was a pretext to crush the opposition
before it became a threat. The way in which the case 
fizzled out against most of those arrested confirms 
this view. The court-martial, finding no evidence against
82. Tanin, 19,20 July,1910; Jeune Turc, 20 July,1910, 
enclosure in Lowther to Grey, no.500, con.,F .0.371/1010/ 
26783; Tunaya, 285-9^; for ferif Pasa’s denial of this 
charge of conspiracy see JjJerif Papa's letter to Grey, 
Paris, 25 July,1910, in F .0.371/1010/25710.
83. Tyrrell to Lowther, Constantinople, 21 July,1910, in 
Lowther to Grey, no.507, con.,Constantinople, 25 July, 
1910, F.0.371/1010/27811.
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the accused, was forced to acquit them. The short 
term effect of this manoeuvre was to break up and 
cause confusion in the ranks of the opposition. But 
its side effects were more important: they convinced
the opposition that parliamentary and legal methods 
would prove useless against a ruthless opponent.
While ^evket Pasa was dealing with the opposition,
the Committee was reconsidering its policies and trying
to strengthen its position. The second anniversary of
the revolution was the occasion for an examination of
the events of the past year and for a statement of 
85policy. In the proclamation to the nation, the 
Committee confessed that its measures to bring about the 
union of the different communities had failed, owing to 
the excessive zeal it had shown in the first two years of 
constitutional rule. It now recognised the opposition of 
the different elements to Ottomanism, and would therefore
iaTfld&Ut , l«f \
8ft. Dr.Rxza Nur, Cemiyeti Hafiye, (Dersaadet 1330s cited by 
Tunaya, 288; Lowther to Grey, no.773, con.,Constantin­
ople, 25 Oct.,1910, F.0.371/1010/39^86; Report of the 
Commission appointed to enquire into the proceedings of 
the secret association, a newspaper extract, enclosure 
in Lowther to Grey, no.605» con.,Therapia, 2k Aug., 
1910, F.O 371/1010/31388.
85. * Osmanli Ittihad ve Terakki Cemiyetinin Millete
Beyannamesi*, Tanin, 27 July,1910.
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leave them alone. The Committee would now pursue 
the cause of unity in a different way, namely, by con­
centrating all its energy on the material and educ­
ational development of the Empire, hoping thereby to
86unite all the elements through a community of interests.
The administrative policy remained as firm as 
before. The proclamation called upon the Porte to 
collect taxes and enlist soldiers from places which 
were providing neither; to collect arms when their 
possession led to brigandage and to crush political and 
non-political bands. The proclamation ended with the 
words:
"...the provision of soldiers and money are the 
foundations of a nation’s sovereignty, its 
defense and good government. Those who give 
neither taxes nor military service do nothing 
for their country.... Sovereignty is a political 
and holy right which is neither given nor 
inherited. It is conditional on a man being 
worthy of it." '
The moderate policy towards the non-Turkish 
elements was no doubt intended to take the sting out of 
their opposition to the Committee. Talat, Cavit, and 
Halil Bey^ * tour of Macedonia in August 1910 was directed 
towards promoting harmony amongst the Unionist organisations,
86. Ibidc
87. Ibid.
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now ridden with dissension. It is in this light that 
we must consider the speech said to have been made by
88Talat before a 'secret conclave' of the Salonika CUP.
It was in order to give confidence to demoralised 
Unionists that Talat spoke in harsh terms and purposely 
exaggerated the strength of the Committee in the cap­
ital. His claims, that "at the present moment the 
reins of power are entirely in our hands••. and the 
cabinet is essentially in the hands of the Committee 
or that "we have a majority in the House of 
Representatives and all attempts to oppose us in the
House have failed miserably...", were not altogether
89justified by past events or the existing situation.
Immediately after making these claims Tal&t contradicted
himself by saying: "In some cases Djavid Bey, myself,
and other members may fail to obtain the complete
90success to which we aspire...."
The Committee's efforts to rally its Macedonian 
clubs and the attempt, at the 1910 Congress, to resolve 
the differences between the Committee and the Parliamentary
88. Vice-Consul Geary to Lowther, Monastir, 28 Aug.,1910,
F.0.195/2358; B.D., ix/1, 207-9.
89 . Ibid.
90. Ibid.
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91Party, bear witness to the Committee’s decline.
But these efforts met with little success and in the
situation the opposition became bolder too. In spite
of martial law a Salonika paper called Turkia; Journal
Democrate published an article on ’The Committee of
92
Union and Progress and the Causes of its Decline’,
In December, the British Consul in Edirne reported the
formation of an opposition group of junior officers in
the Second Army, but which had originated in the Third
Army. This movement was anti-Committee and it criticised
the Government because of its policies of retrenchment,
of making political appointments in the army, and for
raising the loan in Germany and thus losing the good-will
93of France and Britain.
91. Resolutions of the 1910 Congress, Tanin, 19 Nov.,1910; 
Tunaya, 191; French translation in Marling to Grey, no. 
844, con., Pera, 22 Nov.,1910, F .0.371/1017/43063.
92. Turkia: Journal Democrate, 19 Nov.,1910, enclosure in 
Marling..., ibid,
93* Consul Samson to Marling, Adrianople, 2 Dec.,1910 in
Marling to Grey, no.3 con.,Constantinople, 3 Jan.,1911,
F .0.371/1242/8371; Tyrrell to Marling, enclosure in same; 
the man behind this movement was Colonel Sad k, who was 
arrested, nominally on the charge of drunkenness. But 
on the representation of Eyup Sabri, one of the members 
of the Central Committee of the CUP (Tunaya, 191), he 
was released. See Sanson to Lowther, Adrianople, 26 Dec., 
1910, in Lowther to Grey, no.71? con., Constantinople,
3 Jan.,1911, F.0.371/1242/4280.
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The failure of the Porte’s repressive policy
in Albania, Macedonia and the Yemen, and the Committee1s
inability to contain §evket Pa^a, further weakened its
9^position and encouraged the opposition* By the be­
ginning of 1911, opposition which had been crushed the 
previous summer reappeared, calling itself the ’New 
Party1 (Hizb-i Cedid).^ Like the People’s Party, 
this party was also an off-shoot of the CUF, formed
under the leadership of Colonel Sadxk and Abdulaziz 
96Mecdi Bey. Like the earlier opposition this group
was conservative and traditional in character, and
therefore strongly opposed to the social and political
ideas of the Unionists. In late January the political
situation had become serious enough for the Istanbul
correspondent of the National Zeitung to report that:
’’Sensational rfctmours are current here, according 
to which a dissolution of Parliament is imminent* 
The Young Turks are even said to be disposed, 
in view of the revolution in Arabia and the 
critical situation in Albania and Macedonia to 
acquiesce in the dictatorship schemes of the 
War Minister •,,, and after overthrowing Hakki 
Pasa to form a Shevket Cabinet.” 97
w r  For the Government’s policy towards Albania, Macedonia, 
and the Yemen, see Bayur, i, 318-22 and r'i'i/l,, 35-53*
95- Tanin, 9 Jan.,1911; Tunaya, 186-8 ; Bayur, ii/l55;
B.Lewis, 215-6 .
96. Tunaya, 186; B.Lewis, ibid.
97* National Zeitung, 22 Jan.,1911, reported in Times,
23 Jan.,1911.
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The situation was not as serious as rumours 
suggested. But it was serious enough for the Committee 
to sacrifice Tal&t to appease the opposition. Taldt 
was the corner-stone of the Committee and as Minister 
of the Interior was responsible for the 'hard line'
in the provinces. He resigned on 10 February and was
98succeeded by the more moderate Halil Bey, Halil's 
appointment saw immediate changes in the Committee's 
policies. Towards the provinces and the non-Turkish 
elements the principle of centralisation was quietly 
withdrawn, while the capitulations were not attacked 
with the same vigour as before. These changes were 
recorded in a circular to provincial governors in which 
Halil pointed out, that the fundamental policy of the 
Porte was that all Ottomans should enjoy the benefits 
of liberty and justice, the object being "to attain 
unity and thus efface the discord of nationalities 
which was the greatest wound in the State." Governors
were told to treat foreigners as guests of the State
99 /»and in conformity with the capitulations. Talat was
98 . Talat Beyin istifasi, Tanin, 11 Feb.,1911; Stamboul,
11 Feb.,1911; 'Xf, ...Courants Politiques..., wrote
f'...le Comite, s ' il cedait parfois sur les questions 
de personnes, n'abdiquait rien de son autorite, et 
ne changait rien a sa politique.” RMM. xxi,(1912),195.
99* Translation of circular, enclosure in Lowther to Grey, 
no.131, con.,Pera, 20 Jan.,1911, F .0.371/12^^/713^•
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taken out of* the limelight and elected President of 
the Parliamentary Party into which he was expected to 
instil discipline and harmony.
After Talat1s resignation the Committee tried 
hard to regain the initiative from the opposition. In 
what followed Mahmud Jpevket Pa^a was the key figure.
But the Committee was never sure of his position.
Sometimes he seemed to favour the Committee while at 
other tines his attitude was ambivalent. In this
uncertainty the Committee could never act without or 
against him, especially as they considered him to be
, x 102too popular with the people (avam) and the army.
The Committee tried to disorganise the opposition by
having its leader, Colonel Sadxk, posted away from
103the capital. fpevfekt Pa^a refused to do this.
When this failed the Committee decided to try and come 
to an understanding with the opposition. On 20 April,
Talat went to confer with Colonel Sadxk. But hours
100. Tanin, 22 Feb.,1911; Stamboul, same date; Tal&t (Edirne) 
President; Said Bey (Izmir); Munir Bey (£orum); Ali 
Cenani Bey (Aleppo); Mansur Pa^a (Bengazi) Vice- 
Presidents, and Galib Efendi (Kara^i) Treasurer.
101. Cavit1s Memoirs, Tanin, 28 Sept.,1943; also 20,21,
22 Sept.,1943.
102. Cavit, Tanin, 5 Oct.,1943*
103. Ibid.,27 Sept.,1943; Bayur, ii/l, 53 .
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of discussion led nowhere; Sadxk hurled the same old
charges at the Unionists - that they were irreligious,
free-masons, pro-Zionist and self-seekers. Before he
could reach an understanding, he wanted the Committee
104to withdraw from the Cabinet and the Chamber.
When an understanding with the opposition 
proved impossible, a small group of Unionists discussed 
another plan. The Committee would confront the opp­
osition with two alternatives: either to accept the
old Unionist programme as a whole, or to assume power, 
form a cabinet and accept all responsibility. If 
they accepted the second alternative, the Committee, 
which they thought could still count on about fifty
loyal adherents, would retain the name of 'Union and
105Progress' and go into opposition. But this extreme
stand was not accepted by the other Unionists, who
preferred to appease the opposition but to stay in
power at all c o s t s . ^  The result of these discussions
was the publication of the Committee's new ten-point
107programme in the press on 23 April, 1911* This
104. Ibid.,28 Sept.,1943o
105. Ibid.,29 Sept.,1943.
106• I^id.
107. Tanin, 23 April, 1911; Stamboul, 24 April,1911; 
Tunaya, 186; B.Lewis, 216.
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programme conceded all the opposition's demands on 
condition that they be endorsed by the next CUP congress.
Broadly speaking and for the sake of convenience,
the opposition can be divided into two groups. The
traditional-religious group whose members adhered to
the old institutions and values, and whose leader,
Colonel Sadik was appropriately a member of the Melarai
I08Order of Dervishes. Articles 6 , 7 and 9 of the new
programme met their demands. Article 6 read, "while 
preserving general religious and national ethics and 
morals, to make use of the advances and products of 
Western Civilization for the development of the Ottoman 
Empire”: Article 7 called for "the maintenance and safe­
guarding, within the framework of the constitution, of 
historic Ottoman traditions”; and Article 9 required 
the modification of certain articles in the constitution 
"so as to reinforce the sacred rights of the Caliphate 
and Sultanate”.
108. ^Situation en Turquie* Constantinople, 13 30 Avril,19H, 
a memorandum written by Count Ostrorog, soon after his 
resignation as judicial adviser to the Ottoman Ministry 
of Justice, and communicated privately to Sir Eyre 
Crowe. See F .0.371/1247/25257. - On Sad ,k Bey»s 
religious background also see Ali Canip Yontem,*Hizb-i 
Cedid', Yakin Tarihimiz, %ii, 353-5, and Kandemir, 
*Yahudiler, Filistin ve Ittihat-Terakki", Yakin Tarihimiz, 
ii, 243-4.
109. B.Lewis, 216.
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The second group may be said to consist of 
those motivated by personal interest and ambition.
They were either disgruntled officials who had lost 
their positions after the revoltuion, or those who had 
joined the Committee and whose high expectations were 
not met by either the revolution or the CUP. Hiiseyin 
Cahit (Yalijln) rightly gives this group the importance 
it deserves.^^ The remaining seven articles of the 
programme appeased this group. Article 1 laid down 
that deputies should not interest themselves in con­
cessions or similar affairs; Article 2 stated that in 
future deputies should not accept government posts; 
Article 3 that no deputy could become a minister without 
the consent of two-thirds of the members of the parlia­
mentary party; Article 4 said there must be absolute 
respect for the laws and ministerial responsibility 
must be established; Article 5 that the Committee 
would work for Ottomanism...; Article 8 , appointment 
and dismissal of functionaries must be regularised; and
Article 10 that the establishment and working of secret
111societies must be brought to an end.
Count Ostrorog, who until very recently had been 
Judicial Adviser to the Forte, saw this political con­
frontation as an issue between two concepts of State. On
110• Tanin, 2? April,1911; and H .C .Yal^in,‘Bizde ilk 
Hiziple^meJ Yakin Tarihimiz, ii, 153-4.
111. Tanin, op.cit,n. 107.
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the one side there was:
"le 'Rechsstaat' de Bluntschli, un Empire 
constitutionnel, ayant a sa tete un monarque 
place au-dessus des luttes de parti, irres- 
ponsable, et regi par un ensemble des lois 
qu'elaborent les membres d run Parlement, 
discontant librement les questions d'interet 
general aux lumieres de la raison et de 
1 ' experience",
On the other extreme stood:
"... la conception des conservateurs musulmans 
du groupe dissident, laquelle a pour ideal 
extreme mais logique le Dar-ul-Islam de _ _ ~
Mawerdi ou d 'Ibu-Halboun /Haldun?7• • • ♦lf
Behind these ideological differences between
the Committee and the opposition, Count P.strorog saw
the economic motive. Not only were the Unionists for
a modern constitutional, centralised state, they (at
least Cavit and his group) had also declared themselves
convinced partisans of the system of state monopoly,
especially of tobacco. As a result they had become the
irreconciliable enemies of those who:
"par conviction, preference ou interet se 
faisant les defenseurs de la manufacture et 
la vente libre du tabac, sous reserve de la 
perception d'un droit d'Etat par 1 ’apposition 
d'une banderole fiscale sur les boites ou les 
paquets mis en vente," 113
We have already seen how alarmed the French were at the
possibility of the 'tobacco regie', which they administered,
112. Situation, op.cit. n.108.
113. Ibid.
- 176 -
being taken over by the Porte. No doubt the
establishment of French interests in the Empire over a 
period of fifty years and more, had created an Ottoman 
group dependent on France. This group would be as 
anxious as the French to see that their interests and 
institutions were maintained. Thus the attacks on 
Cavit for not raising the 1910 loan in France, what­
ever the conditions. But whatever the strength of 
this economic motive, it usually found expression in 
religious terms, particularly as the Committee was
thought to be intimately associated with Salonika,
115that predominantly Jewish city.
For the moment the dissidents seemed to be 
check-mated by the issue of the new programme. There 
was even a possibility that the programme and its 
concessions might be rejected at the congress. Mean­
while the political storm seemed to have blown over.
On 27 April, Hakkx Pa^a received a vote of confidence 
by a substantial majority of 145 - 45*^"^ A few days
114. See above, 152-3, n.55.
115•^Situation’ op.cit., and Fitzmaurice to Tyrrell, n.d., 
(received in London on 9 March,1911) F.0.800/79,
Grey Papers.
116. Tanin and Yeni ikdam, 28 April, 1911.
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later, Colonel Sadxk, w h OC2 the Committee had been trying
117to remove from the capital, was transferred to Salonika.
In fact all this was illusory and the Committee^
situation did not improve at all, Mahmud IJevket Pasa
was still in control, and with the prolongation of the
state of siege indefinitely on 13 March, his mandate
lidhad been extended as well. The position of the
two remaining Unionists in the Cabinet, Cavit and
Babanzade Ismail Hakkx, became untenable. Both there-
119fore resigned on 8 May. Their successors Nail Bey
and Abdurrahman Efendi were chosen from the Senate, as
if to meet the terms of Article 2 of the new programme.
Because of the continuing dissension in the Committee,
Talat resigned his post as president of the party. He
120was succeeded by Said Bey, deputy for Izmir. On
18 May, the court-martial suppressed Tanin and the
121defeat of the CUP now seemed complete.
117. Cavit, Tanin, 3 Oct,,19^3; Bayur, «Li/I, 55
118. Lowther to Grey, no.l71i con.,Pera, 15 March,1911*
F .0 .371/1246/10018.
119* Tanin, 9 May,1911; Bayur, ii, i, 57.
120. Tanin, 15 May, 1911* and ’Les Unionistes a Beicos1 
(Beykoz), Stamboul, 15 May, 1911.
121. Cavit, Tanin, 10, 11 Oct.,19^3; Senin, 19 May, 1911; 
Stamboul, 19 May, 1911.
- 178 -
The opposition took advantage of its strong
position and put greater pressure on the Committee.
From Salonika, Colonel Sadxk issued a manifesto
appealing to all Unionists to make the Committee a
national body embracing all Ottomans regardless of
race or religion. The soldiers were asked to abstain
from politics and not become tools in the hands of
politicians. He concluded by announcing his intention
122to resign his commission in the army. The end of
the parliamentary session on 4 June took some of the
life out of political issues. But pressure against
123the Committee continued. Sadxk Beyfs efforts in
Macedonia were proving effective. Cn 4 July the
124Mitrovitza branch of the CUP announced its dissolution.
In August, the* appointment of Rifat Pa^a, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, as Ambassador to Paris seemed the 
final blow to Unionist prestige. The Senin is reported
122. Yeni Ikdam, 21 May, 1911. The manifesto was dated 
19 May, 1911.
123* Lowther to Grey, no.403, con., Therapia, 13 June,
1911, F.0.371/1250/23772.
124. Vice-Consul Hough to Lamb (Salonika), Uskub, 4 July,
1911, in Marling to Grey, no.497, con., Constantinople,
9 July, 1911, F.0.371/1250/27808.
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to have hinted that it was time for Hakki P a p  to go. 
In such a political situation it is only possible to 
guess what may have followed had Italy not declared 
war in late September. However detrimental the war 
may have proved to be for the interests of the Empire 
for the CUP it came as a blessing in disguise and 
gave the Committee a new lease of life.
125
125. Reported in Times, Ik Aug.,1911*
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CHAPTER V
THS DECLINE, FALL AND RESURGENCE OF THE CUP
Italy declared war on the Ottoman Empire on
29 September, 1911. The Italian ultimatum was delivered
on 28 September and it stated that as the Italian
government found that it could not obtain satisfaction
from the Porte in questions relating to Italian interests
in Tripoli, and in view of the dangers to which Italian
subjects were exposed, it had decided to occupy the
province. The Porte was instructed not to resist the
invading army, and to send necessary instructions to
Ottoman officials in Tripoli in this vein. The Turkish
Government was given 24 hours to accept Italy’s terms;
1
if it did not do so war would follow.
The timing of the ultimatum - the ultimatum 
itself was not totally unexpected - came as a surprise
1. Text of the ultimatum in Rodd to Grey, no.67, tel.con., 
Rome, 28 Sept.,1911, F .0.371/1251/38003; Bayur, ii, I, 
93-5; text of the declaration of war in Signor de 
Martino to the Grand Vezir, Therapia, 29 Sept.,19H» 
enclosure in Lowther to Grey, no.663, con.,Therapia, 29 
Sept.,1911, F.0.371/1252/38771. See also Lowther to Grey, 
no.248, Constantinople, 28 Sept.,1911; B.D.,ix/I, 282-3; 
Ward and Gooch, Cambridge History..., iii, 454-6; Die 
Grosse Politik der auropaischen Kabinette 1871-1914,
3o/l, Berlin,1926, 61-3; Jagow to Bethraann-Hallweg^
28 Sept.,1911.
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to Hakki Pa^sa and the leeway of only 24 hours threw
2
the Cabinet into a panic. The Turks had been aware
for some time of Italian designs on their North African
province. Sight months earlier Huseyin Cahit, writing
in Tanin, had acknowledged the bankruptcy of Ottoman
sovereignty in Tripoli and prophesied that it would
"fall of its own weight like over-ripe fruit" since
3
the Turks could not defend it directly. A little
i.
later Babanzade Ismail Hakki, the Unionist expert on
foreign affairs,warned that the Italians, who regarded
Tripoli as their private domain and who were alarmed
by rumours of concessions being granted to American
k
enterprise, would resort to arms. The simultaneous
replacement of Italy*s Ambassador at Istanbul and her
Consul-General in Tripoli in late July was "regarded
in Rome as indicating a definite alteration of Italian
5
policy towards Turkey". No doubt the implications 
of these changes was understood in the Turkish capital
2. Usakligil, ii, 212.
3. Tanin, 21 Jan.,1911.
4. Ibid., 17 Feb.,1911; Kuran, 541-2.
5. Rodd to Grey, no.117, con.,Rome, 31 July, 1911,
F.0.371/1251/30691.
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for on 6 September the Tanin summed up the situation 
in no uncertain terms. "The Italians" it complained, 
"regard Tripoli as their promised land.... They deny 
us the right, not merely to defend ourselves but also 
to question them. They want to take from us the right 
to consider the future of that p r o v i n c e . I n  the 
light of the Italian ultimatum how correct this estimate 
proved to be!
In spite of this awareness of their weak and 
hopeless situation, no Turkish cabinet could surrender 
Tripoli without a struggle and still hope to survive. 
Huseyin Hilmi Pa^a told the British Ambassador that the 
"Government..., which is already being accused of being 
too Ottoman and too much inclined to neglect the int­
erests of the other races of the Empire, especially 
the Arabs, could never agree to relinquish an Arab 
Province to a Christian Power. It would mean the rising
en masse of all the Arab Provinces of the Empire against
7
the Government." The inflexible conditions of the
ultimatum, especially the time limit, placed the cabinet
in a predicament. It had either to capitulate or fight
and the Porte knew it could do neither.
Tanin, 6 Sept.,1911.
7* Lowther to Grey, no.893, con.,Pera, 4 Dec.,1911,
F.0.371/1259/49376.
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It therefore reacted in the only other way it 
knew how, namely "by showering telegrams upon its
Q
ambassadors and diplomatic notes upon the Powers....11 
Its reply to Italy was couched in the most moderate 
terms with the object* of playing for time. Though the 
Italian demand to occupy Tripoli was rejected firmly, 
the Porte agreed to open negotiations to work out 
guarantees which the Italians might consider sufficient 
to safeguard their interests in the province. Italy 
was also offered special economic privileges and the 
only reservation that the Porte made was that Italy 
recognise Ottoman sovereignty in the area. Had negot­
iations been opened it seems likely that the Turks would 
have made further concessions. Only a month later 
Said Pasa told the French Ambassador: "Nous demandons
la 1souverainete1,... mais si la conferance insistait
pour la 1suzerainete*, peut-etre devrions-nous nous y 
9
resigner." But Italy refused to compromise and in 
accordance with her ultimatum declared war on the 
Ottoman Empire.
8 . Moukhtar, La Turquie..., 136.
9. Bonpard to M.de Selves, Therapia, 29 Oct.,1911, D .D .F ., 
2e Serie,xiv,no.492,722-5;significantly Said Pa^arefused 
to be appeased by Italian recognition of the Sultan's 
'spiritual sovereignty1 over Tripoli. See also the 
Porte's reply to the Italian Ambassador, 29 Sept.,1911, 
in F .0.371/1252/33347; and Danismend, ...Kronoloji, iv, 
384-6.
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The outbreak of war had immediate repercussions
on the internal political situation. The anti-Unionist
opposition which had been gathering strength throughout
the years attacked the Committee with fresh vigour. As
a result Hakki Pa^a was forced to resign, assuming
full responsibility for the prevailing situation.^
Hakki*s resignation created the problem of finding a
Grand Vezir able and willing to face up to such a
critical situation. Kamil Pa^a was asked to form a
ministry. He refused to do so unless the Committee
refrained from interfering in politics•^  The Sultan
then turned to the other veteran Said Pasa, who accepted
and was appointed Grand Vezir for the eighth time on
1230 September, 1911* Said Pa$a had some difficulty in 
forming a ministry. When he managed to form one a few days
10. Ikdam, 30 Sept.,1911; Bayur, ii/l, 109; U^akligil, ii, 
214-27; Dani^mend, ibid. 386; Inal, 1776; Mente^e, 
Cumhuriyet, 21, 22 Oct.,1946; and Lowther to Grey, no.226, 
tel.con.,Constantinople, 1 Oct.,1911, F .0.371/1252/38491.
11. Kamil's conversation with Lowther and M.Boppe, the 
French Charge d'Affaires, see Lowther to Grey, no.224, 
tel.con.,Constantinople, 1 Oct.,1911, F .0 .371/1251/
38318; and Boppe to M o d e  Selves, Therapia, 3 0ct.,1911,
D .D .F ., 2e Serie, xiv, no.391, 580.
i
12. Hatt appointing Said Pa^a in Ikdam, 1 Cct.,1911; also 
Inal, 1082-3; Bayur, op.cit.; MoukhtarLa Tnnquie, 139*
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later, it turned out to be colourless and consisted
"of men not generally supposed to be in sympathy with
extremists of the committee, and it may be (described)
13
as a Cabinet d 1 Affaires."
On party politics - particularly after Hakki1s
resignation - the effect of the war was to bring about
a temporary and uneasy truce. For the moment patriotism
got the better of partisanship. While the Committee's
prestige declined sharply the opposition were unable to
exploit their advantage, and both sides concentrated on
the Italian aggression. Since Italy was Germany's ally
there was a resurgence of pro-British sentiment. The
Tanin urged the Ottoman press to refrain from arousing
Pan-Islamic sentiments as this would conflict with the
l(tinterests of England, France and Russia. Earlier 
Huseyin Cahit had rebuked the Osmanischer Lloyd, the 
German Embassy paper in Istanbul for trying to
exploit Islam as a weapon against the Triple Entente.
He asked the German paper to stop this practice as it
*
13. Cabinet given in Ikdam and Tanin of 5 Oct.,1911;
Bayur, ibid ; Dani^mend, op. cit. ; Lowther. . • , oi>; cit. ; 
and also Lowther to Grey, no.239» tel.,Therapia,
5 Oct.,1911, F.0.371/1252/39063.
14. Huseyin Cahit, 'Xttihadi Islam ve Katbuatt Osmaniye', 
Tanin, 23 Sept.,1911.
- 186 -
15was opposed to Ottoman principles and policy.
Finally, on 28 September, the Tanin warned Germany that 
if she could do nothing on behalf of Turkey the Ottomans 
would have to reach an agreement with the Triple Entente.
Consequently on the day Said Pasa assumed office 
he addressed a communique to Great Britain appealing
17
for British intervention in the Turco-Italian Conflict. 
When this appeal did not bring a favourable response 
he proposed a formal alliance with either Britain alone, 
or with the Triple Entente. The only condition he laid
15- Tanin, 28 Aug.,1911* Huseyin Cahit wrote: "The Sultan 
is the ruler of all Ottomans and Caliph of the Muslims 
of the entire world. It is therefore natural for 
Muslims.•• to turn their eyes towards Istanbul, the 
home of the Caliphate.But this is only a religious, moral 
and sentimental tie and it would be absolutely against 
our principles and ideas to debase this sacred tie by 
exploiting it for political ends."
16. H.Cahit, 'Ittifak ve Itilaflar Sar^isinda Turkiye1,
Tanin, 28 Sept.,1911* - Neither the Committee nor the 
Porte wanted to become entangled in the dangerous web 
of Pan-Islam. Earlier in February 1911* Rifat Pasa, 
the Foreign Minister told the Russian Ambassador: "Ni
le gouvernement ni le comite de Salonique ne cherchaient 
a poursuivre de panislamisme, cars ils se rendaient 
nettement compte qu'une telle politique menerait a des 
complications dangereuses avec la Russie, l'Angleterre 
et la France. ..." Quoted in MoukhtarLa' Turquje, 100.
17. Grand Vizier to Tewfik Pasha, 30 Sept.,1911, F.0.371/ 
1252/3836^; Bayur,_ ii/l, 110 ff.
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down was that Britain should intervene and induce 
Italy to accept an arrangement on the basis of re­
cognition of the sovereign rights of the Sultan over 
l8Tripoli. But an alliance was not forthcoming, and
Turkey's isolation and Europe's reaction - or the lack
of it - could not but make the Turks cynical about
Europe's attitude towards constitutionalism in the
Ottoman Empire. To Boppe Kamil Pa^a expressed some of
this disillusionment:
"Nous reposions confiants dans notre maison; 
les portes et les fenetres etaient grandes 
ouvertes... et voici qu'un est entre et que 
1'on nous a derobe une province. Qu'est-ce 
done que le droit? Qu'est que la parole de 
1'Europe?" 19
The outbreak of hostilities coincided with the 
third annual congress of the Committee of Union and 
Progress in Salonika. Delegates from the various 
branches had assembled as arranged when the first 
session opened on 30 September. On account of the war 
the order of the day was abandoned and the assembly
18. Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Foreign Office,
31 Oct.,1911, F .0 .371/1263/^855^; Bayur, ii/I, 175-83.
19* Boppe to M.de Selves, Therapia, k Oct.,1911, D .D .F .,
2e Serie, xiv, no.394, 58^.
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converted itself into a 'Committee of National Defense1 
20(C.N.D.). It may be recalled that one of the chief
issues to be discussed and resolved at this Congress
was the dissension within the CUP, and the programme
which its dissident members had forced the radical
21wing to accept in April 1911 But in the emotional 
climate of war the problem was not resolved and the 
dissidents, unable to press for a solution, had to 
accept a compromise. The partisan political activity 
which followed in the wake of the Congress suggests 
that the agreement reached did "little more than paper 
over the cracks".^
20. Tunaya, 191-2. The manifesto inaugurating the C.N.D. 
was issued on 5 October. This body was made up of 8 
members and its function was to recruit volunteers for 
military service. Non-Muslim communities were asked to 
co-operate with this body through their religious heads. 
See Tanin, 6 Oct.,1911, and Lowther to Grey, no.689, con., 
Therapia, 6 Oct.,1911, F .0 .371/1253/39719.
21. See above, 172 ff.
22. B.Lewis, 216-7; the solution was not mentioned in the 
official decisions of the 1911 Congress, see Tanin, 16 
Oct.,1911; French translation in 'X', 'Doctrines et Pro­
grammes des Partis Politiques Ottoman', R .M.M.,xxii,
(1913), 152-8 ; nor in the 'secret decisions' sent to the
F.O. by the British Consul in Salonika, see F.0.371/ 
1263/51124. It seems that the Committee dismissed this 
issue in a summary manner in the guise of a patriotic 
proclamation proclaiming unity. See Tunaya, 192, n.65, 
who quotes a part of the proclamation from Tanin, 27 Sept. 
1527,o.s.(10 Oct.,1911); French translation of which is 
found in Jeune Turc, 10 Oct.,1911, enclosure in Lowther 
to Grey, n o .79^, con., Constantinople, 7 Nov.,1911,
F.O.371/1257/44814.
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For some months past the Committee had been
on the defensive. The war gave the Committee an
opportunity to exploit patriotism to assume the offensive
and regain the initiative. It aroused public opinion
to demand that the honour of the country be saved by
a show of resistance to Italian aggression- Being
unable to answer the Italians in kind, at least
effectively, the Turks turned to the tried device of
the boycott, which had worked against Austria, and
applied it against Italian commerce* On 7 October
the Ministry of Justice issued a circular unilaterally
abrogating the capitulary rights of Italians in the
Ottoman Empire.^
These measures, however, did little to elevate
the Committee's position and prestige in the long run*
Cavit Bey writes how during "Said Papa's first days
they had nourished a great secret hope.•.and how it had
24proved empty. tf The Committee was still thought to 
be powerful but every day it found itself face to face 
with a new crisis. It was thought that the Committee
23* U^aklxgil, ii, 230 ff .; Moukhtar,La^  Turquio,138 ; the 
circular enclosed in Lowther to Grey, no,737* con., 
Therapia, 12 Oct.,1911, F .0.371/1255/41663.
24. Cavit, Tanin, 16 Oct.,1943, and Tanin, 15 Oct.1911.
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had brought Said to power and formed the cabinet. But
this "was not true...; we did not even have the power to
criticise this body /and7every sign of moderation
/itidal7, concession /sukut7 and compromise /itilaf7 came
25
from our side". Finding their position difficult, on
16 October some members of the inner circle of the CUP
- Talat, Cahit, Cavit, Dr. Nazim - discussed the
possibility of setting up a coalition government, which
26they considered "a seductive idea for the present”.
In moments of crisis politicians tend to be
guided by intuition and the general good as well as by
calculated cunning and self-interest. The Unionists were
no exception and saw in a coalition government the end
of political strife and animosity especially while the
country faced a crisis. They had discussed this idea
earlier while Said Pa^a had been forming his ministry.
But because some members had refused to enter the
cabinet at that point - particularly Huseyin Cahit -
27the idea had been dropped. A coalition, they reasoned, 
would mollify the opposition in all parts of the country 
and smooth over all political and ideological differences.
25o Cavit, ibid.
26. Ibid.,17 Oct.,1943.
27. Ibid.; Talat was to becoae Minister of Post and Tele- 
graph, and Cavit Finance.
28. Mente^e, Cumhuriyet, 20 Oct.,1946.
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Once the Unionists had agreed about the practicability
of their scheme, Talat and Halil Bey were chosen for
the delicate task of negotiating with the opposition
and persuading them to join a coalition. Talat and
Halil first called upon the ideologue of the opposition,
Prince Sabaheddin at his villa in Kuruse^me. They
offered him a post in the government which he turned
down and without his active co-operation the coalition
29
scheme was bound to fail.
It would have been a grave tictical error for 
the opposition to have formed a coalition with the 
Committee. A coalition government would have maintained 
the CUP in power, forced the opposition to share the 
blame for the declining situation, while conferring 
no real advantage upon them, As it was^ the Committee 
was fast waning and given a little more rope they were 
sure to hang themselves. The opposition had only to 
bide their time and the government would be theirs.
Consul Samson reported that the Committee’s influence
29* Ibid.; Dr.Nihad Re^ad, a confidant of Sabaheddin's
answering Halil Bey's memoirs, wrote that during this 
period he and the Prince were in Paris and that the 
meeting took place a year later during the Balkan War. 
This, according to the Doctor, was the last meeting be­
tween Sabaheddin and the CUP. See Dr.Nihad Re§ad,
'Ittihad ve Terakkinin Muhaliflerle Temaslari', Cumhuriyet
22 Nov.,1946. - It is probably the Doctor's memory at 
fault because as we shall see the Committee was in no 
positi on to offer terms a year later.
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■was eroding in the vilayet of Sdirne, and Kamil Pa^a
was convinced that the Committee would collapse at
the fourth session of Parliament when the majority of
30the deputies would come out in opposition. Parlia­
ment convened for the fourth session on 14 October 
and Said Pa^a came before the Chamber to seek a vote of 
confidence. This would have been a difficult under­
taking under normal circumstances, and even during such 
critical times the parties had to meet and discuss 
before consenting to give the cabinet their mandate.
The parties met on 17 October and next day Said's
31cabinet received a vote of 125 for and 6 against.
For the moment the political atmosphere had been cleared 
by the vote. The opposition had to temporise until the 
war - not yet a month old - had reached a deadlock 
and emotions had calmed before going into the offensive.
By November the war had been reduced to a 
stalemate. The Italians, because of their naval
50. Samson to Lowther, Adrianople, 20 Oct.,3 Nov.,and 31
Dec.,1911, F .0 .195/2364; and Mr.Ryan's interview with 
Kamil Pa^a, in Lowther to Grey, no.236, tel.con., 
Therapia, 4 Oct.,1911, F .0 .371/1252/39009; also 
Tunaya, 192, n.66.
t
31. On the opening of Parliament see Tanin and Yeni Ikdam,
15 0ct.,1911» on the meeting of the parties see
'Firkalarm Dunku I^jtimajI' , Yeni ikdam, 18 Cct.,1911;
on the vote of confidence see Tanin and Yeni Ikdam,
19 Oct.,1911; also Lowther to Grey, n o •7l4, con.,
Therapia, 20 Oct.,1911, F .0 ,371/1255/41858.
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supremacy, made it virtually impossible for the Turks
to send troops and munitions in large quantities. The
Porte and the Committee had sent a token force of
officers, (including Enver and Mustafa Keraal) who
organised the local bedouins and harassed the Italian
troops from the inaccessible desert. In this kind of
warfare neither side could be defeated quickly. In the
spring of 1912, therefore, the Italians tried to force
the pace by occupying some Turkish islands, bombarding
coastal towns like Beirut and tzmir and even trying to
force the Straits. But these measures had international
implications and were opposed by the other Great Powers
32whose commerce they endangered.
This stalemate was reflected politically by 
the formation of the Liberal Union (Hurriyet ve Itilaf 
Firkasi) on 21 November. This party was formed under 
the auspices of ex-Colonel Sadik, Damad Ferid, Ismail 
H&kki Pa^a, Liitfi Fikri, Rxza Tevfik, Dr. Riza Nur and 
others, men who had only one thing in common: they
were all bitterly opposed to the CUP. Otherwise the 
Liberal Union was a mass of contrasts and confusions
32. For accounts of the Tripoli war see Bayur, ii/lf 99-440
passim; Kuran, 541 ff.; Dani^mend, iv, 384-6. G.F.Abbott,
The Holy War in Tripoli,(1912), and ¥.C.Askew, Europe
and Italy's Acquisition of Libya, (1942), which has an 
extensive bibliography.
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where "liberals mingled with conservatives, clericals
with free-thinkers, and constitutionalists with
33absolutists". The strength of this party lay in its 
ability to unite all those elements which had been 
long hostile to one another. Greeks, Bulgars, Armenians,
Arabs and Turks now worked together, though only with
34the limited aim of overthrowing the CUP. The
founding of the Liberal Union coincided with Kamil
Papa’s meeting with King Edward VII at Port Said, an
event which the opposition press exploited to further
its own political ends. One outcome of all this
activity was what Baron Marschall described as a
3 5"remarkable mania of enthusiasm for England".
33• 'X*, ...Courants PolitiqueSi.., R.H.M.xxi, 207 and 218-9;
The fullest treatment ol tnis party is found in Tunaya, 
315-44.; and Riza Nur, Hiirriyet ve Itilaf Nasa.1 Dogdu,
Nasil Oldti? (1917); also see Kuran, 552-3; Bayur, ii/I,  ^
233-4; BTEewis, 217; D.A.Rustow, Damad Ferid Fashaj S .I . ; 
accounts in the press of the day, especially Yeni Ikdam 
and Tanin of 22,23 Nov.,1911; and Lowther to Grey, n o .864, 
con.,Constantinople, 23 Nov.,1911, F .0.371/1263/48319•
34. Riza Nur, ibid.,quoted by Mente^e, Cumhuriyet, 23 Oct., 
1946; Tunaya, 318-9; Bayur, ibid.; B.Lewis, 217.
35. Marschall to the German Foreign Office, Constantinople,
30 Nov.,1911, G.D.D .,iv, 65-6 . Cavit complained to 
Marschall that "Bompard as well as Lowther have been 
agitating against the Committee and so, indirectly in 
favour of Kianil Pasha", see Same to Same, Constantinople,
31 Oct.,1911, ibid.,64. See also 'Ingiltere Krall - 
K&mil Pa^a, Bir Hatira1, Yeni Ikdam, 23 Ncv.,1911; 
R.Storrs, Orientations, (1937), 125-6 .
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Internal politics were now irrevocably intermingled 
with foreign affairs.
The Liberals chalked up their first success 
after only 20 days of formal existence. This was 
marked by the victory of Tahir Hayrettin, the son of 
the famous Grand Vezir of Tunis, Hayrettin Paj^a, over
the Unionist candidate and Minister of the Interior,
*
Memduh Bey in the Istanbul by-election on 11 December,
1911. The by-election was fought for the seat which had
fallen vacant when Rifat Pa§a was appointed Ottoman
Ambassador to Paris. The Liberal victory by a mere
one vote proved to have great significance in the
3 6
politics of the day. On the day of the election
Mehmed Cavit wrote in his diary:
"To-day the Istanbul by-election took place 
and in spite of all our hopes the nominee
of the Liberal Union won..•• This may be
counted as the Committee of Union and Pro­
gress's first defeat. For some days past 
something within me made me sense this reverse, 
but I did not want to believe it. I thought 
they were pulling my leg. I do not think I 
know of anything which has affected me so much 
since 31 Mart." 37
3 6 . The Istanbul press of 12 Dec.,1911; Tunaya, Middle 
Eastern Affairs, April, 1954, 117-8; and its Turkish 
original in Cumhuriyet, 18 Feb.,1954; Tunaya, 322; 
Bayur, ii/l, 236; Kuran, 353 and B.Lewis, 217.
37. Cavit, Tanin, 30 Oct.,1943.
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The opposition made great capital out of their 
triumph. They spoke of the CUP as a force which had 
passed into the pages of history. Having destroyed 
it they thought they had also laid the foundations of
7 Q
another institution to replace it. This election
set the mood for the future political activities of
both parties. To the Liberals it seemed as if the
tide had finally turned immutably in their favour.
The Unionists saw it as the sign of their impending
fall and therefore the signal for immediate action.
The Committee*s first move in this direction
was to try to have some Unionists - particularly
Talat, Cavit and Ismail Hakki - appointed to the
cabinet. But this move was effectively blocked by
Mahmud $evket Pa^a and Hayri Bey, Minister of Justice 
39and Evkaf. After much endeavour the Unionists suc­
ceeded in having Haci Adil Bey appointed Minister of 
the Interior. But there was an immediate reaction from 
the opposition. Hur^id Pa^a, who was Minister of Marine, 
sent in his resignation, refusing to work with a member
of the CUP, and therefore Haci Adil stepped down.
%
38. Ibid.,Yeni Ikdam, 12 Dec.,1911; Tunaya, 322,n.31; the
Tanin played down the Committee*s defeat representing it 
as a triumph of reaction. See H.Cahit, * Istanbul 
Intihabi*, Tanin, 13 Dec.,1911.
39- Cavit, Tanin, Nov.,19^3*
k°. Ibid., 5 Nov.,19^3.
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Finding themselves in this impasse the Committee were 
forced to turn in another direction. Already in 
August 1910 Talat had told the ’secret conclave1 of 
the CUP in Salonika that "should we ever observe the 
smallest possibility of a vote of no confidence..., 
we are prepared to secure the immediate dissolution 
/of the Chamber7n•^  Though the circumstances were 
not as Talat had speculated, the situation had now 
arisen where these tactics were required.
The dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies 
would force both parties ’to go to the country’ where 
the Committee thought it could win comfortably. Though 
the Committee was on the decline in the Empire, its 
hold on the provincial administration was still secure. 
This was a great asset in an electoral campaign held in 
a country such as the Ottoman Empire, where ’democratic 
habits and values’ had still to take root, and where 
the electoral system was indirect, providing for the 
election of a local electoral college which then voted 
for a candidate for parliament. The Committee also 
enjoyed the added advantage of having an Empire-wide 
organisation and experience of many years. All these
4l. See above, 167,. n.88.
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points would score heavily especially if elections
were held before the Liberals could set up their own
organisation or break up that of the Committee.
The vehicle for bringing about the dissolution
of the Chamber was the modification of Article 35 of
the constitution. This article had been amended in
1909 depriving the Sultan of some of his prerogatives,
and giving the last word to the Chamber of Deputies in
case of disagreement between the Chamber and the 
42Cabinet. Said Pasa wanted to remodify this article 
to its original form thereby restoring to the sovereign 
the power to dissolve the Chamber without consulting 
the Senate. He introduced the Bill on l6 December 
explaining to his audience the need for a strong and 
stable government to direct a war or negotiate a peace 
with Italy. He also pointed out that his Bill conformed 
with the demands of the opposition, who stated that the 
restoration to the Sultan of some of his former powers
43was one of the fundamental principles of their programme.
42. See above, 120.
43. On the amendment of ’Article 35' see ’Yine Kanunu Esasi*, 
Yeni Ikdam, l4 Dec.,1911; H.Cahit, 'Kanunu Esasinin 
Tebdili1, Tanin, 15 Dec.,1911; Cavit, Tanin, l,2 ,3 »Nov., 
1943; Bayur, ii/I,237 ff•; Kuran, 553-4. Text of Said 
Pasa’s speech of l6 Dec.,in Takvim-i Vekayi, 20 Dec.,1911* 
See also Lowther to Grey, no.934, con.,Pera, 18 Dec.,1911, 
F .0.371/1263/51583 with extract from Libert^ of 18 Dec., 
1911*
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The opposition could not refute Said Pasa ’ s
arguments especially after having called for the
restoration of the Sultan to his former position time
and again. 44 Though thoroughly out-manoeuvred by Said
Pasa, the Chamber refused to surrender its recently
acquired privileges voluntarily. Therefore Said Pasa
resigned on 30 December, only to be reappointed the
following day. 45 Said's 'new minis t r y i n  which there
were no important changes, received the Sultan's sanction
was resumed and it continued until 13 January when the 
matter was finally put to the vote. The Bill to 
remodify Article 35 was defeated because it failed to 
obtain the two-thirds majority necessary to carry a
44. See above,172 ff.,n.l07 and 109* See also Ferid Pasa's 
speech before the Senate, in Tanin and Stamboul, 23 Feb., 
1910 and enclosure in Lowther to Grey, no.109*con., 
Constantinople, 23 Feb.,1910, F .0.371/1000/6989> and his 
letter to Stamboul, 19 Feb.,1910. Ferid Pasa argued 
that the constitutional amendments of 1909 had con­
stituted a total break with the past and marked an end 
of the Sultan's prerogatives. The Empire, he said, would 
have done better to simulate the 3ritish rather than the 
example of the French Revolution. In a country like 
Turkey the application of the theory of the sovereignty 
of the people would lead to the dismemberment of the 
Empire since the Turkish element was in a minority. Con­
sequently the 1909 amendments must be undone.
4
45. Tanin and Yeni Ikdam, 31 Dec.,1911, and 1 ,2 ,Jan.,1912. 
Inal, 1086-7; Bayur, ii/1,240; Dani^mend, iv, 386-7*
0
46. Yeni Ikdam, 4 Jan.,1912.
on 3 January, 1912. 46 Next day the debate on Article 35
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47constitutional amendment. Two days later the Sultan 
dissolved the Chamber and ordered fresh elections, and 
in accordance with the requirements of the constitution 
this decision was sanctioned by the Senate on 17 
January..48
With the Chamber dissolved both parties began
campaigning feverishly for the coming election. Some
of the Committee’s advantages over the opposition have
already been noted. The Committee further strengthened
its position by having its members appointed to the
cabinet and to other positions of influence, Adil Bey
gave up his post as Secretary-General of the CUP and
became Minister of the Interior. Talat became Minister
of Post and Telegraph, Ahmed Rxza went to the Senate,
Said Halim Pasa was made President of the Council of
State, and finally on 18 February Cavit Bey entered the
4 9
cabinet as Minister of Public Works.
47. 'Yine Madde1 , Tanin, 5 Jan., 1912. The measure 
received 125 votes for, 105 against with 4 abstentions. 
See Tanin and Teni Ikdam, 14 Jan., 1912, and fX f, ... 
Courants Politiques..., R .M .M .,xxi, 199-200,
48. The Sultan’s Hatt and the Senate’s decree in Tanin and 
Yeni ikdam, 16, 18 Jan.,1912. Also see Bayur, ii/l, 242; 
Inal, 1087; Kuran, 554; and Lowther to Grey, nos.52 and 
66, con.,Pera, 17 and 24 Jan.,1912, F .0.371/1487/2877 and 
3939 respectively.
49. Tanin, 231 24 and 25 Jan.,1912, and Yeni Ikdam, 19 Feb., 
1912.
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The 1912 election is known in Turkish history 
as the 'big-stick election1 (Sopali Se9im or Dayakli 
Se^im).^ Though there was some violence this aspect 
of* the campaign has been exaggerated. The belabouring 
of Riza Tevfik at the hustings at Gumiilcune has even 
been immortalised in the poem 'The Star of Truth'
(Hakikatin Yildxzi), in which Tevfik Fikret is said to
51have evoked the image of Christ before his tormentors:
"All those feverish gangs armed with stones 
Attacked justice in the name of 'justice1.
But every blow restored and every curse refreshed 
And from that holy face blood trickled as stones flew.
The Committee's methods, however, were more 
sophisticated than simply the use of the stick. While 
both sides canvassed the Committee was in a position to 
offer some positive reward in return for votes. Haci 
Adil's object in touring Macedonia and Albania was to 
appease the disgruntled elements by promises and con-
50. B.Lewis, 218; R.E.K09U, 'Turkiye'de Se^imin Tarihi,
1876-1950', Tarih Diinyasx, i/v-vii, 1950; Tunaya, 322; 
Kuran, ^96-7 .
51. Quoted by Mustafa Ragxp, 'Ke^rutiyet Devrinde Intihab 
Mucadeleri', Akgatn, 18 March,19^3• See also Mehmet Kaplan, 
Tevfik Fikret ve giiri, 19^6, 120.
Ve butun kafil e ta§larla milcehhez mahrnum,
Ettiler "hak" diyerek hakka hucum.
Ona her darbe ^ifa, her ac£ soz bir miijde;
Ta^lar indik^e sizan kanlar o kudsx yuzde.
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52cessions and thus win their support. On the other
hand the government was also able to pass restrictive
legislation against the press and the holding of public
meetings, measures which hindered the opposition's
53electioneering campaign.
The opposition could muster nothing as powerful 
against the Committee's big guns. In February 1912 
they tried to damage the Committee's position by 
publishing Kamil Papa's letter to the Sultan, which 
amounted to no more than an indictment of the CUP and 
its policies. Kamil had written the letter from Egypt 
on 20 December, 1911, flushed with prestige from his 
meeting with the English monarch. MHe blamed the 
Unionists for the misfortunes of the Empire, and de­
manded the raising of the state of siege and the dis­
solution of the Committee of Union and Progress. At the
52. Lamb to Lowther, Salonica, 22 Feb.,1912, enclosure in 
Lowther to Grey, no.170, con,,Pera, 27 Feb.,1912, F.O. 
371/1^87/9316; and 'Haci Adil Bey ile Miilakat' , Tanin,
25 Feb.,1912.
53. The Press Laws are in Tanin, Iktiham (ikdam) and Jeune 
Turc of 19 March,1912, the latter being an enclosure in 
Lowther to Grey,n o .230,con,,Constantinople, 20 March,1912,
F . 0 .371/1^93/12552; Server iskit, Tiirkiyede Matbuat
Rejimleri, 19391 Tahlil ve Tarihce Kisrai,t10^-5. The 
Irade on Public Meetings is in Tanin and iktiham, ibid.; 
and enclosure in same to same, no.235» con,,Constantin­
ople, 20 March, 1912, F .0.371/1^93/12557.
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same time he proposed an alliance with England as the
best means of preventing further disaster,M This feeble
attack, dismissed by Huseyin Cahit as 'A Voice from the
Grave1 had no noticeable effect on the fortunes of the 
5kLiberals. In March Damad Ferid Pa^a resigned as
president of the Liberal Union, making way for Marshal
Fuad Pa^a, presumably with the idea of arousing more
55active support from the army. The result of the
election, however, was a landslide for the CUP. Out of
a total of 275 deputies only 6 belonged to the Liberal
Union. ¥riting about the election in the vilayet of
Manastir where 9 out of the 10 deputies elected were
Unionists, Acting Vice-Consul Morgan wrote: "I have
no need to say that all legal and illegal means were
56used to secure this result.” This verdict is just as
applicable to the elctions throughout the Empire.
5 ^ • B.Lewis, 217-8o The text of Kamilfs letter was pub­
lished in Tanin, l6 Feb.,1912 along with Huseyin Cahit1s 
counter-attack, and in Hilmi Kamil Bayur (Kamil's 
grandson), ....Kami1 Paga..., 308-12. A french trans­
lation was enclosed in Lowther to Grey, no.152, con., 
Pera, 19 Feb.,1912, F .0.371/1^86/8187.
55. Iktiham, 20 March, 1912.
56 . Morgan to Lowther, Monastir, 18 Kay,1912, enclosure in 
Lowther to Grey, no.^35, con., Constantinople, 2k May, 
1912, F.0.371/1^95/23^63; B.Lewis, 218.
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Parliament was opened officially on 18 April,
1912. But because there was no quorum the first meeting
could not be held until 15 May. Halil Bey, who had
recently been elected President of the Parliamentary
Party of the CUP, was elected President of the Chamber 
57of Deputies. Within a few days Nail Bey, finding 
that he was unable to cope with the financial situation 
during wartime, resigned. He was replaced by Cavit Bey, 
whose post at the Ministry of Public Works was filled 
by Hala^yan Efendi. The cabinet now took on a 
decidedly Unionist colouring. On 5 June Haci Adil, who 
had made an extensive tour of Macedonia and Albania 
before the elections, made an important statement in 
Parliament. He described the situation prevailing in 
the areas he had visited as explosive and proposed 
measures he intended to take to ameliorate the situation. 
The point of departure in his proposals was the abandon­
ment of coercion as a means of bringing about central­
isation for a policy of concessions and conciliation, 
carrying with it the implication of decentralisation.
This important change was welcomed by all and Huseyin Cahit
57. Tanin and Iktiham, 19 April,1912, and ibid. 15, 16 May, 
1912; also Bayur, ii/l, 244.
58. Tanin, iktiham, 23 May,1912.
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in particular, expressed his impatience to see reform
59introduced as soon as possible.
The amendment of Article 35 was still very much 
on the cards. This should have been easy to carry out 
with their huge majority in the Chamber. But in spite 
of this majority, Unionists were most uncertain about 
being able to carry this measure through, because of 
opposition from within the ranks of the party. This 
problem was discussed at Cavit Bey's house by Said Pa$a, 
Emrullah, Midhat, Nesimi, Ziya, Hayri and Dr. Nazim, 
and they all agreed that it would not be possible to 
have Article 35 amended at the moment. They thought
6othat if the cabinet insisted upon it, it would fall.
The Chamber was divided on this issue and to bring
about unity seemed an impossible task. "In the Chamber
even our best friends, Hala9yan for example, /were7
61canvassing against our proposal." The situation seemed
a repeat performance. As in 1908 the Chamber was packed
with deputies elected under the auspices of the CUP, but
who refused to subscribe to all its policies. It was to
59* Haci Adil's speech in the Chamber, and H.Cahit's editorial, 
'Haci Adil Eeyin Beyanatx', Tanin,6 June,1912; Bbyur, 
ii/l, 262-5 .
60. Cavit, Tanin, 2 Jan.,1944.
61. Ibid.
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remedy this state of affairs that the Committee was 
determined to revise the constitution and dispossess 
the Chamber of its power. The Committee of Union and 
Progress had come a full circle: in 1908 the Committee
had invested all the hopes of the revolution in the 
legislature; after four short years it was reverting
to the old situation by handing back the power to the
executive. It was on 11 June that the Committee's 
Parliamentary Party finally agreed to remodify some of 
those articles which had been amended in 1909, and 
taken away the Sultan's prerogatives.^ The Bill to 
remodify Articles 7 and 35 came before the Chamber on 
22 June and after some discussion it was voted by the
Chamber 210 votes to 1 3 * ^
The government's manipulation of the Chamber 
and its disregard for the opposition showed again the 
futility of trying to bring about change peacefully and 
according to the law. The measures which the government 
had taken - the dissolution of Parliament, the elections 
and the constitutional amendments, though absolutely 
legal - did much to discredit constitutionalism and its 
practitioners, the politicians and more particularly the
62. See above, 117-9< ft. 74,7,2; and Tanin, &2 June, 1912;
Tunaya, 323 ff.
63. Tanin, Iktiham, 23 June, 1912.
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Unionists. Their acts revealed a total lack of* 
direction and ideology and led to a mood of cynicism 
and disillusionment. In the circumstances there 
seemed no other way but for the junior officers, who 
had long been in the background, to step on to the 
stage of politics.
A group of officers had formed an association 
in Istanbul in May-June 1912 known as the 'Group of 
Saviour Officers' (Halaskar Zabitan Grubu). This group 
had connections with both the rebellious troops in
64Macedonia and the Liberal Union in the capital. Their 
objective was to destroy the power of the CUP and restore 
'legal government'. They also demanded the withdrawal 
of the armed forces from politics and wanted the govern­
ment to be left to politicians and officials. Having 
ousted the Committee from power in July, they remained
faithful to this principle and did not permit their
65members to accept governmental posts.
Faced with a revolution reminiscent of the move­
ment of 1908, the Porte's first reaction, like that of
64. Tunaya, 354 ff.; Major Tyrrell to Lowther, Constantinople, 
27 April,1912, enclosure in Lowther to Grey, no.371,con., 
Constantinople, 1 May,1912, F .C .371/1486/19065•
65. Bayur, ii/I, 253-8; Tunaya, 347; Lewis, 219.
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Abdulhamid, was to take repressive action. A Bill 
forbidding officers to take part in politics and laying 
down heavy penalties for those who disobeyed was 
drafted by Mahmud §evket Pa^a. While presenting his 
Bill in Parliament the War Minister declared that he 
had always regretted the interference of the military 
in politics. Even as vali of Uskub in 1908 and sub­
sequently, he said he had tried to check such activity. 
Events in Macedonia had finally forced him to take 
stern measures which he hoped the Chamber would p a s s . ^  
§evket Papa's legislation came too late in the 
day to save the situation, cruch less his own position.
The rebellion continued unabated and on 9 July the
6 7
Minister of War resigned as a concession to the rebels.
His resignation, rather than solving any problem, created
a new one; that of finding someone to fill the vacant
post. In the prevailing chaos no one responsible or
with any political acumen was willing to become War
Minister, and this only discredited the cabinet. To
appease the rebels the post was offered to Nazim Pa§a but
Tanj-n * 2 July, 1912; Cavit, Tanin, 14-20 Jan., 1944.
67 . Iktiham, Tanin, 10 July, 1912; Cavit, Tanin, 15 Jan., 
19^4; Inal, 1871-3; Bayur, ii/I, 258-9 °
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he would have none of it. Mahmud Muhtar Pa^a was
approached but he too declined as did other prospective 
68candidates. But in spite of the crisis and the 
cabinet's precarious position, Said Pa§a was given an 
almost unanimous vote of confidence (194 to 4) on 
15 July.69
The vote confirmed the opposition's charge that
the Chamber was not independent but merely echoed the
Committee's opinions. 'The Saviour Officers' now went
into action. "A manifesto in the press, a declaration
sent through the Army Council to the Sultan and, above
all, certain ominous military movements and preparations,
70brought swift result^'. The situation deteriorated
rapidly. Said Pa^a lost heart and resigned on 17 July.
When the Sultan asked "Why did you resign? They still
have confidence in you." Said Pa^a replied, "they have
71confidence in me, but I have no confidence in them".
68. M.Ragxp, Ittihad ve Terakki Tarihinde Esrar Perdesi, 
(1934), 96-100; Cavit, Tanin,"l^,13 Jan.,19^4;
Moukhtar, La Turquie, 159.
^9* Tanin, Iktiham, l6 July,1912; Inal, 1089; Ragip,ibid.102.
70. B.Lewis, 219; Tunaya, 349; Ragxp, ibid.,101
4ft A
71. Turkgeldi, 55 and Inal, IO89 give the same quotation,
Inal using slightly older language; 3 .Lewis, 219*
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The Committee had also lost the will to continue and
finally seemed resigned to its fall. Talat is reported
to have told Halil Bey:
"My dear friend we go through one crisis after 
another without ever overcoming it. I keep 
asking myself the question are we ruining the
country? Therefore let others come, they are
also sons of the country, are they not? Per­
haps they will do better than us. ¥e will 
help them. The purpose is service to the 
country, is it not?" 72
The Empire was without a government and it 
was left to the Sultan to take charge. One of his 
first acts was to issue a proclamation to the army.
In the proclamation he rebuked those soldiers who had 
sent the declaration to him a few days earlier, and 
asked the army to refrain from interfering in politics. 
He announced that he had consulted the Presidents of
both Chambers and decided that, at a time such as this,
it was desirable and necessary to have a new cabinet 
made up of personalities with great experience in the 
affairs of state, independent views, and free from 
external political influences. Therefore he had invited 
Tevfik Pa$a, his Ambassador in London, to come and lead 
the new government. Until the new government was formed
72. Mente^e, Cumhuriyet, 23 Oct.,1946; Ragip, ...Esrar
Perdesi, 103•
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he expected his troops to remain loyal to the con­
stitution and to the sacred rights of the Caliphate
73and the Sultanate.
Tevfik Pa^a, who had formed the caretqker
government on 13 April 1909*rejected the Sultan's
appeal by placing too many conditions, and the problem
of finding a suitable Grand Vezir remained. Kamil Pa^a,
Ferid Pa^a ahd Huseyin Hilmi Pa^a were considered
possible candidates but were dismissed as being too
controversial. In the case of Kamil Pa^a, Talat Bey
even asked Halid Ziya to use his influence with the
Sultan to prevent Kamilfs appointment since this would
7klead to civil war.
Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pa^a was the most suitable 
choice in the circumstances and he was appointed Grand 
Vezir on 21 July, 1912. He was known to stand above 
politics and also possessed a military reputation 
sufficient to win and command the respect of the re­
bellious army. His cabinet - known as the * Father and
73. Royal proclamation in Tanin, 20 July,1912, with French 
translation enclosed in Marling to Grey, no.622, con., 
Constantinople, 23 July,1912, F .0.37l/l496/31978» a ^so 
Inal, 1713-^.
7k, U^akligil,iii,47; Turkgeldi, A9; Bayur, ii/I, 279-80; 
Ragip, ,,.Esrar Perdesi. 10^-6.
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Son Cabinet1 (3aba-Cgul Kabinesi) because of the 
presence of his son Mahmud Muhtar, or as the * Great 
Cabinet* (Buyiik Kabine) because of the array of three 
ex-Grand Vezirs in its ranks - contained "Personalities 
with great experience in the affairs of state*. .* as 
the Sultan had desired. Only a few of its members were 
free of outside political influence; the majority was
determined to destroy the Committee as a political
75 /vforce. In the cabinet Kamil Pa^a was President of
the Council of State, Damad Ferid was Minister of the
Interior, Huseyin Hilmi Pa^a was Minister of Justice,
Nazim Pa^a was Minister of War, and Mahmud Muhtar was
I
Minister of Marine. The Iktiham which called this line­
up the *Muhtar Pa^a-K&mil Fa§a Cabinet* was proclaiming
an open secret; that once the political storm had blown,
76
Ahmed Muhtar would make way for Kamil P a p .
The Committee had been formally ousted from 
power and the new government immediately set about 
digging up its roots. At the first meeting of the 
cabinet the Grand Vezir told Nazim Pa^a that the
77Committee "had only three or four days more to live11.
75* Hatt appointing Ahmet Muhtar Pa$a in Tanin,22 July,1912; 
Inal, 1812-5; Turkgeldi,^9; Moukhtar,La Turquie, 159; 
U^akligil, iii,47-8.
76. List of cabinet in Iktiham.22 July,1912; Inal,l8l2-5;
and Tewfik Pasha to Grey,23 July,1912,F .0.371/1^96/31368.
77• U^akligil, iii, 52.
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On 23 July, fittingly, the fourth anniversary of the
revolution, the state of siege was lifted though only
78to be re-established on 6 August, 1912. Hereafter 
it was the government's policy to crush the Committee 
and replace officials associated with the CUP with 
ones who were hostile to it. Being opposed to this 
policy because it accentuated the differences rather
79than bring about harmony, Hilmi Pa9a resigned in August.
The 'Saviour Officers', who had only partially 
achieved their 'objective went into action again on 
24 July. They sent an ultimatum to the President of 
the Chamber demanding the dissolution of Parliament
80within 48 hours. The Committee, still a force to be
reckoned with in the Chamber, decided to meet the
challenge. Halil Bey had the ultimatum read and amid
an uproar the Unionists clamoured for an explanation
from the government for the overt role which the military
was being permitted to play in politics. Omer Naci,
78. Takvim-i Vekayi, 24 July,1912; Inal,l8l6 ; B.Lewis,220; 
Ragip, ...Esrar Perdesi, ll8 .
79- Inal, l6l7; Tiirkgeldi, 56; Ikdam, 15 Aug., 1912; Cavit, 
Tanin,23 Jan.1944; and Marling to Grey, no.647,con., 
Constantinople, 30 July,1912, F .0 ,371/1496/32942; also 
same to same, no.352, tel.pr.,l4 Aug.,1912, F.0.371/ 
1509/36732.
80. Mente^e, Cumhuriyet, 29 Oct.,1946; Cavit, Tanin,18,19 
Jan.,1944; Tunaya, 229.
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himself an ex-soldier, refused to believe that the
ultimatum had come from the military who, he said, were
not capable of such action. He implied that it was
purely a political act inspired by opponents of the 
8lCommittee. The War Minister was held responsible
and summoned to give an explanation. Nazim Pa^a,
however, dismissed the ultimatum as a bluff but. said
he would take action against papers which had published
82the ultimatum. It was Nazim Pa^a who was bluffing;
the ’Group of Saviour Officers1 was in fact the military
extension of the Liberal Union and both Nazim and Prince
8  *“5Sabaheddin were connected with it.
After this debate it became evident that so 
long as the Committee continued to dominate the Chamber 
the cabinet’s position would be insecure. The dissolution 
of the Chamber - constitutionally - became the aim of the 
government. On 30 July, following a sharp debate the
81. Debate in Tanin, 26 July,1912; see also Babanzade 
Ismail Hakkl, *Meclis-i Mebusanda Tarihi bir Gun*, ibid., 
Kuran, 565-7; Ragip, ..,Esrar Perdesi, 109*
82. Debate, ibid.
83. Mente^e, Cumhuriyet, 23 Oct.,1912, and Tyrrell to Marling, 
Constantinople, 29 July,1912, enclosure in Marling to 
Grey, no.637, con., 4 Aug.,1912, F .0.371/1495/33863; 
Tunaya, 346-7.
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cabinet received a vote of* confidence of 167 votes to
84
45 with 9 abstentions. The government, now more 
secure, submitted Article 35, which had already been 
passed by the Chamber, to the Senate. Ahmet Muhtar 
Pa^a, who had been President of the Senate and who had 
great influence with Senators, many of whom were ex­
officers, had no difficulty in persuading the Upper House. 
Article 35 was sanctioned on 4 August, and in the same 
session the Senate sanctioned the modified form of 
Article 43, which stipulated that in the event of dis­
solution, the session of the new Chamber would be an 
extra-ordinary session lasting two months, and which 
could be prolonged for another term. The Tanin des­
cribed this measure as the ’final blow1 against the
85Committee and the constitution. Knowing that the 
Chamber would be dissolved next day, the Unionist 
deputies met early in the morning, passed a motion of
86censure against the government and adjourned sine die. 
Immediately after, the Sultan issued an Irade declaring
84. iktiham, Tanin, 31 July,1912; Bayur, ii/I, 290-3;
Ragip, ...Ssrar Perdesi, 110-11.
85. Babanzade Ismail Hakki, ’Son Darbe', Tanin, 5 Aug.,1912; 
Ragip, ibid.,111-2.
86. Tanin, 6 Aug.,1912.
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the Chamber's action illegal and a Hatt-i Humayun
87dissolving the Chamber and ordering fresh elections.
The Unionists had felt their way carefully
after the formation of the 'Great Cabinet’. The
editorial in the Tanin of 23 July had been most
moderate and they were hoping to function as an active
88opposition in the Chamber. But the dissolution
dispelled these hopes, and fearing there were harder
times ahead the Unionists began to shift their activities
89from the capital to Salonika. But the government,
fearing a resurgence of Unionist power in Macedonia,
90proclaimed martial law on 8 August. The government’s 
measures against the Committee became more repressive, 
and the fortunes of the Tanin reflect their harshness 
and the Committee's decline. The Tanin suspended
87* Ibid.; Inal, 1817-8; translations of the irade and hatt
enclosed in Marling to Grey, no.663, c o n C o n s t a n t i n ­
ople, 6 Aug.,1912, F.0.371/1496/33869.
88. Ismail Hakki, '10 Temmuz ve Yeni Kabine'.
89. Cavit, Tanin, 22 Jan.,1944.
90. Iktiham, 9 Aug.,1912; 'X', ,..Courants Politiques...,
R .M.M.,xxi, 205; circular proclaiming martial law
enclosed in Marling to Grey, no.695, con.,Constantin­
ople, 10 Aug.,1912, F.0.371/1482/35852.
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publication 'voluntarily' on 11 August under govern­
ment pressure, reappearing on 21 August and continuing 
publication until it was suspended on 3 September.
Next day it appeared as Cenin and was immediately 
suspended. The following day it emerged as Senin and 
appeared until 12 September. It was then suspended 
and came out next day as Kak. This game of hide and
seek continued into November when Tanin suspended
91publication until more favourable times.
Yet the Committee did not lose heart; the 1912
Congress bears testimony to this. It was the first
Congress to be held outside Salonika, meeting in the
capital under police surveillance. It denounced the
government's action of dissolving Parliament, which had
92been sanctioned by the Sultan, as unconstitutional.
But having denounced the dissolution as illegal 
unanimously, the delegates disagreed over participation 
in the coming elections. Participation would be in­
consistent with the denunciation and when it was put to 
the vote it was defeated. But Talat, always the realist,
91. Cenin, 4 Sept.,1912; Senin, 5 Sept.,1912; Hak, 13 Sept., 
1912; Cavit, Tanin,24 Jan.,1944 and L.Bouvat, * La 
Guerre Balkanique dans la Presse Ottomane', R.M.M*, 
xxi, 234 and 226-7.
92. Resolutions of the 1912 Congress enclosed in Marling to 
Grey, no.788, con.,Constantinople, 16 Sept.,1912, P.O.
371/1486/39742; Tunaya, 192-3; Ragip, ...Esrar Perdesi, 
208 ff.
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argued that refusal to participate would bring the
Committee into open conflict with the government,
enabling it to crush the Committee, After much heated
discussion it was again put to the vote and those in
93favour of participation won by 85 votes.
The impending war with the Balkan states made 
all political debate academic. For the moment political 
activity went into the background, elections were post­
poned, and political factions concluded a spontaneous 
and informal truce to meet the challenge. Mobilisation 
in the Balkans on 30 September was followed next day by 
the Turkish mobilisation decree. On 2 October the allies 
presented their minimum demands. The Porte was asked 
to nominate with the consent of the Powers a Swiss or 
Belgian Governor-General for Macedonia; set up local 
legislative assemblies; create local gendarmeries; and 
lastly, carry out reform under the supervision of the 
Ambassadors of the Great Powers and the representatives 
of the four Balkan States. The French Minister of
Foreign Affairs commented that after ordering mobil-
9kisation these demands were virtually an ultimatum.
93* Resolution, ibid.; Ragip, ibid.,214-6.
94. Bertie to Grey, no.lA5, tel.con.,Paris, 2 Oct.,1912,
F .0.371/1^99/^1350; Ragip, ibid.,120.
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The Porte agreed to carry out the necessary
reform in accordance -with the proposals of the Eastern
Rumelian International Commission of l880. But it
refused to give any guarantees until Parliament met
95and gave its sanction. No cabinet could have leaned
back further to meet the demands of the allies. Public 
opinion as expressed in the press agreed that reform 
was necessary, but only to prevent European inter­
vention. Reform must not take the form of autonomy
96or decentralisation. The Committee warned that no 
cabinet should take upon itself a guarantee to carry 
out reform under the mandate of the Powers, or recognise
Europe's right to exercise direct or indirect control
97over Ottoman affairs. Once war was declared opinion
against concessions hardened and "all sections of the 
native press took up a hostile attitude towards the 
acceptance by the Porte of any intervention.... They
were unanimous in declaring that war would be preferable
98to such humiliation."
95- The Sublime Porte's official note to the Powers ic in 
F.0.371/1501/43^20.
96. Tanin, ikdam, 8 Oct.,1912; Bouvat, op.cit.,n.91> 225? 
Moukhtar,La Turquie, 170-1.
97. H.Cahit, 'Devletlerin Te^ebbusu', Tanin,10 Oct.,1912, 
ismail Hakkx, 'Karp ve Diplomas!, Tanin, 22 Oct.,1912.
98. Lowther to Grey, no.875» con.,Constantinople, 18 Oct., 
1912, F.0.571/1502/44676.
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The new situation called for certain changes.
The first need was to end the war with Italy, and peace
was signed at Lausanne on 17 October, the day before war
broke out in the Balkans. Italy retained Tripoli but
allowed the Porte to save face by permitting the Sultan-
Caliph to retain his right of appointing the Kadi of
Tripoli. His representative was also permitted to act
as the religious liason between the Caliph and his
99Libyan followers. In order to assume the offensive
on the diplomatic front the experienced, Anglophile
Grand Vezir, Kamil Pa^a was recalled on 29 October.
On 3 November the Foreign Minister "considered the moment
opportune for the intervention and mediation of the
Powers" . Four days later K&mil wrote a personal
letter to Sir Edward Grey appealing to Britain "to
induce Russia, her ally, to prevent this war, the sole
102object of which is to weaken Turkey."
99. Karl Strupp, Aktensttlcke zur Orientalischen Frage, 
(1916), 236-6171 Danismend, iv, 395-6.
100. Ikdam, 30 Oct.,1912; Inal, 1^10; Turkgeldi, 67-8 .
101. Lowther to Grey, no.576, tel.con.,Constantinople,
3 Nov.,1912, F.0.371/1513/4656A.
102. K&mil Pa^a to Grey, 7 Nov.,1912, F.0.800/79*
(Grey Papers).
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Externally K&mil's appointment did not have 
the desired effect of winning the sympathy of Britain 
or the Triple Entente. Internally, however, it had 
the unfortunate effect of ending the political truce 
brought about spontaneously by the threat of war.
The Committee's opponents welcomed Kamil's appoint­
ment; the Unionists denounced it as a direct threat
and challenge to the Committee of which Kamil was
103described as being the arch-enemy.
The outbreak of war proved disastrous for
Ottoman arms. The Turkish army which had been at war
with Italy took time to mobilise. War against new
adversaries in a new theatre of war caught the army
unprepared for fresh mobilisation and concentration.
Any preconceived plans which might have been used in
Macedonia were upset by political changes at the Ttfar
Ministry. Nazim Fa^a, when asked if war plans were
ready, replied: "There is a set of plans prepared
during the time of Mahmud Sevket Pasa, I am going to
10*fcobtain and examine them." But they were never used.
103. Tanin, ikdam, 30 Oct.,1912.
104. Tiirkgeldi, 60; Ragip, Esrar Perdesi, 118-20, and 
129 ff•; for accounts of the Balkan Wars see Kuran, 
573-85; R.Rankin, The Inner History of the Balkan 
War, (191^)» passim.
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Fighting with the minimum of organisation, Turkish
troops were routed everywhere. By early November
they had been driven back to the Catalca line of
defence, about kO miles from the capital. Total defeat
seemed imminent and the cabinet, having no stomach for
a fight, sought the best possible terms from the enemy.
On the evening of 6 November when the Ottoman
armies were in full retreat, Kamil summoned a Council
of Ministers. Such was their state of despair that they
agreed to allow the Powers to despatch one warship each
to the Bosphorus to safeguard their interests in
Istanbul. This was an open confession that the Porte
no longer considered itself capable of maintaining law
and order. This was severely criticised in the Renin
105the following day. Some days later Kamil saw Mr.
Fitzmaurice and confided that since the Powers had 
rejected his request for mediation he was now seeking 
to communicate directly with the King of Bulgaria.
He said that he had also given his War Minister dis­
cretionary powers to ask for an armistice if he found 
that the position at Catalca was u n t e n a b l e . ^  Talking
105- Renin (Tanin), 7 Nov.,1912.
106. Lowther to Grey, no.6ll, tel.con.,Constantinople, 
11 Nov.,1912, F .0.371/1513/^8125.
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to Kamil, Hr. Fitzmaurice could not fail to get the
impression "that the Turks have no real stomach for
107_________________ _ ___
further fighting with the Bulgars".
While Kamil was working for an early peace,
the Committee was advocating resistance. Turkey, wrote
Huseyin Cahit, had nothing to gain from a conference.
If the Porte could obtain the cessation of hostilities
either by the recognition of the status quo ante bellum
or by some small sacrifice, it should do so. But to
place Turkey unconditionally into the hands of Europe
108would be disastrous. Later in November, however,
the Bulgarian advance was halted at Catalca. Hereafter
Turkish arms regained their confidence and made a
recovery while the Bulgars with their extended lines
109of supply fought at a disadvantage. This placed
the Porte in a better position to negotiate an armistice 
though it raised a clamour amongst the Unionists. Kamil, 
who - thought that the CUP should go along with Salonika
107. Fitzmaurice to Tyrrell, pr .,Constantinople, 6 Jan., 
1913, F.0.800/79, (Grey Papers).
108. Tanin, 9 Nov.,1912.
109. George Pilcher, 1 In the Chatalja Lines During the 
November Battle', The 19th Century, 73, 1913, 624-43; 
Ragip, Esrar Perdesi, 130.
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which had fallen to the Greeks on 8 November - took 
strong measures against the Committee. Unionists 
were arrested in large numbers and either imprisoned 
or exiled to Anatolia, while others escaped to Europe.
With the vocal elements of the CUP out of the way, the 
Porte was able to sign an armistice on 3 December on 
condition that the belligerents open negotiations 
w i t h m  a week.
For the moment the initiative had passed from 
the battle field to the conference table and the 
issue of war and peace now hinged on the besieged 
town of Edirne. Both parties met in London in December- 
January to discuss the terms of peace. But the Turkish 
delegation had already stated in Paris that they could 
conclude peace only on honourable terms. Re^id Pa^a 
pointed out that Turkey’s military strength was increasing 
daily and that fighting would break out if one of the
two parties attempted to impose onerous terms on the 
112other. On 1 January, 1913» the Turkish peace proposals
113were stated at the conference. _____________________
110. 'Tevkifata Dair - Idarei Urfiye Beyannamesi1, Tfcdam,
26 Nov.,1912; Cavit, Tanin, 12,14,18 Feb.,1944. After 
the fall of Salonika K&mil is reported to have said: 
"Now they have no future; they were a revolutionary 
party and their centre was Salonika, Salonika has gone; 
they should clear out too." See Tiirkgeldi, 78.
111. Ikdam, 4 Dec.,1912.
112. Reported in The Times, l4 Dec.,1912.
113. Ikdam and The Times, 2 Jan.,1913*
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i) All occupied territories to the west of 
the vilayet of Edirne would be ceded, but the deter­
mination of the boundaries and status of autonomous 
Albania must be submitted to the decision of the Great 
Powers•
ii) The vilayet of Edirne would remain in direct 
possession of the Ottoman Empire, and Turkey and 
Bulgaria would negotiate any rectification of the 
frontier recognised by them as necessary,
iii) Turkey would not cede any of the Aegean 
islands, but would discuss with the Great Powers questions 
relating to them.
iv) Turkey would consent to any resolution 
that the protecting powers may come to regarding Crete.
v) The four points above form an indivisible
whole.
The Turkish proposals were not accepted by the 
allies,, and though the Porte made other minor con­
cessions a deadlock was soon reached. But for Greyfs 
patience and perseverance the conference would have 
broken up. He intervened personally and decided to 
settle the dispute by imposing the will of the Powers on 
both parties. On Monday, 13 January he summoned a meeting 
of Ambassadors of the Powers. The meeting drafted a
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collective note asking the Porte to cede Edirne to
Bulgaria and to leave the question of the islands to
the Powers. If the Porte failed to accept their
'advice1, the note warned that there would be a renewal
of war which would expose Turkey to grave perils. In
the final conclusion of peace the Porte would require
the moral and material support of the Powers, but this
would depend upon how she took their advice. This
Ilknote was communicated to the Porte on 17 January.
Faced with what was virtually an order from the Powers, 
the Forte found itself in a difficult situation. There 
seemed no way out but to give in. On 23 January the
4kUnionists, assuming that Kamil was about to surrender 
Edirne, carried out a coup d'etat, forced Kamil to 
resign and formed a government of their own.
The coup, known as 'the Attack on the Sublime 
Porte* (Babiltli Baskim), was not an act of desperation 
made in the simple belief that Edirne was about to be 
surrendered. Much thought and organisation went into 
the coup and its seed is to be found in KStmil's appoint­
ment as Grand Vezir.
Ilk, Grey to Lowther, London, 17 Jan.,1913, B. D. ix/lXi **17; 
Bompard to Poincare, Pera, 17 Jan.,1913? D .D .F .,
3 e Serie, v, no.230, 290-1; The Times, ik and 17*Jan., 
1913; and G.F.Abbott, 'Peace?', The 19th Century,
73, 1913, ^1-52 .
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We may recall how, at the outbreak of the
war with Italy, the Committee attempted and failed to
reach an understanding with the opposition by proposing
a coalition. With the threat of war in the Balkans the
Committee, now in opposition, again endeavoured to have
a non-partisan government in power. When the allies
put forward their demands, the Committee responded
at once with a proclamation declaring their solidarity
with the government, offering their co-operation and
showing a willingness to let bygones be bygones. But
Kamil's appointment ended the good-will and reintroduced
115animosity and suspicion on the political scene.
But in spite of this change - adverse from 
the Committee's point of view - the Committee tried to 
come to an understanding with Kamil though with no 
success. They wanted a more representative cabinet with 
l^evket Paj^a as War Minister. He had held that office for 
two and a half years and had prepared the war plans, and 
was therefore better equipped to deal with the situation. 
Nazim Papa's name was linked with the Liberals and he 
was known to be an opponent of the CUP. Furthermore, he 
had been vali of Baghdad and had been out of touch 
with the military situation.
115. See above J.90-1, n. 29 ; and Ragip, Esrar Perdesi t 96-/00  .
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Talat and Said Halim Pa§a saw Kamil on
6 November in order to discuss the situation, but Kamil
refused to co-operate. He dismissed them with f,a
short dry statement" that reports from the front
revealed extremely low morale among the troops. Since
fighting was out of the question he was seeking
ll6mediation and carrying out negotiations. Tal&t also
saw Jevket Pa^a and the latter complained of ill-health
117declaring that he was unable to accept any position.
On 8 November the Tanin published the news that Sevket 
Pa^a was to be appointed Inspector-General. This news 
caused confusion in government circles and "Damads, 
K&mil Pa^a and the i^eyhulislSm went to the SuAtan to
11 ^
prevent this appointment", and the Tanin was
119immediately suppressed. What appears to have been
the last meeting between the Committee and Kamil took 
place on 9 November. This encounter did not prove to 
be fruitful either. In Kamil's words, "since their
116. H.K.Bayur, ...Kamil Paga..., 390; Cavit, Tanin,
7 and 9 Feb ♦ , 19kk\
117. Cavit, ibid. ,7 Feb., 1 9^.
118. Ibid., 8 Feb., 19^.
119. Ibid., 10 Feb.,19^^; also see above,216-7 .
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situation and opinions did not reveal any good in­
dentions the matter was dropped after suitable advice
120(on both sides) Kamil's policy became more re­
pressive and the Committee also turned from words to 
121conspiracy.
Having failed to move Kamil the Committee turned
to Nazim Pa^a. In a letter to Unionist exiles in
Brussels Tal&t wrote of how they finally decided to
122stage a coup. He described how they approached
Nazim Pasa first and encouraged him to continue fighting,
I
and to use experienced men like Izzet Pa^a, the Chief 
of General Staff, as well as Unionist officers like 
Enver, Fethi and Cenal« But Nizam did not respond 
to their overtures either, and after some time, having 
done all they could, they gave up having hope in Nazim,
120. H.K.Bayur, ...Kamil Pasa..., 390.
121. See above, 2l6ff. £avit, Tanin, 12,14 and 18 Feb.,1944, 
and The Times, 11, 18 and 20 Nov.,1912.
122. Taint's letter was reproduced by H.C.Yalcm in Tanin,
24 Feb.,1944 as an annex to Cavit's memoirs. This 
letter of 444 words and dated 14 Jan.,1913 (I Kanunisani, 
1328 o.s.) described Unionist activity over a period
of about two months, from mid-November to mid-January. 
Throughout Talat gives no dates and it is therefore 
never clear when the meetings he mentions took place, 
or, more important, when the Committee changed its 
plan of action. Nevertheless it is a most valuable 
document.
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They then turned to Mahmud $evket Fa^a, Izzet Faja
and their own officers and discussed the possibility
123of overthrowing the government and taking over.
At a special meeting (no date) all eventualities were
discussed and plans made, all top secret. But it
was decided that since they (the Turks) did not possess
the means to wage war, - especially to take the offensive
and to break out of the (Jatalca lines - a coup would
only demoralise the people (efrad) further. Therefore
for the time being, all plans for the coup were shelved.
A little later (it is difficult to say when), they found
that some members of the cabinet were arguing that since
the existing cabinet was committed to retaining Edirne -
though it lacked the means to do so - it ought to resign
and the ministry that followed would be able to cede the
124town and save the country from a difficult situation.
K&mil Fa^a was raeBttwhile proposing to convene a 
consultative council (meclisi negveret), though some
123. Ibid.; on 12 January, two days before the date of
Talat's letter, a "Lieutenant Zeki Bey...the most in­
fluential leader after Enver Bey, of the Unionist 
Officers" visited the German Ambassador and told him 
that "his comrades condemned Kiarail Pacha's vacillating 
attitude in the peace question and wished to overthrow 
the Cabinet in order to go on with the war." See 
Baron von Wangenheim to the German Foreign Office,
12 Jan.,1913, G.D.D.,iv, 156
124. Talat, ibid.
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ministers thought that this would lower the cabinet's
prestige further and bring the country nearer to
_ . , 125 The Unionists decided not to interferecalanity.
while the cabinet was negotiating. But if the cabinet
resigned they resolved that they would:
"...prevent harmful characters like Albanian 
Ferid (Pa^a) or Re^id from coming to power.
If Nazxm were asked to form a ministry they 
would /remain neutral7 neither commit themselves 
nor enter his cabinet... In any peace which 
resulted the army would certainly wish to 
pnnish those responsible for this situation, 
namely the cabinet; and this too had been 
prepared. After that our plan would be brought 
into operation. The cabinet would be over­
thrown and as Cavit and Cahit had proposed,
we would come to power and try to bring the
country back to life, if this were destined. ^  
For this eventuality we must prepare from now."
Talat's letter suggests that the Committee
wanted to assume power and responsibility only after
someone else had made peace and borne the odium for
doing so. Their only condition was that peace must not
be made at the cost of Edirne. But after the Collective
Note of 17 January this condition was impossible. Kamil,
who had been pessimistic even earlier, was aware of this.
But he was too shrewd and experienced a politician to
accept the reprobation for surrendering Edirne. Kis way
125. Ibid.
126. Ibid.
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out of this impasse was to summon a Grand Council,
composed of important and responsible people in the
Empire, which would shoulder the responsibility for
ceding the town to the Bulgars collectively.
The Grand Council was summoned and met at
Dolmabahce on 22 January and almost unanimously
127supported the cabinet's policy of peace. Next day
the cabinet met at the Sublime Porte in order to draft
the reply to the Collective Note. But before the
cabinet had drafted the reply the Unionists launched
their attack. Enver and a small group burst into the
cabinet chamber and at gun-point forced Kamil to write
128out his resignation. Nazxm Pasa who confronted them
at the door of the chamber was shot. His remark, "You
have deceived me: is this what you promised?" suggests
129complicity between him and the Committee. His
assassination, on the other hand, seems to have been the
punishment which the army would want to inflict on "those
130responsible for the situation".
127. Xkdam, 22 and 23 Jan.,1913; H.K.Bayur, ...K&rail Paga..., 
38^-6; Bonpard to Jonnart, Constantinople, 23 Jan.,19131 
D. D.F. . 3e S&rie, v, no.2*fc2, 300.
128. On the coup d'etat see Ragip, Esrar Perdesi, passim; 
Kuran, 586 ff.; Dani^mend, iv, 397-^01; y . H .Bayur, 
ii/1,25^ ff.; H.K.Bayur, ibid.^ 386 f f ,; Inal,l*Hl ff.; 
and 187^,ff.; Turkgeldi, 78-9 ; Halide Edip, Memoirs, 3^2.
129- Nazim Papa's remark quoted in Turkgeldi, 79-80 and Kuran 
388; on the complicity between N4zam and the Unionists 
see H .K .Bayur, ibid. ✓
130. Talatfs letter, op.cit. , n.122.
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One can only speculate on whether Kamil would
have surrendered Edirnej though there is sone evidence
which suggests that he would have ceded the town. The
very summoning of the Grand Council was for the purpose
of having a consensus on war and peace. Twelve days
after his fall Kamil expressed to Mr.Fitzmaurice, who
was escorting him to the Khedival liner departing for
Egypt, fthis fears that the refusal of his successors to
accept the friendly counsels of Europe would eventually
entail greater territorial and financial losses on
Turkey. He said he had hoped to save the guns and
military equipment •.• which would cost about
£T. 2,000,000 and which would have been required for
131the fortification of Chatalja..." The implication
is clear: Kamil was prepared to give up Edirne.
Whether the Committee made a mistake in thinking 
that Kamil had already ceded Edirne is of no importance. 
They had decided on overthrowing the government long 
before. The question of Edirne, which had become an 
emotional factor in current politics, provided them with 
a good opportunity and justification for staging their 
coup. The Unionists were also aware of the difficulties 
of holding the town. But once in power they themselves
131. M r .Fitzmaurice1s Report, 5 Feb.,1913, F .0.195/2^51/3^0•
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could not surrender the town without loss of face or 
indeed their very position. Edirne fell to a joint 
Serbo-Bulgar assault after a long and brave resistance 
on 26 March, 1913- But when the allies began bickering 
among themselves over the spoils of war, the Committee 
took advantage, recaptured Edirne in July, and vindicated 
their claim as saviours of Edirne.
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CONCLUSION
The Committee of Union and Progress passed 
into history along with the Ottoman Empire in the wake 
of defeat in World War I. The society disbanded and 
some of its leaders fled the country. Because of the 
disastrous end the judgement of history on the Committee 
has been unduly harsh and biased, especially when we 
consider the legacy they left for the Republican era.
The achievements of the Young Turks have been noted in 
greater detail by more competent authorities;^" my t
purpose here is to consider their work in the political 
field.
The CUP emerged in July 1908, not as a political 
party representing limited political and socio-economic 
interests, but as a society which considered itself the 
agent of the general will. This was a legacy from the 
days of the struggle against the Palace and it remained 
a part of the Committeefs psychological personality.
Under pressure from other political forces which came to 
the surface after the constitution was restored, the
1. See B.Lewis, 1 Emergence...., 222-33; K.Karpat, Turkey 1s 
Politics, 29-31; Hikmet Bayur, 'Ikinci
Mesrutiyet Devri Uzerinde bazi Du^unceler’, Bell., 
xxiii, (1959), 267-85.
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Committee declared itself a parliamentary party. It 
continued to retain, however, all the embracing structure 
and identity of a society.
Though the Committee adhered to the principle 
of constitutionalism, in practice its aims were always 
in contradiction to this principle. The Unionists 
wanted to unite all the politically articulate elements 
and concentrate their efforts on the single task of 
saving the Empire. While the Committee acquiesced to 
a multi-party system, it tried to avoid political 
strife by reaching understandings with factions behind 
the scene rather than in parliament. Parliament was 
intended to serve as a platform for expressing decisions 
already agreed upon. But opposition groups did not 
fall in with this plan, so that when parliament convened 
it was full of factions struggling for conflicting ends.
One of the main charges against the Committee 
has been its role in destroying the multi-party system 
and setting up a dictatorship. This is sometimes 
attributed to the failure of the Young Turks to under­
stand the parliamentary system of government and the 
functions of a loyal opposition within it. There is 
some truth in this, for the Young Turks were indeed 
trying to set up a western institution in an alien
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environment. But unfavourable circumstances played 
their part, possibly a dominant one. The entire decade 
was crisis-ridden, opening with Bulgaria’s declaration 
of independence and closing with the signing of the 
Mudros Armistice. It was precisely under such un­
suitable conditions that the Turks began their ex­
periment in constitutional government, and the ex­
periment was bound to fail.
This failure had grave consequences: it led
to the intrusion of the military in polities. The 
army which had played an important role in having the 
constitution restored was a potential political factor 
at all times. Civilians in the CUP seemed aware of 
this danger and took certain precautions. It is no 
coincidence that the more prominent junior officers - 
such as Enver, Fethi, Hakki, and later Mustafa Kemal - 
were kept out of active politics by being posted to 
Ottoman Embassies as Military Attaches. But the con­
stant bickering among the civilians and their inability 
to maintain law and order always provided the occasion, 
indeed the need, for military intervention. It was 
not only the Committee which made use of the army when 
in difficulties. The opposition too, finding that 
they could not make headway alone, called in the soldier
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The senior officers, who were more reluctant to interfere 
in politics, might have saved the situation. But they 
went down with the traditional bureaucratic elite 
during the Balkan War, the climax being the assassination 
of Nazim Pa^a - and JJevket Pa^a six months later - and
the resignation of Kamil. Thereafter the military j
I
t
within the CUP eclipsed the civilian element,: all the 
more as the scene was set for the 191^ war.
If on the Committeefs debit side we put the 
failure to establish parliamentary government, and the 
intrusion . of the army into politics, on its credit 
side we ought certainly to place the impetus it gave 
to modernisation and secularism. Many of the obstacles 
which had stood in the way of reform for generations 
were cleared away. Traditional institutions like the 
Palace and the Porte were totally discredited and lost 
their positions as leaders of the Turkish community.
All these changes facilitated the setting up of the 
Republic, while some Unionist policies became a model for 
their successors. Even in the field of parliamentary 
government and the multi-party system, the seed did 
not fall on barren soil. The plant that emerged, though 
not always strong, survived.
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